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For millennia, humankind has struggled 
to develop water resources for domestic 
water supplies, to provide irrigation, and to 
limit flood losses. This struggle to leverage 
water-related opportunities and manage 
water-related risks, while addressing social 
and environmental demands, is at the heart 
of water security.
Most of the world’s developing countries remain 
relatively water insecure. Most developed 
countries invested heavily in water security, 
often starting early on their path to growth. 
These developed nations are now relatively 
water secure, but must continuously adapt and 
invest to maintain water security in the face of 
climate change, deteriorating infrastructure, 
economic development, demographic change, 
and rising environmental quality expectations.
Today, the challenge of water security is global, 
and growing. Achieving and sustaining water 
security, in both developed and developing 
countries, is likely to increase in complexity 
and priority - not only as climate change 
intensifies, but also as the demands of economic 
growth increase. The criticality of this 
challenge is reflected in the World Economic 
Forum’s 2015 Global Risks Report, in which water 
is ranked as the global risk with the single 
greatest potential impact on economies over the 
next ten years. Its importance is also signalled 
by the proposed development of a dedicated 
Sustainable Development Goal for water.
The objective of this Report is to promote 
sustainable growth and well-being, by 
providing empirical evidence to guide 
investment in water security. It seeks to: 
analyze the dynamics of water security and 
growth; quantify water-related risks and 
opportunities and their trajectories; and assess 
the experience of past pathways of investment 
toward water security. The Report focuses on 
growth: where, how, and how much, water 
security affects growth. The Report adopts a 
risk-based approach to identify the hazards  
and vulnerabilities of a lack of water security.
Water security, 
sustainable 
growth, and 
well-being
Water-related risks (such as scarcity,  
floods, access, and resource degradation)  
are growing, as population growth and 
economic growth put greater pressure on  
water resources - pushing more people and 
more assets ‘into harm’s way’. Water-related 
risks are also growing due to climate change, 
as water availability becomes less predictable, 
and as extreme weather events become more 
common. Where multiple water risks are 
present, the challenge of achieving water 
security will be compounded.
Although we focus on risks in this analysis, 
it must be emphasized that water is not only 
destructive - it is also profoundly productive. 
Water is essential to all life - and to households, 
agriculture, industry, energy, and transport. 
Thus, investment in water security is not only a 
matter of protecting society from specific water-
related risks; it is an investment that supports 
economic growth and social well-being. While 
economic growth can enhance risks by increasing 
the value of exposed assets, growth also provides 
the resources needed to manage water and water-
related risks. Growth enables investment in 
institutions (defined broadly to include agencies, 
rules, and incentives), information systems 
(hydro-meteorological, economic, and social), 
and infrastructure (natural and constructed), 
as well as investment into vital research and 
development of innovative technologies,  
and financial risk management tools.
Policies and infrastructure investments are 
needed to enhance water security; to allocate 
water between alternative uses; to deliver  
water at specific times, places, and prices;  
to ensure water quality; and to protect people 
and assets from water-related hazards. All of 
these can create opportunities and reduce risks 
for different regions, sectors, and communities. 
This, in turn, can have a profound impact 
on economic growth, inclusiveness, and the 
structure of economies.
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Moreover, as the world globalizes, water- 
related risks that were once considered local 
supply limitations or weather hazards are 
increasingly seen as regional and global 
challenges. Globalization can help mitigate  
local water-related challenges through food 
trade, financial risk management tools,  
foreign direct investment, and cooperative 
disaster warning and response mechanisms. 
Yet, the negative impacts of these risks can 
also be propagated through the global economy, 
and through social disruptions, population 
displacement, disease, and species and  
habitat losses.
Conceptual framework of the dynamic of water security  
and sustainable growth
Executive Summary
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Framing the 
water security 
challenge
Sustainable economic growth, wealth,  
and human well-being are at the heart of 
the Report’s framing of the water security 
challenge. Recognizing the environmental, 
social, and inter-generational significance of 
water management, we have framed the water 
security challenge in terms of sustainable 
growth. Well-being is also a key element of 
this conceptual framing, as many of the values 
associated with water security are non-financial 
in nature, i.e., physical security, dignity,  
equity, ecosystem integrity, and recreation.
As illustrated in the conceptual framework 
diagram, a country’s water endowment (i.e., 
water availability, quality, and variability) 
influences the level of investment needed 
to achieve a chosen level of water security. 
Investments to manage water resource 
endowments can modify this dynamic: 
moderating the effects of hydrological 
variability by providing reliable water  
delivery at acceptable prices, quantities,  
and quality; and by protecting lives and 
livelihoods against water-related disasters. 
There is growing evidence that the endowment 
of ‘hydrological complexity’ is very different 
between most rich and poor countries. Most 
rich countries enjoy relatively manageable water 
endowments (i.e., ‘simple hydrologies’ providing 
relatively reliable, plentiful water resources), 
and have made the investments needed to 
manage these hydrologies. Many poor countries 
face ‘difficult hydrologies’, and hence require 
greater investment to achieve water security. 
These countries are often the least able to afford 
such investments, as the box shows. 
Water security is not a static goal: it is a 
dynamic continuum that will alter with 
changing climates, growing economies  
and asset stocks, and resource degradation.  
As social, cultural, and aesthetic priorities  
and values evolve, water security will evolve 
with them.
Investing in 
water security
Not all water-related investments will be 
beneficial. Investments may be excessively costly, 
may not lead to the intended benefits, may result 
in harmful and perhaps unintended impacts upon 
people and the environment, or may close off 
more beneficial future investment opportunities.
Identifying the range of effects water security 
may have on economic growth - in a rigorous 
manner - is a challenge for several reasons.  
First, because water is such a pervasive input  
into so many economic activities, it is difficult 
to sort out statistically how water-related 
investments may affect any one of the many 
pathways leading to economic growth. There 
is no small irony here: because water is so 
important for so many reasons, it is difficult 
to actually show, statistically, the importance 
of water-related investments to economic 
growth. Second, the causal links between 
water-related investments on the one hand, 
and economic growth on the other, clearly run 
in both directions. Water-related investments 
can increase economic productivity and growth, 
while economic growth provides the resources 
to invest in institutions and capital-intensive 
water infrastructure. Finally, water-related 
investments can increase human well-being 
without also increasing national income  
or economic growth as they are  
conventionally measured.
At the project level, cost-benefit analysis is 
still arguably the best tool available to assess 
specific water-related investments. A good deal 
of work is being done to refine cost-benefit 
methodologies, in particular to take better 
account of environment and social costs; but 
the question of what constitutes ‘good practice’ 
remains a topic of debate. There is a clear 
need to identify and avoid poor investments in 
water security, and, even with its well-known 
limitations, cost-benefit analysis remains a 
necessary and useful tool to appraise specific 
water-related investments.
At the basin or state level, it is important to look 
beyond individual projects to dynamic, adaptive 
pathways and their impacts on economic growth, 
equity, and the structure of economies.  
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Economic growth, hydrological variability, and investment  
in water security 
This graphic illustrates the relationship between economic growth, hydrological variability,  
and investment in risk mitigation. 
It shows that wealthy river basins (green dots, clustered in the upper left-hand quadrant) 
generally feature simpler hydrologies and larger investments in water security.
Poorer basins (red dots, clustered in the lower half of the chart) have invested less  
in water security, and many face complex hydrologies.
The investment required to transition from water insecurity to water security  
is greatest in those basins with highly variable hydrology (see coloured contour lines).
Note: The horizontal axis summarizes hydrologic variability. The vertical axis is a composite indicator of 
investment in infrastructure and institutional capacity. The dots represent all river basins with populations 
greater than 2 million, coloured to indicate high (green), middle (yellow), and low (red) levels of GDP per 
capita (using World Bank definitions). The coloured contours are a linearly interpolated surface reflecting  
the association between variability, water security investments, and GDP.
From: Hall et al. (2014).
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This requires performing cost-benefit analysis 
on sequences (or portfolios) of projects and 
carefully considering how pursuing a specific 
project may foreclose future options. It raises 
challenging problems of quantifying the wider 
benefits of water investments on the economy. 
Water policies and infrastructure investment 
decisions will have long-lasting impacts on 
development options across economies.
Finally, in finding the ‘right’ investments, 
it is essential to take special account of 
social, cultural, and environmental values; 
and to recognize that the impacts of water 
management decisions tend to greatly affect 
the poor, women, and the environment. Given 
this, multi-criteria evaluation techniques may 
be needed to supplement cost-benefit analysis. 
Regulations may be needed to ensure fulfilment 
of social imperatives.
A theoretical 
model of the 
dynamics 
of water-
related risk, 
investment,  
and growth
To understand better the dynamics of investment 
in water security, we developed a growth  
model relating country wealth to investment  
in protective and productive water-related assets. 
Our theoretical analysis showed that when an 
economy is exposed to water-related risks there 
is a benefit attached to early investment in assets 
that mitigate those risks and protect productive 
assets. Countries that can make such investments 
protect their growth prospects from water-related 
threats and can therefore better harness the 
productive benefits of water-related investments. 
By contrast, in situations where hydrological 
hazards cause losses that affect other sectors  
of the economy, the economy can experience  
a significant water-related drag that limits the 
ability to harness water-related opportunities.
Nonetheless, we find that the trajectories 
of changing national wealth over time are 
strongly context-dependent. They rely on 
specific suites of policy choices and investment 
decisions. Where a country is heavily exposed 
to climate-driven losses (in particular, for 
example, where agriculture dominates), the 
likelihood of substantial feedbacks between 
water-related losses and national wealth is 
strong and we see situations in which a poverty 
trap is possible. In contrasting situations where 
the economy is more effectively disconnected 
from water-related losses - either through 
economic diversification or water-related 
policies, practices, and infrastructure that limit 
vulnerabilities - there is a much lower chance 
of experiencing water-related limits to growth.
Poor countries that are particularly vulnerable, 
because of difficult water endowments and 
agriculture-dependent economies, can become 
trapped in a cycle of economic losses and 
under-investment that inhibits growth. In order 
to overcome the water-related drag on growth, 
these countries will need targeted and sustained 
investment to protect their most important 
assets, seize their greatest water-related 
opportunities, and build resilience to  
water-related shocks.
In particular, the model reveals that even in an 
interacting hydro-economic system, the route 
from poverty to wealth is not best found through 
water-related investments alone. The fastest 
improvements in economic growth arise through 
investments in water-related assets that are 
combined with measures to create broad-based 
growth across multiple sectors of the economy.
An empirical 
analysis of the 
dynamics of 
water security 
and growth at 
the global scale
An econometric analysis (a fixed-effects  
panel regression) was performed across 113 
countries, to determine whether there is 
Executive Summary
19
empirical evidence of a statistically significant 
impact of hydro-climatic variables, including 
hazards, on countries’ per capita GDP growth. 
This econometric analysis focused upon the 
effects of hydrological variability on growth  
in GDP. From this perspective on water security, 
countries whose economic performance is 
resilient to water security-related variables - 
such as runoff, floods, and droughts -  
are relatively water secure. Countries where 
growth is strongly correlated with these  
factors are relatively water insecure.
The findings confirm that water insecurity acts 
as a drag on global economic growth. Both our 
empirical and theoretical analyses demonstrates 
the importance of investment in water security 
for development - and the importance of 
development for investment in water security.
Water and water-related hazards have a 
statistically significant effect on economic 
growth that historically has been at least 
as important, and likely more important, 
than temperature effects. Runoff, which can 
be thought of as ‘fluctuating annual water 
availability’, was shown to have a statistically 
significant effect on annual economic growth. 
Drought and flood were also shown to have 
statistically significant negative impacts on 
growth. Together, they reflect the multiple 
ways in which water and water hazards affect 
economic growth. These results have important 
implications for economists assessing the 
potential economic costs of climate change.  
The results underscore that studies neglecting 
water may underestimate the economic 
consequences of climate change, especially  
in the most sensitive countries.
On drought specifically, an analysis was 
undertaken to calculate the cumulative effect 
of drought over time (1980-2012). The results 
showed the clear benefits of reduced drought 
impacts, and demonstrated how the effect of 
droughts can compound over a long period.  
In Malawi, for example, a 50 percent reduction 
in the drought effect led to a 20 percent higher 
per capita GDP at the end of the simulation.  
In the case of Brazil, the reduced drought effect 
(by 50 percent) led to GDP per capita that was 7 
percent higher. The countries that stand to reap 
the greatest benefits from drought reduction 
were concentrated in the Middle East, Africa, 
South America, and Southeast Asia.
The effects of hydro-climatic variables on 
growth are strongest in countries that are poor 
(low income), and those that have high water 
stress (a measure based on per capita water 
resources), high dependence on agriculture  
(>20 percent of GDP from agriculture), or both. 
These countries tend to be concentrated in  
Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, along with 
a few countries in South America and Europe. 
The particular vulnerability of countries under 
water stress suggests that as water stress 
increases worldwide, managing water effectively 
will become significantly more important for 
sustaining global economic growth. And the 
OECD’s baseline projections indicate that by 
2050, 3.9 billion people will be subject to  
severe water stress.
The global 
status of water 
security
The impacts of water insecurity materialize 
through a wide range of different mechanisms 
for people, households, businesses, and 
communities. Water scarcity results in reduced 
crop yields, hydropower plant output, and 
thermal power plant cooling, which can 
subsequently push up food and energy prices. 
Floods damage homes and other floodplain 
assets, harm people, and disrupt businesses  
and supply chains. Inadequate water supply  
and sanitation increases mortality and 
morbidity, reduces labour productivity,  
and increases healthcare costs. Pollution  
and degradation inhibit ecosystems’ capacity  
to deliver ecosystem services.
The analysis of risk involves quantification  
of hazards, exposure, and vulnerability. Records 
of the impacts of risks provide further (though 
often incomplete) evidence about the scale of 
risk. The language of risk provides a general 
framework within which the many facets of 
water insecurity can be incorporated. Analysis 
of risk provides evidence that feeds directly into 
cost-benefit analysis. However, quantification 
of risks is challenging, especially at a broad 
scale, so our risk estimates are uncertain and 
inevitably contain significant gaps, in particular 
in relation to impacts upon people and the 
environment, which are not readily monetized.
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To assess the status of water security, we have 
analyzed water-related risks on a global scale, 
focusing upon four headline risks: (1) droughts 
and water scarcity; (2) floods; (3) inadequate 
water supply and sanitation; and (4) ecosystem 
degradation and pollution.
Water scarcity materializes through the  
interplay between hydrological variability, 
human demands for water (for agricultural, 
industrial, energy, and municipal purposes), 
and water infrastructure systems. Commonly 
adopted metrics of water scarcity quantify the 
balance between water availability and demand 
on average - overlooking seasonal variation in 
supply and demand, and the buffering effect 
that storage provides. We have developed a new 
aggregate model of water scarcity that operates 
on a monthly basis for every large river basin 
globally (see facing page).
Even taking into account the effects of 
investment in water infrastructure, the risks 
of scarcity are most severe in South Asia and 
northern China; and signicant risks of water 
shortage exist in all continents. The risks are 
increasing in all locations - and most notably 
in India and Pakistan, where demand for 
irrigation water in particular is projected to 
increase. Scarcity and hydro-climatic variability 
contribute to volatility in food crop production. 
This is particularly pronounced in Africa, but 
also notable in South America, Central Asia,  
and parts of Europe. 
Our findings show that enhanced water 
security can help stabilize food crop production 
and prices. The probability of global wheat 
production falling below 650 million tons per 
year is reduced from 83 percent to 38 percent. 
And the probability that the price of rice could 
exceed US$400 per ton is reduced from 21 
percent to 0.7 percent. The potential global 
welfare gain, from securing water to existing 
irrigators, was estimated at US$94 billion 
for 2010. This analysis does not capture the 
potentially significant benefits of additional 
investments in agricultural efficiency,  
or expansion in irrigated areas, that might  
be fostered by greater water security.
Floods are an extremely (and increasingly) 
damaging form of water-related hazard.  
Floods in Thailand during 2011 resulted 
in US$46 billion in economic losses, and 
US$16 billion in insured losses. Our global 
risk analysis estimates an expected annual 
flood damage of US$120 billion per year from 
property damage alone; with almost half of that 
economic risk in North America. By the 2030s, 
in the absence of adaptation, coastal flood  
risk is projected to increase by a factor of four;  
while fluvial flood risk could more than double.  
The risk estimates are sensitive to assumed 
flood protection levels - thereby demonstrating  
how important flood protection measures  
are in reducing vulnerability to flood risk.  
Sea level rise, subsidence, population growth,  
and economic growth mean that flood risk  
in coastal cities and estuaries will, in future, 
Overview of risk-based indicator framework
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Index of frequency of shortages of water available for use
Expected annual damage due to fluvial and coastal flooding
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become particularly concentrated in coastal 
Asia. The greatest flood risks to people (in 
terms of the numbers exposed to flood risk)  
are now, and will remain, overwhelmingly 
located in Asia.
Inadequate water supply and sanitation 
continues to have the greatest economic 
consequence of all water-related risks.  
It also continues to be the most harmful risk  
to people, with diarrhoeal diseases resulting  
in 1.4 million premature deaths in 2010.  
The total global economic losses associated 
with inadequate water supply and sanitation, 
have been estimated by WHO at US$260 billion 
annually. Much of this loss reflects per capita 
estimates of the value of time spent fetching 
water, or walking to open defecation sites.  
The human impacts of inadequate water supply 
and sanitation are concentrated in South Asia 
and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Water-related risks to the natural environment 
arise from human interference in the aquatic 
environment: pollution, over-abstraction, and 
interruption of the natural variability of flow 
regimes; and interference in river, wetland,  
and coastal morphology. The threats are 
multiple, and they interact - undermining 
catchment and coastal systems’ capacities  
to deliver ecosystem services. Taking a water 
security perspective, estimates were made to 
determine the frequency of failing to meet 
benchmark estimates of environmental flow 
requirements. In every continent, there are 
rivers whose water use patterns put aquatic 
ecosystems at risk - indicating that water 
insecurity is a global threat to environment.  
We have not sought to monetize these risks,  
as it is extremely complex and beyond the scope 
of this Report. The issue of environmental risk 
remains an important area for further study.
Our global analysis highlights hotspots of 
vulnerability, both in terms of anticipated 
economic impacts, and in terms of populations 
at risk:
• South Asia has the largest global 
concentration of water-related risks, 
including severe impacts across the full 
range of hydrological variability (droughts  
to floods), the largest global concentration  
of people without adequate sanitation,  
Economic losses from inadequate water supply and sanitation
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and growing environmental threats.  
India, with its very large population,  
is the top ranked country globally for the 
number of people exposed to water shortage, 
people at risk of flooding, people without 
adequate water supply and sanitation,  
and number of undernourished children.
• The exposure to flood risk in East and 
Southeast Asia is increasing rapidly.  
China and Vietnam respectively have the 
second- and third-highest economic risks 
of flooding, globally, led only by India. 
Vulnerability to water scarcity varies 
markedly across the region, with northern 
China being particularly challenged.
• As a proportion of GDP, the impacts of 
inadequate water supply and sanitation 
are greatest in Sub-Saharan Africa - 
the one region in which these risks are 
increasing. Africa also exhibits the greatest 
variability in crop production, highlighting 
African economies’ sensitivity to hydro-
climatic variability. This variability in food 
production, in turn, is reflected in high levels 
of child malnutrition. North Africa stands 
out in terms of the number of people,  
and percentage of the population, at risk  
of scarcity.
• The United States is estimated to have the 
greatest economic exposure to flood risk in 
the world, with expected annual property 
damage from fluvial and coastal flooding 
estimated at US$54 billion (0.3 percent of 
GDP). Europe and North America generally 
experience water security, with risks reduced 
to tolerable levels. Yet, flood risks are 
anticipated to rise in both Europe and  
North America, and various environmental 
risks are seen. Significant investments to 
maintain, upgrade and/or expand water 
supply and sanitation services, wastewater 
treatment systems, agricultural water 
management, and water management 
institutions, will be needed to sustain 
current levels of water security.
Relative economic impacts of water insecurity
Three economic risks have been standardized to the same total economic impact globally:  
(1) Water scarcity to agriculture; (2) Flood damage to property; and (3) Inadequate water supply 
and sanitation.
Executive Summary
24
• South America experiences significant 
variability in agricultural yields. However, 
thanks to its relatively high potential for 
productivity-enhancing water-related 
investments, the region is expected to see the 
greatest global increase in food production 
(in percentage terms). In our econometric 
analysis, South America is also shown to 
be a region that stands to reap some of the 
greatest benefits from drought reduction.
This Report does not provide a fully monetized 
value for global water security. The range 
and nature of water-related risks do not lend 
themselves to consistent valuation, and some 
cannot be monetized with available data and 
methods. Thus, an aggregate value would not be 
defensible. However, taking the economic risks 
of water security that can be monetized as a 
lower bound, the scale of the challenge exceeds 
hundreds of billions of dollars annually.
The extent of ‘upside’ economic opportunities 
associated with water security are not always 
presented in this Report, because a risk-based 
approach does not capture these potential 
returns in full. Risk calculations focus on 
estimated losses of existing assets or expected 
losses of current production. Yet, investments 
in water security can create opportunities and 
incentives for precisely the kind of productivity 
enhancements, and additional investments,  
that generate growth.
Finally, the Report cannot provide advice on 
specific investments. No matter how large 
the global economic risks associated with 
water security might be, not all investments 
in water security will be beneficial. Moreover, 
investment in water security cannot eliminate 
water-related risks, but it can help to manage 
them to a tolerable level. As the Report shows, 
achieving water security requires a continuous 
process of sound decision-making founded on 
a basis of careful analysis at the local scale. 
There is no substitute for thorough appraisal of 
specific investments and investment pathways.
Relative economic impact of water insecurity per capita
Three economic risks have been standardized to the same total economic impact globally, and 
then divided by the national population: (1) Water scarcity to agriculture; (2) Flood damage to 
property; and (3) Inadequate water supply and sanitation.
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Top ten countries for people at risk of water insecurity
Top ten countries (with population greater than 1 million)  
for proportion of population at risk of water insecurity
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Pathways to 
water security
How have policymakers responded to water-
related risks and opportunities? We examine 
historical pathways to water security, where 
pathways are defined as sequenced portfolios of 
investments in institutions and infrastructure 
underpinned by investments in information.
Pathways are dynamic: actions are taken 
in response to a changing context of risks, 
opportunities, and expectations; and in 
response to recurring patterns of challenges 
and responses. The triggers for action can come 
in different forms: gradual or chronic stress, 
variability, shocks, or combinations of major 
changes to multiple dimensions simultaneously. 
Thirty-two cases were examined in order  
to reconstruct, analyze, and compare pathways 
to water security within different contexts. 
Eight illustrative cases are presented in 
this Report. The cases capture different 
configurations of water-related risks and 
patterns of investment in water security.  
In each case, specific risks, opportunities, 
and prior investments influence the priorities 
for action and the range of possibilities for 
achieving and sustaining water security. 
Timelines were created for these eight case 
studies in order to illustrate specific pathways. 
The timelines present political and economic 
events; water-related hazards and opportunities 
that may have acted as investment triggers; 
and discrete investments in information, 
institutions, and infrastructure. 
The importance of context makes it difficult  
to generalize from specific experiences; 
however, we can identify some general  
lessons and insights for city, river basin,  
and aquifer contexts.
Pathways to 
water security: 
general lessons
The case studies show that institutions, 
information, and infrastructure can be 
interdependent and mutually reinforcing. 
Typically, they are complementary, yet 
sometimes they substitute for one another - 
depending on progress through a pathway, 
and local conditions. Generally, significant 
investment is needed in all three, as the  
full benefits of investment depend on  
their interaction.
Sequencing is strongly influenced by socio-
economic and political context; and by the 
type and scale of risks faced and opportunities 
created. Ideally, investments in water security 
are based on robust information that provides a 
shared understanding of the system’s dynamics 
and its dominant risks and opportunities.  
For example, in the Rhine River of northern 
Europe, agricultural and industrial development 
enabled economic growth, thereby placing 
increasing assets at risk from floods and water 
pollution. Systemic risks in the Rhine have 
spurred international cooperation coupled  
with efforts to define adaptation tipping  
points, coordinate national and international 
policies, adopt innovative approaches to  
flood management, and integrate risks  
and uncertainty into strategic planning, 
forecasting, and communication.
The cases also demonstrate the different factors 
motivating investment. Crises present both 
the need - and opportunity - for investment; 
but it is important not to wait for a crisis to 
plan and act. The triggers for investments in 
water security include: economic opportunities, 
chronic impacts and acute shocks, and both 
water-related and external factors, such 
as political changes, natural hazards, and 
international trends. In any given situation, 
multiple factors combine to trigger investment, 
producing a pattern of challenge and response. 
For example, a rapidly growing population in 
the Mexico Valley, combined with a sequence 
of natural hazards, land subsidence, political 
leadership changes, and financial crises have 
spurred both investment and institutional 
reforms in the urban pathway to water  
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security in Mexico City. The late 1980s and 
early 1990s presented an ‘avalanche’ of triggers 
that provided a window for investment and 
reform: a major earthquake as well as protests 
about unreliable water supply and sanitation 
services prompted studies, construction of 
inter-basin transfers, and consolidation of 
water management responsibilities in the 
national water agency in 1989. The coincidence 
of financial crisis and political change led to 
efforts to decentralize water management, 
including incentives for private participation  
in water services, which have met with  
mixed success.
Finally, many historical investments have 
underestimated costs, overestimated benefits, 
and foreclosed alternatives. Water resources 
development can bring growth, but can also 
have negative consequences. What emerges 
clearly is that yesterday’s innovation can 
become today’s constraint, if there is not 
enough flexibility embedded in the system. 
This is illustrated by the experiences in semi-
arid rivers like the Colorado, Murray-Darling, 
and Yellow, where historic development has 
led to river basin closure - meaning that 
downstream needs, water quality standards, 
and additional water demands cannot be 
met during all, or part, of a year. However, 
in some cases institutional innovations have 
been quite successful in re-aligning historic 
allocations with changing values and increasing 
demands, and embedding flexibility into water 
management systems. In the Murray-Darling, 
for example, despite a 70 percent decrease in  
the water available for irrigation during the  
12-year Millennium Drought (in 2008-2009,  
as compared with the baseline 2000-2001 water 
year), the gross value of irrigated agriculture 
declined by less than 20 percent due to the 
existence of effective water markets that 
reallocated water among competing uses.
Case studies of cities, river basins, and aquifers
Eight case studies are presented in the Report, selected from an analysis of 32 cases. They include: Mexico 
City, Gauteng Province, and Singapore (Cities); Colorado, São Francisco, and Rhine (Rivers); and the Guarani 
and Nubian Sandstone (Aquifers).
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Pathways to 
water security: 
cities, rivers, 
and aquifers
The case studies reveal different patterns  
of triggers, water security investments, and 
economic activity across multiple contexts.  
Case studies and historic pathways are 
descriptive rather than prescriptive, as they 
reflect actual pathways not optimal pathways. 
Looking forward, decision makers will need to 
innovate and adapt, without being limited to the 
solutions adopted in the past. The case studies 
illustrate several challenges and opportunities 
for tailoring pathways in cities, rivers, 
and aquifers.
Cities
We examine pathways to urban water security 
in three contexts: mature cities in advanced 
economies; rapidly developing cities in emerging 
economies; and predominantly poor cities with 
rapidly expanding informal settlements.
Mature cities in advanced economies generally 
face the primary challenge of deteriorating 
urban water networks; and many face increasing 
vulnerability to floods, with high-value assets 
at risk. Innovation in water use efficiency and 
re-use, balanced with infrastructure investments 
to replace essential underground assets, may 
sustain water service levels. Innovation in  
these cities may influence - by example -  
the pathways undertaken by less advanced cities. 
For instance, the urban pathway to water 
security in Singapore has attracted significant 
international interest. Singapore’s strong 
public utility enabled the implementation of 
strategic approaches to research, development, 
and long-term planning; with a wide range 
of infrastructure that includes reservoirs, 
desalination plants, wastewater collectors, 
and treatment and reuse technologies. There 
has been a strong commitment to demand 
management and full economic pricing of water 
for consumers. Singapore’s water and wastewater 
services have become increasingly advanced  
in order to support its growing economy,  
which has enabled continued investment  
in these systems.
Rapidly developing cities in emerging 
economies often face inequitable access to 
water services, costly water technologies and 
delivery models, and rapidly rising numbers 
of people and assets at risk. Innovative 
institutional and infrastructure approaches will 
be needed to accelerate pathways to urban water 
security, ensuring universal water supply and 
sanitation access and integrated management 
of pollution and flood risks. For example, in 
the Gauteng Province of South Africa (which 
includes the cities of Johannesburg and 
Pretoria), rapidly growing human settlement in 
the headwaters of the relatively dry and variable 
Limpopo system has made investment in water 
security essential. The end of Apartheid in 1994 
brought the political imperative to expand water 
services to peri-urban settlements. Extensive 
storage and transmission infrastructure has 
been developed in order to cope with climatic 
variability - designed and operated to achieve 
reliability levels of 99.5 percent for power,  
and 98 percent for urban supplies. Ninety-five 
percent of the Province’s population  
has access to a safe water supply, although 
human settlement and industry impact on  
water quality.
Predominantly poor cities with rapidly 
expanding informal settlements face the 
greatest challenges. In these cities, generally-
weak utilities deliver conventional water 
supply and sanitation services to only a 
small proportion of the population; and there 
is rapidly-expanding settlement, often in 
vulnerable watersheds and floodplains.  
In such cities, significant investment is needed 
in institutions, information, and infrastructure,  
to meet the challenge of designing and 
delivering universal, reliable coverage;  
as well as coverage that is cost-effective  
and context appropriate.
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Rivers
We examine pathways to river basin water 
security in three hydro-climatic contexts: 
highly variable/monsoonal, semi-arid or arid, 
and temperate river basins and lake systems.
Highly variable/monsoonal basins typically 
experience extreme intra-annual variability, 
hydrological uncertainty, and often severe 
floods and droughts. In highly variable rivers, 
planning efforts and investment in water 
security have attempted to decouple economic 
growth from the impacts of climate variability 
and extremes. Basin-wide institutions, shared 
knowledge, and coordinated infrastructure have 
proven important for managing freshwater 
variability (e.g., through allocation rules, 
floodplain zoning, reservoir and aquifer storage 
and operations). In the Mekong River, for 
example, a major challenge now is to harmonize 
national development with transboundary 
interests. The Mekong River Commission has 
made a significant investment in the data and 
knowledge needed to strengthen basin-wide 
water security, and is exploring joint water 
resources management and development 
opportunities on the basis of this  
shared knowledge.
Arid and semi-arid basins face challenges of 
absolute scarcity and freshwater variability 
that can lead to heavy reliance on supply-side 
infrastructure and to ecosystem degradation. 
Robust and balanced pathways in these 
circumstances are likely to include innovative 
storage alternatives (e.g., aquifer storage), 
conjunctive use of multiple sources (e.g., reuse, 
rainwater harvesting), water use efficiency, and 
economic instruments to allocate scarce water.
Temperate basins tend to be more water secure, 
often with complacent dependence on existing 
infrastructure to manage risks. Innovative 
institutions and infrastructure can safeguard 
sustainable growth by mitigating water security 
risk and flood risk in particular, and enhancing 
environmental quality.
Aquifers 
We examine groundwater contributions to water 
security pathways in two contexts: aquifers 
where significant surface water is available, 
and aquifers where society is dependent on 
groundwater for urban development and 
irrigated agriculture. 
Aquifers where significant surface water 
is available often face challenges associated 
with localized overdraft and water quality 
deterioration, mainly due to urban use.  
This can result in future aquifer restoration 
costs as well as water logging and soil 
salinization, due to rising water levels caused 
by unplanned recharge (e.g., leaking water  
and wastewater networks). The Guaraní Aquifer 
System, for instance, is exploited mainly to 
meet urban water needs. In some cities that 
draw on this aquifer, groundwater levels have 
fallen by an estimated 30-40 meters since 1970, 
with a consequent increase in water supply 
costs and degradation of local rivers.
Aquifers where society is dependent on 
groundwater for urban development and 
irrigated agriculture generally face challenges 
of unregulated and intensive groundwater 
abstraction - resulting in declining water 
levels, deteriorating water quality, and 
land subsidence. The consequences of 
aquifer mismanagement are increased 
exploitation costs for major cities and 
irrigation developments, and deterioration 
of groundwater-dependent ecosystems. 
Investment in institutions and knowledge 
systems may facilitate sustainable groundwater 
development - with appropriate measurement 
technologies and regulatory tools including 
monitoring networks and models; quantity 
and quality regulations enabling reallocation 
and aquifer recovery; user involvement in 
groundwater management; and innovative 
infrastructure investments, including  
aquifer storage.
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Toward 
strategic 
and adaptive 
pathways
Our analysis of case studies reveals cycles  
of adaptation in the quest for water security.  
At each stage, decision makers have had options 
at their disposal, and have made choices 
with a view to reaching goals. The evidence 
available to inform decision-making is always 
uncertain. While there is growing evidence 
of the relationship between water security 
and economic development, our analysis 
demonstrates that it remains scarce.  
The methodologies of systems analysis,  
decision analysis, and benefit-cost assessment 
- which are central to making strategic choices 
about investment in water security - have 
matured in recent decades. They provide the 
opportunity to shift from reactive management 
of the impacts of water security, to the pro-
active management of risks.
Looking forward
The profile of water security risks will change 
in the future, as countries invest and adapt.  
The headline risks examined in this Report 
all show increasing trends globally - with 
the important exception of water supply and 
sanitation. In addition, we found that the 
hydro-climatic effects on growth are stronger 
in countries with high water stress, and water 
stress will grow with population. By 2050,  
the OECD’s baseline projections indicate that  
3.9 billion people will be subject to severe  
water stress.
The impact of hydro-climatic variability on 
economic growth, however, does not need to 
increase. Policies and investments in water 
security can dampen the impacts of water risks. 
Our analysis has shown that economic impacts 
are particularly pronounced in countries with 
agriculture-dependent economies, low levels of 
mean water availability, low levels of access to 
safe water supply and sanitation, and rapidly 
increasing vulnerability to flooding.  
Making better use of available water, ensuring 
reliable water quality and services, developing 
financial risk management products for periods 
of shortage or natural disasters, and promoting 
a transition to less agriculturally dependent 
economies, all emerge from the empirical 
analysis as potential mechanisms for de-
linking economic growth from hydro-climatic 
variability, and providing greater water security.
Investment in water security can, therefore, 
help to safeguard growth against growing 
water-related risks. There will be many 
investment pathways to water security, but it 
is likely that successful pathways will share 
certain characteristics. They should be devised 
and assessed in terms of outcomes and tradeoffs 
among economic, environmental, and social 
criteria. Investments in physical infrastructure 
will need to be accompanied by sound water 
institutions, integrated into wider governance 
frameworks and improved information systems. 
As economies mature, emphasis will shift to 
making the most of existing resources and 
assets, and deploying innovative institutions 
and policy instruments. Investments should be 
developed in order to be robust to uncertainties; 
and to support adaptive management as risks, 
opportunities, and social preferences change.  
In addition, investments should be tailored to 
their context. All of this will require refined 
analytic tools, more holistic perspectives, 
innovation, and continuous monitoring, 
assessment, and adaptation.
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 Chapter 1: 
Introduction
‘Water … is the cause of life or death, or increase  
or privation, nourishes at times and at others  
does the contrary …’
Leonardo da Vinci, circa 1500
‘When the well is dry, we know the worth of water.’
Benjamin Franklin, 1746
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1. Introduction
Societies have always grappled with  
the elusive value of water. We see  
this in myths, literature, and art  
across the world. It is mobile, variable,  
and unpredictable. When you have enough 
water, it has little value. When you have  
too much, it can destroy. When you have  
too little, it can be priceless.
Human society has instinctively sought to limit 
the many risks that water brings. And, at the 
same time, to seize water’s many opportunities 
for enhancing lives and livelihoods. This is 
evidenced by substantial investments over 
millennia in canals, reservoirs, aqueducts,  
and wells, and also in early water-related 
institutions and information systems. Each 
generation has faced this challenge of water 
security; future generations will confront added 
complications from climate change.  
This effort to reduce water risk and seize  
water opportunities, to improve societal wealth 
and well-being, is the goal of water security.
Most developed countries have invested  
heavily in water information, institutions,  
and infrastructure systems. Today, they are 
relatively water secure, facing largely tolerable 
water-related risks. Most of the world’s 
developing nations, however, are relatively  
water insecure. 
In a future of rapid economic growth, escalating 
water stress, and climate change, the challenge 
of achieving and sustaining water security will 
be a priority in both developed and developing 
countries. This will likely entail large-scale  
and long-term investments that will require 
careful design, appraisal, and sequencing. 
Societies will need to make difficult choices 
regarding the allocation of resources among 
different growth-enhancing investments,  
and between the complex economic, 
environmental, and social trade-offs  
inherent in water resource management. 
Concern over the growing global impact of 
water risks is reflected in the World Economic 
Forum’s Global Risks 2015 Report, where water 
is ranked as the global risk with the greatest 
potential impact on economies and societies 
over the next ten years. 
Its importance is also signalled by the  
proposed development of a dedicated 
Sustainable Development Goal for water.
The Global Dialogue  
on Water Security and  
Sustainable Growth  
2013-2015
While intuition firmly points to the need for 
investment in water security, this intuition 
alone cannot tell policymakers which 
investments should be made, and how much 
investment is justified. Evidence is needed  
to guide the design, and scale, of water  
security investments.
The need for evidence - this need to provide  
an empirical basis for investing in water 
security - inspired the Global Dialogue on  
Water Security and Sustainable Growth.  
The Dialogue was launched by the Global  
Water Partnership (GWP) and the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) in 2013, with twin objectives:  
to provide an evidence base for investment  
in water security and sustainable growth;  
and to undertake associated international  
and country-level consultations on water 
security and sustainable growth.
The Dialogue comprises:
A High-Level Panel
co-chaired by Mr Angel Gurría, Secretary 
General of the OECD, and Her Excellency  
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, President of Liberia.  
The High-Level Panel leads the Dialogue. 
A country consultation 
process identifying the priorities and  
concerns of countries pursuing water security, 
with consultations held in some 40 countries.
A Task Force 
comprising an international team of 
economists, scientists, engineers, and policy 
experts. This team leads the Dialogue’s 
substantive analysis: developing empirical 
evidence to support the dynamics of water 
security and growth.
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1. Introduction
This Report
This Report presents the findings of the 
Task Force. The Report draws upon original 
research commissioned by the Task Force 
from the universities of Oxford, McMaster, 
University of Massachusetts, Manchester 
(UK), Southampton, Madrid and VU University 
Amsterdam as well as from the International 
Food Policy Research Institute, the Global 
Climate Forum, and Deltares. In addition, the 
Report has drawn upon expert advisers in the 
analysis of pathways case studies; and data and 
information provided by the City University 
New York, the International Hydropower 
Association, the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis, the International 
Water Management Institute, the World Health 
Organization, and the World Bank. A listing of 
the many individuals contributing to this effort 
is provided in the Acknowledgements. 
The Report provides evidence that promotes  
and guides investment in water security by:
• analysing the economics of 
 water security and growth
• quantifying water-related risks,  
 opportunities and trajectories
• illustrating and assessing  
 pathways of investment  
 in water security.
This work draws upon, and adds to,  
a growing body of literature on water  
security. However, it differs from most  
current work in several ways, by:
focusing on economic growth
asking where, how, and by how much  
water insecurity may limit growth
adopting a risk-based approach
assessing the hazards and vulnerabilities  
of water insecurity, and the growth 
opportunities that follow risk reduction
seeking empirical evidence
going beyond intuitive, qualitative,  
or subjective metrics 
Although the best-available datasets have  
been used, hydro-meteorological monitoring 
systems will vary in network density across  
the world, data management and reporting 
systems will vary in quality, and consistency 
and comparability will always be a challenge  
in compiling global data. 
The Report is structured as follows:  
Chapter 2 explores the relationship  
between water security and sustainable  
growth. It provides a simplified conceptual 
framework, a theoretical model, and new 
empirical evidence of this relationship.  
Chapter 3 examines the global status of water 
security, locating and analysing four ‘headline’  
risks - both individually and collectively -  
to identify global risk and opportunity 
alignments, and ‘hotspots’. Chapter 4  
identifies and assesses pathways to water 
security followed in representative cities, 
aquifers, and river basins across the world,  
and draws lessons for policymakers.  
Lastly, Chapter 5 provides the  
Report’s conclusions.

Chapter 2: 
Water security, 
sustainable 
growth, & 
well-being
2.1 The water security challenge 
2.2 The complex economics of water
2.3 A theoretical model of the dynamics  
 of water-related risk, investment,  
 and growth
2.4 An empirical analysis of the impact  
 of hydrological variability on growth
2.5 Summary
2. Water Security, Sustainable Growth, and Well-Being
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2.1 The water  
security challenge
Water-related risks exacerbate  
global economic, social, political,  
and financial challenges.
In 2010 and 2011, Russia, China, and Argentina 
experienced droughts, while Canada, Brazil, 
Pakistan, and Australia experienced floods, 
resulting in falling global grain and sugar 
stocks, and a doubling of prices for these 
commodities. Rapidly rising food prices caused 
riots in food-importing North African countries, 
aggravating existing social tensions as the 
‘Arab Spring’ took hold. In Syria, by 2011 - 
following several years of drought, extensive 
crop failure, and massive losses of livestock 
- 2 to 3 million people had been driven into 
poverty. This poverty contributed to a mass 
rural exodus into economically depressed cities, 
deepening existing instability as the country 
descended toward civil war.1 Thailand’s 2011 
floods killed 884 people, damaged 1.5 million 
homes, destroyed 25 percent of the rice crop  
and 7,500 industrial enterprises, and caused  
an estimated US$46 billion in financial losses.2 
The closure of industrial plants had impacts  
on global supply chains, triggering shortages  
of goods, such as computer hard drives and 
motor vehicles, that were felt across the world.
Water risks (such as scarcity, floods, water 
borne disease, and environmental degradation) 
are growing as population and economic  
growth put greater pressure on water resources, 
and push more people and assets ‘into harm’s 
way’. Water risks are also growing due to 
climate change, as water availability becomes 
less predictable, and extreme weather events 
become more common. Where multiple water 
risks are present (or ‘co-located’), the challenge  
of achieving water security is compounded.
1 Werrell and Femia (2013).
2	 Aon	Benfield	(2012);	Nabangchang	et	al.	(2015);	 
 World Bank (2012).
Moreover, as the world’s economies globalize, 
water-related risks that were once considered 
local supply limitations, or weather hazards, 
are increasingly seen as regional and global 
economic challenges. Globalization can help 
mitigate local challenges in various ways. 
For example, utilizing regional and global 
food trade and aid networks during times of 
deficit may help ease food price fluctuations, 
and secure adequate food supplies. Economic 
impacts of hydrological uncertainties can also 
be countered through the increasingly global 
availability of weather-related financial risk 
management products and services -  
such as commodities futures and options,  
and crop- and weather-based insurance.  
Access to sophisticated regional and global 
severe weather forecasts, warnings, and 
response systems, can also help mitigate  
losses associated with hydrological 
uncertainties and extremes. 
The negative impacts of water risks can 
propagate through the global economy as well, 
via severe water-related price shocks in food, 
energy, transport, and insurance; as well  
as from the unanticipated supply chain  
disruptions that may result from large-scale 
natural disasters, or from a lack of water 
availability as an input to production.
Environmental and social impacts of  
water-related risks can be widely felt  
in the form of species and habitat loss,  
social disruption, population displacement,  
and disease. Hydro-climatic extremes and  
water resource availability are increasingly  
seen as stressors or threat multipliers that 
aggravate existing challenges; challenges  
that relate not only to economic performance, 
but also to environmental management,  
social tensions, and political stability.3
3	 Scheffran	et	al.	(2012).
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Yet, water is not only destructive: it is also 
profoundly productive. Water sustains human 
life, and the ecosystems upon which all 
living things depend. Water is essential for 
households, agriculture, industry, energy,  
and transport. Similarly, while economic 
growth can enhance risks (by increasing  
the economic value of assets at stake),  
it also provides the critical resources needed  
to manage water-related risks. Not only 
through investments in the institutions 
(defined broadly to include agencies, rules, 
and incentives), information systems (hydro-
meteorological, economic, and social), and 
infrastructure (natural and constructed) needed 
to manage water resources and water-related 
risks, but also via investments in research and 
development of innovative technologies  
and financial risk management tools.
The goal of water security is to leverage 
the opportunities, and manage the risks 
associated with water and, in so doing, 
facilitate sustainable growth and enhanced 
well-being. The policies and infrastructure 
investments implemented to enhance water 
security will allocate water between alternative 
uses; deliver water at specific times, places, 
and prices; ensure water quality; and protect 
people and assets from water-related hazards. 
These actions will create opportunities, and 
reduce risks, for different regions, sectors, 
and communities, which, in turn, can have 
a profound impact on economic growth, 
inclusiveness, and the structure of economies.
Framing the 
water security 
challenge
Our objective in this chapter is to examine  
the effects of water security on wealth and 
well-being, and in so doing, to show how  
water influences - both positively and 
negatively - the things that people and  
societies value.
While the mandated focus of this report is  
the relationship between the management 
of water resources and changes in economic 
wealth (i.e., growth), we recognize that sound 
management of water and other natural 
resources is essential for environmental 
sustainability, social equity, and the quality  
of life of future generations. Thus, we frame  
the water security challenge in terms of 
sustainable growth. This concept of sustainable 
growth brings two important considerations  
to our analysis.
First, we explicitly recognize that 
considerations of well-being extend to future 
generations. Steps taken today to improve well-
being, should not unduly compromise the well-
being of future generations. Such considerations 
are germane to our study of water because, 
while water is a renewable resource, some  
of the interventions we make now in the  
aquatic environment may be difficult,  
perhaps impossible, to reverse in the future. 
Second, our framing in terms of sustainability 
explicitly recognizes that there are multiple 
dimensions of well-being and prosperity, 
beyond material wealth alone. These dimensions 
include social, cultural, and environmental 
values, many of which are directly associated 
with the state of the aquatic environment. 
Therefore, the goal of improving the material 
wealth of societies must be negotiated within 
the boundaries imposed by the availability  
and sustainability of the water resource,  
and balanced with the cultural and spiritual 
values of water. 
A schematic of this report’s framing of 
the dynamic between water security and 
sustainable growth, is presented in Figure 1.
Sustainable economic growth, wealth, and 
human well-being are at the heart of this 
framing. Here, ‘wealth’ is considered to include 
both natural and human-made capital assets: 
recognizing that water security inherently 
speaks not only to the provision of water as an 
input to production, but also to sustaining water 
resources and freshwater ecosystems (including 
rivers, lakes, and aquifers) as assets of great 
economic, social, and environmental value. 
Well-being is a key element of this conceptual 
framing not least because many of the values 
associated with water security are non-financial 
in nature (i.e., physical security, dignity, equity, 
and leisure).
The flow of this dynamic starts with water 
endowments. A country’s water endowment 
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comprises the absolute level of its freshwater 
availability; the fragility or strength of its 
freshwater ecosystems; and, importantly,  
the variability of its hydrology. This is a  
natural endowment that will influence how 
much a country needs to invest to achieve  
a given level of water security. Countries  
with temperate climates and regular rainfall,  
large freshwater lakes, and reliably safe, 
accessible, and replenished groundwater 
aquifers (common characteristics,  
for example, of most of North America and 
Europe) will be able to achieve water security 
with comparatively less effort and capital 
investment. In contrast, greater effort and 
capital is needed in countries that are arid  
(such as many countries in the Middle East, 
northern Africa and western Asia; as well  
as most of Australia), or prone to significant 
hydrological variability and extremes (such as 
many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, and in 
monsoonal southern and south-eastern Asia).
Conceptual framework of the dynamic of water security  
and sustainable growth (Fig	1)
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Thus, water endowments create both 
opportunities for, and risks to, growth and 
well-being. Where water is reliably available, 
economic opportunities are enhanced.  
Where water is unreliable or of inadequate 
quality, or where water-related hazards  
(i.e., floods, droughts, or contamination)  
are present, there will be drags on growth.
Investments made in order to manage a national 
or regional water endowment can modify this 
dynamic, moderating the effects of hydrological 
variability by providing reliable water delivery 
at acceptable prices, quantities, and quality; 
protecting lives and livelihoods against water-
related disasters; and protecting ecosystems 
from degradation. These investments might 
include the development of institutions  
(e.g., water rights, markets, pricing policies,  
and quality regulations), the sharing of 
information (e.g., extreme weather forecasts 
and warnings, and agricultural advisories),  
and the building of infrastructure (e.g., natural 
or human-made water storage, water supply 
and sanitation systems, and irrigation) designed 
both to leverage opportunities and to mitigate 
risks - often simultaneously.
Humans have strived to manage their water 
resources for over 10,000 years,4 but the 
Industrial Revolution marked a dramatic 
shift in this effort. Across the industrializing 
world, portfolios of investments were built 
for water resource management, water supply 
and sanitation, and irrigation services. These 
investments systematically reduced water-
related risks - leading to widespread water 
4	 Mithen	(2012).
security in many parts of the world by the latter 
part of the twentieth century. Water risk  
is now largely tolerable for most people  
in developed nations, except when catastrophes 
strike, or where over-exploitation of the 
aquatic environment leads to unacceptable 
environmental impacts. Developing countries 
are now taking determined steps toward greater 
water security, too. Yet, many countries remain 
water insecure, particularly in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Asia.
The importance 
of water 
endowments
There is growing evidence that the endowment 
of ‘hydrological complexity’ varies greatly 
between most rich countries on the one hand, 
and most poor countries on the other,  
even when their mean annual rainfall numbers 
are similar (see Box 1). ‘Difficult hydrology’  
is a combination of unpredictable drought and 
flood extremes, plus high inter-annual and/
or intra-annual variability (and associated 
unpredictability) of rainfall and runoff.  
Water security requires that this variability  
be managed, thereby ensuring predictable  
water supplies that are capable of meeting 
multiple, seasonally-changing demands,  
and also reducing potentially damaging 
extremes. In temperate regions (including 
most of the developed world), this variability 
is relatively low, and its management requires 
relatively less investment in institutions, 
information, and infrastructure. In tropical 
and monsoonal regions, including Sub-Saharan 
Africa and densely settled South and Southeast 
Asia, both inter-annual and intra-annual 
variability are very high.
Hydrological variability can be both good  
and bad. For example, the inter-annual 
variation in the flows of the Nile famously 
brought seven years of plenty followed by 
seven years of famine. Clearly, it would have 
been better if water-related investment had 
delivered 14 years of plenty. Yet, for millennia 
- in fact, until the nineteenth century - the 
annual Nile flood also washed excess salts from 
the soil, which was essential to the long-term 
Where water is  
reliably available,  
economic opportunities  
are enhanced. Where 
water is unreliable or 
of inadequate quality, 
or where water-related 
hazards are present, there 
will be drags on growth.
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Economic growth, hydrological variability,  
and investment in water security. (Box 1) 
This graphic illustrates the relationship between economic growth, hydrological variability,  
and investment in risk mitigation. 
It shows that wealthy river basins (green dots, clustered in the upper left-hand quadrant) 
generally feature simpler hydrologies and larger investments in water security.
Poorer basins (red dots, clustered in the lower half of the chart) have invested less  
in water security, and many face complex hydrologies.
The investment required to transition from water insecurity to water security  
is greatest in those basins with highly variable hydrology (see coloured contour lines).
Note: The horizontal axis summarizes hydrologic variability. The vertical axis is a composite indicator of 
investment in infrastructure and institutional capacity. The dots represent all river basins with populations 
greater than 2 million, coloured to indicate high (green), middle (yellow), and low (red) levels of GDP per 
capita (using World Bank definitions). The coloured contours are a linearly interpolated surface reflecting  
the association between variability, water security investments, and GDP.
From: Hall et al. (2014).
2. Water Security, Sustainable Growth, and Well-Being
43
productivity of Egyptian agriculture. Without 
this inter-annual hydrological variability, 
irrigation in the Nile Valley would have been 
unsustainable. Moreover, ecological systems 
have adapted to existing hydrological  
(and climatic) variability, and species have 
evolved to accommodate these conditions. 
Anthropogenic changes to the variability of 
hydrological systems can alter ecosystems,  
and these changes may impose costs and 
benefits on the economy, and on the livelihoods 
of poor households.
Managing difficult hydrology requires major 
investments; yet, most countries with difficult 
water endowments are poor, and least able  
to make the needed expenditures (see Box 1).  
The few parts of the developed world with 
relatively high variability (including the  
western United States and Australia)  
made very large investments early in their 
development, and they continue to invest 
significantly in sophisticated institutions 
supported by advanced data collection and 
analysis. Many of these countries invested 
early in their development in infrastructure, 
including investment in dams and large  
storage reservoirs needed to secure intra-year 
and multi-year water supplies. As a result,  
their per capita water storage is up to two 
orders of magnitude higher than that of 
developing nations experiencing similar,  
or even greater, hydrological variability. It is 
important to recognize this inverse relationship 
between hydrological complexity and per capita 
wealth, and that pathways to water security will 
be more difficult, and more costly, in locations 
with complex hydrology.
It is also important to recognize that water 
security is not a static goal. In this report,  
we seek to identify which countries,  
river basins, cities, and aquifers are more  
or less water secure; but there is not a clear-
cut dividing line, because water security 
is a continuum. Moreover, it is a dynamic 
continuum that will alter with changing 
climates, growing economies and asset stocks, 
and evolving social, cultural, and aesthetic 
priorities and values. Nevertheless, water 
security is not entirely subjective. Analyses  
of the investment pathways taken in a wide 
range of different societal, economic,  
and cultural contexts, reveals that historically, 
both good and bad choices have been made  
in the management of water resources.
It is important to recognize 
this inverse relationship 
between hydrological 
complexity and per capita 
wealth, and that pathways 
to water security will be  
more difficult, and more 
costly, in locations with 
complex hydrology.
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2.2 The complex  
economics of water 
The economic 
dynamics of 
water-related 
investments
To understand the complex economic dynamics 
of water-related investments, one must 
appreciate several distinctive facts about water. 
First, the physical nature of the resource 
historically made water a largely local concern. 
Unlike electricity, water is heavy, and generally 
expensive to transport long distances.  
So, most water problems were tackled locally, 
and solutions were crafted to meet hydrological 
and financial realities at the local scale.  
In other words, the abundant water resources 
of Canada and Sweden cannot economically 
be transported to alleviate water shortages in 
Namibia or Yemen. While countries with chronic 
water shortages must, for the most part, find 
their own local solutions, there is an increasing 
trend to consider large-scale, long-distance 
water transfers. This includes transfers within 
countries (e.g., inside Pakistan, Libya, China, 
and India), and transfers between countries 
(e.g., from Turkey to Israel, and from Canada  
to the United States). The costs and complexities 
of these transfers can be very high.
Because water itself is typically extremely 
difficult to move long distances, strategies to 
manage water scarcity must often focus not  
on moving water as a factor of production,  
but rather on moving the products of water. 
This is the concept of ‘virtual water’.5 Although 
Canada cannot economically ship water to 
Ethiopia, it can ship wheat; this can ease the 
water demand/supply imbalance that Ethiopia 
faces as a consequence of water scarcity or 
variability. Because some 80 percent of the 
5 Allan (2000).
world’s water is used for agriculture, global 
agricultural trade is an important part  
of the global solution to this local challenge.
The physical nature of both surface water and 
groundwater resources also ignores political 
boundaries. Many water problems cannot be 
tackled at the local level, or confined within 
the boundaries of a single administrative or 
political entity. For example, the 6,500 km-
long River Nile flows through 11 nations, all 
of which have aspirations for its use. Such 
water problems are best tackled at a regional 
(rather than local) level; and they pose complex 
challenges, in part because states must choose 
whether to cooperate with their neighbours, 
or attempt to solve their water security 
problems alone. If states do not consider 
the consequences of their actions on their 
neighbours, then water-related investments 
cannot achieve their full economic, social,  
and environmental potential, and water-related 
political tensions and risks can increase. 
Second, a distinctive feature of water is that, 
with the exception of certain sources of fossil 
groundwater, it is a renewable, common-pool 
resource subject to congestion, overuse,  
and degradation. Unlike coal or oil, when water 
is used, it is not ‘consumed’. After it is used, 
a molecule of water continues through the 
hydrological cycle, and in due course,  
the resource will be replenished (more or less) 
in a way that coal or oil stocks cannot. The 
economic analysis of renewable resources is 
fundamentally different from the economic 
analysis of non-renewable resources. The 
analysis of renewable resources requires a 
focus on the sustainable use of the resource 
over time, aligning the rate of usage with the 
resource’s natural capacity, and its timeframe 
for regeneration.
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Despite the renewable nature of the resource, 
the natural supply of water from precipitation 
and runoff is variable and unpredictable; and 
the use of water can change the spatial and 
temporal availability of the renewable stock, 
as well as the quality of the resource. Such 
changes may impose additional costs on society, 
and these costs must be incorporated into the 
economic analysis of water-related policies  
and investments.
Third, water is not simply a commodity:6  
it has far-reaching social and environmental 
significance. In most societies, there are 
cultural and aesthetic values attached to water, 
springs, and rivers. These derive from belief 
systems dating back to antiquity, as evidenced 
by the construction of ancient structures such 
as riverside temples, fountains, stepwells, and 
gardens. Increasingly, access to water is seen as 
a human right. In many societies, a high value 
is also placed on the recreational opportunities 
provided by water, and the existence of free 
flowing rivers. In all places, the health of 
ecosystems is inextricably entwined with water 
management. As tangible as these factors are, 
they remain very difficult or controversial,  
to capture in economic terms.
Identifying the range of effects of water security 
on economic growth, in a rigorous manner, 
is a challenge for several reasons. In the first 
place, because water is such a pervasive input 
into so many economic activities, it is difficult 
to find convincing counterfactual situations 
to statistically substantiate how water-related 
investments affect economic growth. People 
must have minimum quantities of drinking 
water to live. Because water is a factor of 
production in all sectors, they will also need 
water to raise crops and animals, and to pursue 
economic livelihoods of all kinds. Water-related 
risks from variable supply, floods, droughts, and 
waterborne disease, may all adversely affect 
human well-being, productivity, and economic 
growth. There is no small irony here: because 
water is so important for so many reasons, it is 
difficult to statistically show the importance of 
water-related investments to economic growth.
6	 Boulding	(1962).
Additionally, the causal links between water-
related investments and economic growth, 
clearly run in both directions. Water-related 
investments can increase economic productivity 
and growth, and economic growth can provide 
the resources to finance capital-intensive 
investments in water-related infrastructure.  
A plot of water-related infrastructure and 
national income will show a strong positive 
relationship, but this tells us little about the 
relative magnitudes of the two causal links 
running in opposite directions. Work remains  
to be done to assess the degree to which water-
related investments will enhance economic 
growth in individual cases. 
Finally, water-related investments can increase 
human well-being without increasing national 
income or economic growth as conventionally 
measured. For example, the provision of piped 
water supplies will save households - and in 
particular, women and girls - from time spent 
collecting water outside the home. This is  
an improvement in quality of life that will  
not necessarily be reflected in national  
income statistics. 
Overall, the literature suggests that the 
relationship between water and economic 
growth varies greatly with context. Some 
investments in water security will be attractive, 
while others will be undesirable, both in terms 
of economic returns on investment and in 
terms of the trade-offs between economic, 
environmental, and social values. The challenge 
will always be to determine the design, timing, 
and sequencing of investments in a particular 
location, so that they yield the highest returns. 
... water-related 
investments can  
increase human  
well-being  
without increasing  
national income ...
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Appraising 
investments in 
water security
Not all water-related investments will be 
beneficial. Investments may be excessively 
costly, may not lead to the intended benefits, 
may result in harmful and perhaps unintended 
impacts upon people and the environment,  
or may close off more beneficial future 
investment opportunities. 
Often, the benefits of large-scale water 
investments have been considered self-evident. 
For millennia, people have struggled to control 
water resources for irrigation, to limit flood 
losses, and to provide domestic water supplies. 
Would so much labour and treasure have been 
devoted to this task over such a long sweep 
of history, if the benefits were not large and 
important? But, the salient economic question 
is not just whether benefits exist: it is whether, 
and on what timescales, benefits exceed costs 
(be they economic, social, or environmental); 
how they compare to benefits from other 
investment opportunities; and how costs, 
benefits, and impacts are distributed  
across society.
Quantifying the costs and benefits of water-
related investment is, in fact, increasingly 
difficult. Where water was reliably abundant 
relative to demand, the primary focus of 
economic analysis was determining the most 
cost-effective approach for delivering water to 
users. Investment capital was the fundamental 
constraint to delivering water; meaning that 
least-cost, supply-side engineering solutions 
became the usual approach to meeting water 
demands. There was, by and large, enough 
water for all users who were able to finance  
the infrastructure needed to access it.  
Projects tended to be appraised in strictly 
financial terms (without full regard to social 
and environmental trade-offs), and designed  
to achieve a limited set of objectives. 
Today, capital constraints continue to limit 
investment, particularly in poor countries where 
water insecurity tends to be greatest. But, in 
addition, the quantity and quality of the water 
resources themselves are now increasingly 
becoming constraints on  
economic growth. As competition for water 
grows, both the ‘opportunity cost’ of allocating 
water to one use rather than another, and also 
the costs associated with water pollution,  
are becoming increasingly pronounced.  
It is, therefore, important to understand the 
full range of potential water uses if we wish 
to rigorously assess the economic benefits 
and costs of investments in water security; 
this is especially so relative to other priority 
investments competing for the same limited 
financial and water resources. 
As water resource constraints become more 
binding, and hydrological uncertainties grow 
due to climate change, it is also increasingly 
important for water planners to understand  
the complex inter-relationships among different 
water uses. Planners should incorporate 
feedback effects such as water quality and 
ecosystem degradation, and the dynamics 
of timing and sequencing, into analyses of 
investment costs and benefits. In a world 
of growing water scarcity, planning must 
increasingly take into account water resource 
constraints, and the impact one water use will 
have on another. In a globalizing world, the 
geographic extent of these inter-relationships 
expands, too.
Investments intended to promote water 
security must increasingly address interrelated 
challenges with solutions that achieve multiple 
objectives. As populations and economies grow, 
and as climate change makes weather less 
predictable and more severe, more people and 
assets are in ‘harm’s way’, facing multiple risks. 
Thus, dams should be designed and operated to 
provide multiple benefits, such as flood control, 
power, and irrigation. Hydro-meteorological 
services should provide agricultural advisories, 
as well as storm warnings. The multipurpose 
nature of many water-related investments 
makes it important to assess the full range  
Investments intended to 
promote water security 
must increasingly address 
interrelated challenges 
with solutions that achieve 
multiple objectives.
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of risks and rewards in a given location, and to 
determine the most cost-effective interventions 
for managing multiple, often interrelated,  
risks; while also capitalizing on opportunities 
for investment.
Economic assessment of water-related 
investments is also complicated by the fact that 
they yield two conceptually different types of 
economic benefits. Investments can reduce the 
losses experienced as a result of water-related 
hazards, and at the same time, they can produce 
valued goods and services. Moreover, they can 
do this across multiple sectors and boundaries. 
Both the reduced losses, and the added value 
of productive water use, enter the cost-benefit 
analysis on the benefit side of the equation. 
For example, the benefits of dams include both 
flood and drought mitigation (reduced flood and 
drought losses), and hydropower generation  
(a ‘valued good’). Similarly, piped water supply 
and wastewater connections yield health 
improvements (reduced losses), quality-of-life 
benefits, and aesthetic benefits from in-house 
plumbing (a valued service). Professionals in a 
particular discipline naturally focus on the type 
of outcome in which they have expertise, and 
tend to neglect or de-emphasize other valued 
outcomes. Thus, it is easy to overlook the full 
spectrum of economic benefits from water-
related investments.
Finding the 
right water 
security 
investments
The ‘right’ investments in water security will 
always be context-specific. Investments will 
be set within specific institutional and cultural 
settings, economies, ecosystems, topographies, 
and hydrologies. They will be dependent on a 
common-pool water resource whose availability 
and quality can be affected both by other users, 
and exogenous climate shocks. All of this will 
influence project design and the magnitude 
and distribution of the benefits and costs of 
investments.
Many investments will be part of a larger 
infrastructure network such as a water supply 
and sanitation system, or a hydropower 
generation and transmission system. Network 
technologies are characterized by economies of 
scale, joint products, and positive externalities. 
These effects take economists into a world of 
increasing returns from investments, and are 
thus especially hard to quantify and value. 
The level of development of these broader 
systems will affect potential returns on 
new investments. Incremental expansions 
of mature systems, for example, will often 
be economically attractive; whereas the 
development of new systems that rely on 
extensive networks for economies of scale,  
can - in their early stages - appear to be  
poor investments. 
In addition, the returns on many infrastructure 
investments will depend upon the strength of 
the institution that operates and manages it, as 
well as the human, financial, and information 
resources on which it draws. Investments in 
water security must therefore be designed 
holistically, in order to provide an effective 
balance of institutional, informational,  
and infrastructure financing.
Returns on large-scale, long-lived, networked 
infrastructure thus tend to be highly path 
dependent. In other words, they will depend 
greatly on the level of existing infrastructure 
stocks and their effective management. 
The breadth and complexity of these sorts 
of infrastructure investments often require 
significant complementary institutional 
capacity (and financial resources) for 
management, operations, and maintenance.  
In addition, they require robust information
Returns on large-scale, 
long-lived, networked 
infrastructure thus tend to 
be highly path dependent. 
In other words, they will 
depend greatly on the level 
of existing infrastructure 
stocks and their effective 
management.
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and decision-support systems in order  
to facilitate ongoing adaptive management.  
This means that it is important to understand 
where a country sits on its pathway toward 
water security, and to assess portfolios of 
water-related investments within the context  
of that pathway.
Context will also influence the way in which 
water security investments are conceptualized: 
as ‘upside’ opportunities to secure potential 
growth, or as ‘downside’ risk management 
to secure continued growth. Developing 
countries with relatively low stocks of water 
security-related infrastructure tend to focus 
on the upside growth potential of investments; 
while developed countries, with relatively 
mature infrastructure stocks and significant 
accumulated assets at risk of water-related 
hazards, tend to focus on the downside  
risk management aspect of water  
security investments. 
Whatever a policymaker’s focus, it is important 
that risk and uncertainty are incorporated into 
the assessment of water-related investments. 
There are two commonly used approaches for 
appraising investments in water security that 
incorporate risk and uncertainty.7 The first 
is an approach focused on risk management, 
structuring the question so as to find the least-
cost method of achieving a tolerable level of 
water risk. In this approach, a policy objective 
is set (i.e., the level of risk the society deems 
to be tolerable), and the task is to find the 
investment or investments that most cost-
effectively achieve the targeted level of risk. 
The second is a more economic approach, 
seeking to guide investment to the point where 
a marginal dollar invested in water security 
will return a marginal dollar in benefits, i.e., 
where marginal costs equal marginal benefits. 
Those benefits can include positive welfare 
benefits (e.g., the economic value of increased 
hydropower production), and also the benefit of 
risk reduction, which is the difference between 
the expected annual loss pre-investment and 
residual risk, i.e., the expected annual loss  
post-investment.
7 Hall et al. (2012).
Both approaches conceptualize the water 
security challenge as a constrained 
optimization problem in which the timing, 
sequencing, and sizing of investments (and 
their operations) are chosen either to minimize 
costs (the ‘tolerable risk’ approach), or to 
maximize benefits (the ‘economic’ approach), 
subject to specific constraints. Both methods 
incorporate the economic opportunities from 
the productive uses of water, and the benefits 
from reducing the destructive aspects of water. 
In both formulations, constraints are used  
to characterize the biophysical realities of  
the hydrological system (such as the timing  
and absolute limits of water availability),  
and social prerogatives (e.g., relating to social 
preferences for maintaining environment flows, 
safeguarding water quality, meeting basic 
needs, and protecting cultural and natural 
heritage). In the ‘tolerable risk’ approach, 
constraints are also used to set ‘tolerable risk’ 
from water hazards, effectively mandating 
that investments achieve the level of benefits 
associated with pre-specified standards.
At the project level, cost-benefit analysis is 
still arguably the best tool available to assess 
specific water-related investments. A good deal 
of work is being done to refine cost-benefit 
methodologies; in particular, to take better 
account of environment and social costs, and 
to better accommodate uncertainties. Yet, the 
question of what constitutes ‘good practice’ 
remains a topic of debate. Cost-benefit analysis 
falls uneasily into a middle ground, where it  
is criticized both by proponents of intuition 
(who feel it is unnecessary to undertake detailed 
analysis), and by proponents of comprehensive 
modelling (who propose economy-wide models 
designed to capture system-wide effects of 
large water-related investments). Despite this 
discomfort, there is a clear need to identify  
and avoid poor investments in water security; 
and, even with its well-known limitations, 
cost-benefit analysis remains a necessary  
and useful tool to appraise specific water-
related investments. 
At the level of the river basin or the state, it is 
important to look beyond individual projects 
to dynamic, adaptive pathways (see Chapter 
4), together with their impacts on economic 
growth, equity, and the structure of economies. 
This requires performing cost-benefit analyses 
on sequences (or ‘portfolios’) of projects, and 
carefully considering how pursuing a specific 
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project in the present might foreclose options 
in the future. Water policies and infrastructure 
investment decisions will have long-lasting 
impacts on development options across 
economies, and the path-dependency  
of large-scale water infrastructure  
reinforces the importance of analyzing  
water development pathways.
Finally, in finding the ‘right’ investments,  
it is essential to take special account of social 
and environmental impacts. In many countries, 
the impacts of water management decisions  
will particularly affect the poor, women, and the 
environment. The poor are disproportionately 
affected by the destructive impacts of water 
insecurity, because they tend to live in areas 
more susceptible to weather-related disasters, 
they rely more on rain-fed agriculture,  
and they use more unprotected water sources.  
In the developing world, women and children 
are more likely to be affected by natural 
disasters than are men.8 The poor, and women, 
also tend to be disproportionately constrained 
in terms of capturing the opportunities of 
water-related growth, because they hold fewer 
land and water rights. Environmental needs 
are generally the first water uses that fail to be 
met in times of scarcity, because few countries 
have formalized, enforced water allocations 
for ecosystems use. When water quality 
becomes degraded, it threatens the health of 
freshwater ecosystems and groundwater quality. 
As societies have gained wealth, they have 
consistently demanded greater environmental 
quality, suggesting that with growth will come 
greater demands for water quality, and for 
healthy ecosystems.
8	 Doocy	et	al.	(2013);	Neumayer	and	 
	 Plumper	(2007);	WP	TWG	(2010).
... it is essential  
to take special  
account of social and 
environmental impacts.
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2.3 A theoretical  
model of the dynamics  
of water-related risk, 
investment, and growth
The need for investment - both to increase 
economic growth, and to mitigate water-
related risks - is regularly cited as a policy 
priority. Yet, prior work to conceptualize 
the role of water-related investments 
has focused on these two objectives 
independently. 
Policies and investments designed to improve 
water security should facilitate communities’ 
access to the growth potential associated  
with the availability of adequate and reliable 
water supplies for municipal, agricultural,  
and industrial use; and at the same time,  
reduce communities’ exposure to water-related 
risks such as floods, droughts, and water-
related disease. To capture the dynamics  
of this interacting system, a growth model  
was developed relating country wealth to 
investment in both protective and productive 
water-related assets (see Figure 2).
As any economy grows, it generates income 
and builds wealth that can be invested in 
developing a stock of productive and protective 
water-related assets. In hazardous hydrological 
environments prone to extreme floods or 
prolonged droughts, water-related economic 
losses act as a drag on the rate of growth. 
Where countries have sufficient wealth to 
protect themselves from these hydrological 
losses (e.g., through investment in flood control, 
irrigation and storage, information systems,  
or strong institutions), robust economic  
growth is possible. On the other hand, poorer 
countries exposed to water-related hazards  
may struggle to recover from repeated 
debilitating losses, creating a vicious cycle 
where economic growth is repeatedly hampered 
by hydrological hazards.9 
9	 Grey	and	Sadoff	(2007).
Similar dynamic behaviour has been described 
in other literatures linking environment and 
economics; and for some conditions, it is 
analogous to a poverty trap.10 Indeed, there is  
an ongoing debate within development 
economics about both the prevalence or 
likelihood of poverty traps, and also the 
10	 Bonds	et	al.	(2010);	Dasgupta	(2001).
Growth model relating 
country wealth to 
investment in protective 
and productive water-
related assets (Fig	2)
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circumstances in which they might arise. 
The majority of work to date has concerned 
poverty traps at the household, rather than at 
the macroeconomic, level; and has not focused 
specifically on water security.11 
The simple conceptual model presented in 
Figure 3 sheds some light on the debate, with 
specific reference to the water sector, showing 
as it does the complex and dynamic behaviour 
of an economy subject to water-related 
protective and productive investments.  
In countries where economic growth is 
restricted by the lack of available water 
resources, and when water-related losses are 
11	 Dasgupta	(2001);	Sachs	(2005).
sufficiently frequent or large to derail sustained 
economic growth, a poverty trap can be a 
feature of the system of water, growth, and risk, 
as depicted in Figure 3. The actual existence 
of a poverty trap is, in practice, dependent on 
economic and environmental factors specific  
to an individual country.
Any point on Figure 3 will experience a 
trajectory of growth or decline that depends on 
its initial position, its ‘water endowment’ and 
context-dependent constraints and parameters. 
The prognosis for a country is promising if it 
begins at initial condition (a) in Figure 3. This 
initial situation reflects moderate wealth but 
only moderate water security, for example the 
western United States in the early twentieth 
century, or Israel in the mid-twentieth century. 
Theoretical dynamics of a water poverty trap	(Fig	3)
Note: Direction field for the system depicting the relation between wealth and investments in water  
security (including natural endowments). The arrows indicate the direction of the rate of change  of points in 
the domain. The colour of the arrow indicates the total magnitude of the rate of change  (red = rapid;  
blue = slow). Bold blue lines with large arrows represent the convergent trajectories  (solid) and the separatrix 
(dashed). The unstable saddle point is marked with an ‘S’.
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There is sufficient national wealth, making 
water-related investments possible. These 
investments come at the expense of investment 
in other sectors of the economy, and initially 
they are a drag on economic growth; but 
without them, further growth is hard to sustain. 
Once the initial investment is made, the amount 
of additional investment required to mitigate 
water-related risk is still significant, but can 
be allocated from the proceeds of growth in the 
wider economy.
The situation for a country that begins at initial 
condition (b) in Figure 3 is less encouraging. 
Here, the level of water-related endowment or 
investment is identical to the situation in (a) - 
perhaps owing to a similar level of unmanaged 
hydro-climatic variability, for example. 
However, the level of initial wealth is much 
lower. In this case, the lack of wealth seriously 
constrains mitigation of water-related losses 
and, after a period of stagnation, the economy 
is drawn into the poverty trap. Such an example 
trajectory is rarely seen in reality: these are 
locations in which large-scale, commercial 
agriculture is unlikely ever to have been 
viable. Such a trajectory is restricted by the 
presence of a poverty trap, and is investment-
limited, so only an external injection of wealth 
(e.g., through overseas investment, or the 
exploitation of mineral resources) can shift the 
trajectory to one of growth.
The trajectory followed by a country that begins 
at initial condition (c) is not promising, either. 
This initial condition, in which water security 
is low and wealth is low represents the most 
perilous set of circumstances considered in 
the present analysis. With vulnerable water 
resources and modest wealth, an initial phase of 
investment drives an increase in water security. 
However, this investment depletes wealth 
to the point where growth is insufficient to 
compensate for losses incurred due to lack  
of water security. Modern examples of countries 
in this situation might include Niger and Chad.
Finally, the situation for a country that begins 
at initial condition (d) in Figure 3 complements 
initial condition (a), in the sense that its 
trajectory is one of growth, albeit the starting 
point is one of relatively low water-related risk, 
coupled with little wealth. Such a system might 
be typical of the eastern United States in the 
mid-nineteenth century, or of a northwestern 
European country in the mid-eighteenth 
century. During the initial phases of growth, 
water security is not a priority; the economy 
can grow without limits imposed by water-
related risks. Indeed, the economy can afford 
to grow unencumbered by the need to invest 
in water security, instead allocating capital to 
opportunities in other sectors bringing higher 
rates of economic growth. Subsequently, the 
necessary level of investment in water security 
can be made from the proceeds of growth, 
providing that the impact is not so severe  
that it drags the trajectory across the divide, 
towards the poverty trap.
The location of the ‘tipping point’ (i.e., the point 
at which pressures will direct an economy either 
toward growth or toward poverty) will depend 
on the adequacy and effectiveness of water 
security-related investments compared to other 
investments in the wider economy. This finding 
implies that investing in the development, 
management, and operation of water-related 
institutions and assets can act to insulate 
a country from adverse water-related risk. 
In other words, developing and maintaining 
critical water security-related assets and 
institutions moves the country’s growth 
trajectory away from the tipping point (S) in 
Figure 3, and reduces the risk that a country’s 
efforts to grow in other sectors of the economy 
will be thwarted by regular water-related losses 
or water-related drags on productivity.
It is instructive to consider the effect of 
planned and unplanned interventions in the 
system of water security investments, risk, 
and growth. For example, climate change may 
lead to exogenous changes in water resource 
availability and variability. Such changes could 
lead to a requirement for greater investment  
... developing and 
maintaining critical water 
security-related assets and 
institutions ... reduces the 
risk that a country’s efforts 
to grow.. will be thwarted 
by regular water-related 
losses or water-related 
drags on productivity.
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to maintain the same level of risk, and in some 
cases, they would move the system closer to 
Figure 3’s poverty trap. By contrast, technical 
advances in desalination, or the adoption 
of water-saving technologies, would lead to 
increased water security, and consequently 
move the growth trajectory away from the 
poverty trap. Because of the economy’s 
potential vulnerability to exogenous factors, 
it is particularly important to identify and pay 
close attention to climate change adaptation 
measures within those countries that lie closest 
to the water-related poverty trap, for example, 
those countries with the highest water-related 
losses as a fraction of their GDP (see Chapter 3).
It is also possible to experience exogenous 
shifts in GDP due, for example, to the onset 
of war or the discovery of valuable natural 
resources. Such events may, in the former 
case, cause otherwise water-secure countries 
to descend into insecurity; in the latter 
case, increased access to capital may permit 
investment in water security that could place 
the country on a trajectory of growth. Whether 
such growth can be sustained depends on the 
amount of capital available relative to the costs 
of the necessary investments in water-related 
infrastructure. Some trajectories may require 
a substantial initial commitment of national 
wealth to the goal of reducing water risk before 
returns are seen. Historical studies from the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Germany 
have documented substantial public investment 
in water infrastructure in the nineteenth 
century. Those investments were stimulated 
by the requirements of private industrial 
producers, combined with the pressing need 
to simultaneously improve public health and 
reduce water-related risks, such as droughts 
and floods.12 
This theoretical model of the dynamics between 
water-related risk, investment, and growth, 
suggests that the optimal growth strategy  
for minimizing the risk of falling into a 
poverty trap13 requires a combination of both 
12	 Brown	(1988);	Groote	et	al.	(1999);	 
 Hassan (1985).
13	 With	respect	to	Figure	3,	this	would	be	a		 	
	 trajectory	that	is	tangential	to	the	bold	 
	 blue	lines	that	separate	the	trajectories	 
	 of	growth	and	decay.
(i) investments in water-related infrastructure 
and the related investments required to ensure 
their productivity, and (ii) investments in 
other sectors, in order to stimulate broader 
economic growth. In other words, water-
related investment is not a silver bullet that 
will result in inevitable growth and prosperity. 
Nonetheless, in areas with difficult hydrology, 
growth without adequate provision for water 
will leave a fragile economy vulnerable to 
water-related risks, and without the investment 
opportunities water security can bring.
... water-related investment 
is not a silver bullet that 
will result in inevitable 
growth and prosperity. 
Nonetheless, in areas  
with difficult hydrology, 
growth without adequate 
provision for water will 
leave a fragile economy 
vulnerable to water-related 
risks, and without the 
investment opportunities 
water security can bring.
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2.4 An empirical  
analysis of the  
impact of hydrological  
variability on growth
The connection between water security  
and economic growth is intuitively clear,  
but empirical evidence of this relationship  
is scarce. 
Water-related hazards such as floods, droughts, 
and disease cause damage to an economy 
through the destruction of physical property 
and infrastructure, the loss of human capital, 
and the disruption of economic activities.  
These events are readily observed and 
undoubtedly have economic impacts.  
The dependence of agricultural production  
on reliable rainfall is similarly evident  
in many countries without significant  
irrigation investments.
Box 2 shows the relationship between  
growth (annual per capita economic growth,  
in percent) and annual runoff (spatially 
averaged) for Malawi, India, and China.  
Malawi shows highly variable economic growth, 
closely corresponding to the variability in 
runoff. India shows some correspondence 
between runoff and growth, amid a positive 
growth trend. Per capita economic growth in 
China shows a very stable pattern, with little 
correspondence to runoff variability. Thus, we 
see a range of relationships: suggesting that in 
some countries, hydro-climatic variability may 
have a strong effect on economic growth, while 
in other countries, a ‘decoupling’ can occur.
This highlights important questions about 
how water insecurity affects economic growth. 
Is the relationship between hydro-climatic 
variability and growth a causal relationship? 
Is it significant only in a very few countries 
with particular circumstances, or is it a global 
concern? Are the effects of hydro-climatic 
variability a sufficiently large drag on economic 
growth to justify investment or reforms?  
And, if so, what interventions and investments 
will be most effective in diminishing an 
economy’s vulnerability to the harmful  
effects of water-related hazards?
The impact of 
hydro-climatic 
variability 
on economic 
growth 
There are surprisingly few empirical  
studies addressing these important questions. 
Despite the recent interest in indicators of water 
security, no studies provide an empirical basis 
for identifying the drivers of water security.  
In particular, current definitions and indicators 
of water security are not empirically linked  
to economic growth.
Early empirical studies of the relationship 
between infrastructure investments (not limited 
to water) and growth were subject to criticism 
in particular due to the problem of determining 
the direction of causality.14 In other words,  
did infrastructure investment cause growth,  
or did growth lead to infrastructure investment? 
More recent work - using structural growth 
models to account for the feedbacks between 
investment and growth in the wider economy 
- has more clearly identified the substantial 
contribution of infrastructure to growth.15
14	 Gramlich	(1994);	Munnell	(1992).
15	 Esfahani	and	Ramírez (2003).
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Annual per capita GDP 
growth and annual runoff, 
for three countries. (Box 2)
These figures show the annual per 
capita GDP growth and annual runoff 
(standard normal units) from the period 
1980-2012. Malawi shows highly variable 
economic growth, which often reflects 
the variability of runoff. India shows 
fairly consistent economic growth, 
with variability that exhibits some 
correspondence with runoff variability. 
China shows steady economic growth 
that, in the latter part of the period 
especially, shows little correspondence to 
runoff variability (i.e., a ‘decoupling’).
Looking more specifically at research on the 
relationship between hydro-climatic variables 
and economic growth, there is an emergent 
literature that establishes a link between 
climate factors and economic growth,  
for specific regions of the world.16 Early efforts 
focused on the effect of changes in temperature 
on agricultural production17, 18 and the wider 
economy.19 More recent econometric analyses 
have considered variability in precipitation  
(i.e., rainfall, snow, sleet, and hail) in addition 
to temperature.20 Precipitation extremes 
(rainfall variability, floods, and droughts)  
have been shown to have a statistically 
significant detrimental impact on different 
measures of economic growth in Sub-Saharan 
Africa;21 and more recent analyses, using a 
global data set of country level per capita GDP 
growth, show that anomalously low or high  
precipitation has a negative economic effect; 
thereby providing evidence that variability  
in precipitation can indeed hinder growth.22 
However, neither temperature nor precipitation 
alone can capture all of the ways in which 
water may potentially affect economic growth. 
While the recent recognition of the importance 
of precipitation is clearly linked with water-
related impacts, it still does not account for 
land surface and temperature influencing the 
amount of water available for use in a given 
location; nor the occurrence of potentially 
harmful flooding. To address this, the Task 
Force’s analysis used ‘runoff’ as one of several 
hydro-climatic variables to explain changes in 
per capita GDP growth. Runoff was estimated 
using a gridded model estimate of water 
accumulating at the land surface as a result 
hydrologic processes, e.g., by infiltration and 
evapotranspiration (see Box 3). As a result,  
the runoff variable captures both temperature 
and precipitation effects, and thus should 
provide a better indicator of water available  
16	 Fankhauser	and	Tol	(2005);	Seo	et	al.	(2009).
17	 Mendelsohn	et	al.	(1994).
18	 Schlenker	et	al.	(2006).
19	 Nordhaus	(2006).
20	 Deschênes	and	Greenstone	(2007).
21 Brown et al. (2011).
22 Brown et al. (2013).
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Specifications of the econometric analysis (Box 3)
The analysis of the effect of climate and water-related hazards on economic growth was 
conducted using a fixed effects panel regression model, with individual and year fixed effects. 
Country fixed effects were used to control for omitted variables that vary across countries (e.g., 
other aspects of geography, culture, and institutions). Year fixed effects controlled for factors 
that might vary over time, but affected all countries in much the same way. 
This specification helped adjust the model for global shocks to the economy, such as the  
global financial crisis of 2008-9. The standard errors on the coefficients estimated through  
the model were obtained through robust covariance matrix estimation, in order to account  
for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The standard errors are clustered at the country 
level. The specifications of the model are shown below: 
 
     i= 1,…,113 and t = 1980,…,2012
 
Where represents the dependent variable (per capita GDP growth) of country i at time t,  
 is the regression coefficient for each independent variable, represents the exogenous 
independent variables (hydro-climatic indices for basin i at time t), is the basin fixed  
effect meaning that it represents the time-invariant aspects of basin i, represents the  
year fixed effects, and represents the time-variant factors. This model was used for  
all panel regression results. 
Observations of precipitation, including a measure of meteorological drought, plus temperature, 
are also included in the analysis. In total, nine hydro-climatic variables were used as 
independent predictors in a fixed effects panel regression. These variables were: (i) mean 
annual precipitation; (ii) mean annual temperature; (iii) the squared mean annual temperature 
(to account for non-linear effects); (iv) mean annual runoff (streamflow); (v) drought and 
excess precipitation, positive thresholds (WASP+1); (vi) drought and excess precipitation, 
negative thresholds (WASP-1); (vii) runoff, positive thresholds (WASR+1); (viii) runoff,  
negative thresholds (WASR-1); and (ix) percentage of area under flood in each country.
While precipitation is generally indicative of water availability, it does not account for the 
effects of evapotranspiration, which is a function of temperature and soil moisture; and which 
can be particularly significant in the semi-arid tropics. To account for these evapotranspiration 
effects, runoff data were introduced to an econometric analysis of economic growth for  
the first time; the runoff data being taken from a model output of the MacPDM gridded 
hydrologic model.23 In addition, the use of monthly precipitation data is not generally a  
viable representation of flood hazard, which is expressed at shorter timescales in most cases.  
This study therefore introduced a flood hazard metric based on a new global model of flood 
hazards by Winsemius et al. (2013). 
The analysis was conducted at the national (country-level) scale. Precipitation, temperature, 
and runoff variables are standard normal variates; thus, a unit increase in the variable above 
the mean (i.e., one standard deviation) implies a change in annual per capita GDP growth rate 
(%) equal to the value in the table. Extreme variables (WASP and WASR) are fractions of a 
country in the given state. These regression coefficients represent the reduction in per capita 
GDP growth rate (%) when the fraction of the country in the extreme state is equal to 1.
            
23 Arnell (1999).
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for use. In addition, to better represent  
the potential effect of hydrologic extremes, 
thresholds were used to designate the fraction 
of a country in an extreme state of runoff or 
precipitation. As Box 3 shows, the variables are 
inevitably correlated, but together they create a 
representative summary of the hydro-climatic 
conditions in a particular country.
To determine whether there is empirical 
evidence of a statistically significant impact  
of hydro-climatic variables, including hazards, 
on per capita GDP growth on the countries of 
the world, and to help identify the key drivers 
of those impacts, we performed an econometric 
analysis (i.e., a fixed-effects panel regression) 
across 113 countries (see Box 3).
As Box 3 indicates, we found it useful to 
conceptualize water security as ‘protection 
from water-related drags on economic growth’. 
By this definition, countries whose economic 
performance is resilient to water security-
related variables such as runoff, floods and 
droughts, are relatively water secure. Countries 
where growth is strongly correlated with 
these factors are relatively water insecure. 
The work presented here comprises the most 
complete economic assessment to date of the 
effects of water-related hazards on economic 
growth, and includes variables never previously 
incorporated, such as runoff and flood hazard.24 
24 Winsemius et al. (2013).
We note that there are also hydro-climatic 
effects on waterborne disease, and these water 
and sanitation-related impacts will also  
affect growth.
Using this model, runoff was revealed to have 
the most highly statistically significant effect 
(at a 99 percent confidence level) on annual 
economic growth, of all the variables examined. 
The variable used for runoff is representative 
of the general availability of water; separate 
variables are used for flood (Weighted Anomaly 
Standardized Runoff, or WASR) and drought 
(Weighted Anomaly Standardized Precipitation, 
or WASP) extremes. Runoff has a positive 
relationship with growth that indicates that 
greater water availability has a significant  
and positive causal effect on economic 
growth. The positive nature of the effect 
was not surprising, but the strong statistical 
significance with the 113-country data set 
suggests that the temperature and precipitation 
effects reported in earlier studies are indeed 
related to water availability. 
Drought25 (WASP) was shown to have a 
statistically significant (95 percent confidence 
level) negative impact on economic growth as 
well, which is consistent with previous studies. 
The magnitude of the effect depends on the 
characteristics of each country. On average,  
a major drought (affecting 50 percent or more  
of a country’s area) was found to reduce 
economic growth (as measured by per capita 
GDP) by about half a percentage point in that 
year (e.g., reduced from 3% to 2.5% per year). 
Flood extent (WASR) was also found to have 
a negative association with per capita GDP 
growth (at a 90 percent confidence level). 
Although it is widely recognized that floods 
have episodic negative effects, this analysis 
clearly demonstrated the extent to which these 
individual events can accumulate to affect 
economic growth in significant ways. 
25	 Drought	was	defined	in	two	ways:	using	a	 
	 variable	based	on	precipitation	(Weighted	 
 Anomaly Standardized Precipitation, or WASP)  
	 and	a	similar	variable	based	on	runoff	(Weighted	 
	 Anomaly	Standardized	Runoff,	or	WASR).	 
	 These	variables	are	defined	in	Brown	et	al.	 
	 (2011).	For	most	of	this	analysis,	the	WASP-1	 
	 variable	was	used	to	represent	drought.
... countries whose 
economic performance is 
resilient to water security-
related variables such 
as runoff, floods and 
droughts, are relatively 
water secure. Countries 
where growth is strongly 
correlated with these 
factors are relatively  
water insecure.
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Overall, the results show a strong connection 
between water availability and economic 
growth in a global dataset. The effects will vary 
among individual countries: strong in some, 
yet insignificant in others. This corresponds 
with earlier studies, but provides greater 
substantiation of the relationship because 
it examines multiple measures that better 
characterize the complexities of hydro-climatic 
variability and water availability. Previous 
studies of these relationships have been  
based on precipitation and temperature.  
Here, in addition, runoff and a flood metric  
have been included, and both were found to  
be statistically significant.
The statistical significance of multiple hydro-
climatic variables does not imply that economic 
growth is solely determined by water, and 
water-related hazards. The magnitude of the 
effect on economic growth across the entire data 
set is small,26 because there are many factors 
that affect economic growth. However, in some 
countries the effect may be quite large. The 
results are best interpreted as showing that water 
availability and water-related hazards, such as 
floods and droughts, act as a drag on growth, or 
a ‘headwind’, reducing the economic growth that 
would have occurred if not for these effects.
This empirical evidence of the relationship 
between water and economic growth also 
has important implications for assessing the 
potential economic costs of climate change. 
Water-related impacts of climate change will 
be significant, and studies that neglect the 
impacts of the availability of water and water-
related hazards will underestimate the economic 
consequences of climate change. Previous 
economic studies of the effects of climate 
change have focused primarily on temperature. 
Here we see that historically temperature is not 
statistically significant, but the effect of runoff 
(which reflects the general availability of water 
and thus is temperature related) and water-
related hazards are. Without taking into account 
hydrological variability, the economic returns on 
adaptation investments made to improve water 
security are likely to be underestimated. 
26	 From	an	econometric	standpoint,	this	is	a	 
	 positive	attribute	because	it	shows	that	the	 
	 model	is	not	over-specified.
Overall these findings indicate that, on average, 
global economies are vulnerable to changes 
in the availability of water and water-related 
hazards, and that water insecurity acts as  
a drag on economic growth. Water security  
is therefore not only an investment in 
protecting communities; it is an investment  
in enabling growth.
Looking more specifically at the economic 
impacts of drought, an analysis was undertaken 
that builds on earlier studies and looks at 
which countries are most severely affected by 
drought (see Box 4). The analysis focused on 
the difference between countries’ economic 
growth rates in drought years and in all other 
years. This allowed isolation of the drought 
effect. Simulations were conducted to represent 
the growth in countries with and without 
the drought effect present. This enables us 
to visualize the cumulative effect of drought 
over time. The difference between the drought 
growth rate and non-drought growth rate 
reflects the degree to which a country was 
affected by drought, while accounting for its 
baseline growth rate. Based on this simulation 
analysis, one can determine which countries 
would most benefit from a reduction of the 
drought effect in terms of economic growth 
rate. The results showed that in Malawi, for 
example, a 50 percent reduction in the drought 
effect led to a 20 percent higher per capita GDP 
at the end of the simulation. In the case of 
Brazil, the reduced drought effect led to GDP  
per capita that was 7 percent higher.
The results showed a very clear negative 
association between drought and average 
economic growth rates globally, confirming 
that droughts produce a drag on global 
economic growth. Simulations that determined 
the benefits of reduced drought impacts also 
demonstrated that the effect of droughts  
may compound over a long time period.  
A visualization of the simulation results is 
presented in Box 5. These simulations showed 
that the countries that stand to reap the 
greatest benefits from drought reduction  
were concentrated in the Middle East,  
Africa, South America, Central Asia,  
and South and Southeast Asia.
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Simulation of reduced drought effect on economic growth  
(Box 4)
In order to demonstrate the growth effects  
of the economic drag caused by drought,  
a simulation was performed assuming 
reduced drought effects. The results for 
Malawi are shown here.
The growth rates in drought years were 
replaced with growth rates calculated 
assuming a 50% reduction of the drought 
effect (i.e., the difference between growth  
in drought and non-drought years, divided  
by 2). The new series of growth rates was 
used to simulate economic growth for a  
30-year period, beginning in 1980.
Countries with the largest reduction in growth due to drought 
(Box 5)
This map shows the countries with the largest difference in economic growth between drought 
years and non-drought years. Here, drought is defined as >30% of a country’s area with rainfall 
below the drought threshold. The calculation uses the average of the difference between the 
growth rate in years when drought occurs, and the growth rate in all other years. Countries  
in grey show little difference - or even higher growth - during drought.
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Results from fixed effects panel regression on country level per 
capita GDP growth (1980-2012) from 113 countries, conditioned  
on human water stress, and % GDP from agriculture	(Table	1)
 Human Water Stress % GDP from Agr 
Climate Variables > 0.8 < 0.8 > 20%  < 20% All Obs
Annual Precipitation -0.57 (0.14)
0.01 
(0.73)
-1.57 * 
(0.04)
-0.16 
(0.52)
-0.40 
(0.10)
Temperature 0.07 (0.771)
-0.122 
(0.491)
-0.425 
(0.247)
0.044 
(0.746)
-0.09 
(0.50)
Temperature (^ 2) -0.086 (0.651)
-0.177 ‘ 
(0.081)
-0.243 
(0.132)
-0.127 
(0.221)
-0.14 
(0.138)
Annual Runoff 0.685 * (0.037)
0.214 
(0.376)
1.446 * 
(0.036)
0.454 * 
(0.032)
0.567** 
(0.005)
Meteo. Drought (WASP-1) -1.878 ‘ (0.075)
0.039 
(0.962)
-2.898 * 
(0.017)
-0.791 
(0.214)
-1.152* 
(0.044)
Meteo. Flood (WASP+1) 1.115 (0.249)
-1.106 
(0.298)
2.705 
(0.298)
-0.231 
(0.737)
0.284 
(0.685)
Runoff Drought (WASR-1) 1.819 ‘ (0.090)
0.82 
(0.449)
4.537 ‘ 
(0.085)
0.936 
(0.143)
1.58 * 
(0.019)
Runoff Flood (WASR+1) -1.549 ‘ (0.083)
-0.15 
(0.871)
-2.611 
(0.141)
-0.91 
(0.174)
-1.021 ‘ 
(0.086)
Observations 1221 2112 891 2574 3729
Country 37 64 27 78 113
Note: Values indicate the regression coefficient for each variable (p-value in parentheses). Negative coefficients 
indicate negative effects on per capita GDP growth. The analysis focusing on water stress grouped countries based 
on the Human Water Stress (HWS) index. This measure, which is roughly equivalent to available water resources per 
capita, was obtained from the HWS data set developed by Vörösmarty et al. (2010). The subsets were created using a 
threshold on the conditioning factor, to divide the countries into two sets: respectively, those with values above and 
below the threshold. The threshold was selected based on break points in the empirical probability distribution of the 
conditioning variable. A threshold level of 0.8 was selected to separate countries, where a higher score means greater 
pressure on water resources. An agriculture-dependent economy was defined as one in which more than 20% of GDP 
is derived from agriculture. The threshold was predicated on the empirical probability distribution of the conditioning 
variable. The categorization is based on year 2012 values. The flood variable was not available for these regressions. 
Significance levels: *** 99.9%; ** 99%; * 95%; ‘ 90%
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Country Classification
Climate Variables LI LMI UMI HI
 
Annual Precipitation -1.142 (1.066)
-0.879’ 
(0.497)
0.234 
(0.596)
-0.314 
(0.316)
Temperature -0.72 (0.623)
-0.367 
(0.302)
-0.355 
(0.216)
0.065 
(0.172)
Temperature(^ 2) -0.306 (0.233)
-0.176 
(0.270)
-0.061 
(0.109) -0.0114
Annual Runoff 0.956 (1.156)
0.506 
(0.363)
0.439 
(0.499)
0.460 ‘ 
(0.263)
WASP-1 -3.430’ (1.986)
-1.975 
(1.654)
2.217 
(1.360)
-0.929 
(0.578)
WASP+1 1.597 (2.241)
1.873 
(1.879)
0.652 
(2.275)
0.04 
(0.914)
WASR-1 6.192 (3.814)
1.56 
(1.655)
-1.469 
(1.127)
1.421’ 
(0.725)
WASR+1
-1.762 
(2.367)
0.337 
(1.586) -5.5472 -0.7299
 
R2 0.012 0.012 0.014 0.011
Observations 660 990 825 1254
Country 20 30 25 38
Fixed individual and annual effects panel regression results  
for countries, by income classifications	(Table	2)
Note: Values indicate the regression coefficient for each variable (p-value in parentheses). Negative coefficients 
indicate negative effects on per capita GDP growth. Countries are grouped based on the World Bank’s 2014 ‘gross 
national income’ (GNI) classifications as: ‘low-income’ (LI), ‘lower-middle-income’ (LMI), ‘upper-middle-income’ 
(UMI), and ‘high-income’ (HI).
Significance levels: *** 99.9%; ** 99%; * 95%; ‘ 90%
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Two 
characteristics 
that influence 
vulnerability to 
water-related 
risks 
The effect of water availability and water-
related hazards was significant in the global 
analysis, but some countries are clearly more 
water secure than others. What characteristics 
make a country more or less susceptible to 
water–related risks?
A panel regression analysis was conducted on 
subsets of countries, in order to investigate 
three factors that are potentially related to a 
country’s sensitivity to water-related risks. 
These factors were (i) level of income; (ii) 
level of water stress; and (iii) dependence 
of the economy on agriculture. The results 
are shown in Table 1. The specifications for 
this model were identical to the fixed effects 
model described previously, in Box 3. In this 
case, however, the regressions were conducted 
for subsets of countries based on the three 
classifications given above. The analysis is not 
meant to be exhaustive, but rather a deeper 
investigation of selected factors that emerged 
in the preliminary analysis. The effects of water 
supply and sanitation-related hazards have 
not been assessed due to lack of available time 
series data, but they are also likely important.
The results showed that hydro-climatic 
effects on economic growth were stronger 
in agriculture-dependent countries, and in 
countries with high human water stress  
(an index reflecting per capita water resources) 
(see Table 1). The statistical significance of 
the effects of runoff and drought on economic 
growth was higher in water stressed and 
agricultural dependent countries. Also, for 
countries in the low-income group, the 
magnitude of the coefficients on the climate 
variables was higher for almost all variables, 
suggesting that the largest impacts of hydro-
climatic conditions are in countries with lower 
incomes (see Table 2).
The results show that the countries most 
economically vulnerable to hydro-climatic 
effects are those that are poor, water stressed, 
and/or dependent on agriculture. Box 6 shows 
the countries falling into these categories: 
Africa, the Middle East and South Asia stand 
out. The economic growth of nations with 
high human water stress27 is more sensitive 
to the availability of water, so any reductions 
of water availability due to climate variability 
are felt severely. Nations with lower levels 
of water stress show no such effects and are 
only sensitive to temperature (squared) of the 
variables considered. Similarly, the economic 
growth of nations with a relatively high 
contribution of agriculture to GDP (in excess of 
20 percent) are more sensitive to runoff, and 
are negatively affected by drought. Nations 
with less dependence on agriculture (below 20 
percent) still show dependence on runoff,  
albeit at a much lower magnitude, but no  
effect of drought.
For countries with high water stress,  
the effect of runoff was significantly higher 
than in other countries. This suggests that 
investments substituting for runoff (e.g., 
efficiency improvements) are more important 
for growth within countries that are currently 
water stressed (i.e., South Africa, Pakistan, 
Ethiopia, Mexico) than within countries that  
do not suffer from water stress (i.e., Canada).
This result also suggests that as water resources 
become increasingly stressed globally, the 
importance of managing water will become 
significantly more important for sustaining 
economic growth. Indeed, the OECD’s baseline 
projections indicate that by 2050, 3.9 billion 
people will be subject to severe water stress. 
Three-quarters of these people will live in  
the BRIICS (Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia,  
China and South Africa).28
For agriculture-dependent countries, 
dependence on runoff and the effect of drought 
were significantly greater than they were in 
countries with less dependence on agriculture. 
For these countries, the results imply that  
a major drought (e.g., affecting half a country’s 
27 The	human	water	stress	index	is	described	 
	 in	Table	1.
28 OECD (2012).
2. Water Security, Sustainable Growth, and Well-Being
63
area) may reduce economic growth in that year 
by more than a percentage point in the span  
of a year. For example, based on these numbers, 
Brazil has lost an average of approximately  
a quarter of a percent of economic growth every 
year, for each of the last 30 years, to drought.
In countries without water stress (< 0.8)  
or dependence on agriculture, the drought 
effect is not statistically significant. However, 
runoff remains a statistically significant factor 
even in those countries. This likely indicates 
the aggregate effects of variability and water 
availability, not only on agriculture, but also on 
energy production (e.g., hydropower generation, 
and cooling of thermo-electric power plants). 
Generally, economic growth is higher in years 
with more water available. 
The overall results of this econometric analysis 
on subsets of countries show that the countries 
most vulnerable to the effects of hydro-climatic 
variables are those that are poor, water stressed, 
and/or dependent on agriculture, and that 
growth in these countries is significantly more 
vulnerable to hydro-climatic conditions.
Countries most economically vulnerable to  
hydro-climatic effects (Box 6)
This map shows the countries with: high human water stress (greater than 0.8; hatched);  
low income (World Bank designation; yellow outline); and high agricultural dependence 
(greater than 20%; red); all of which are factors associated with larger effects of water,  
and related hazards, on economic growth. Variables are explained in the note accompanying 
Table 2.
... the countries most 
vulnerable to the effects  
of hydro-climatic variables 
are those that are poor, 
water stressed, and/or 
dependent on agriculture, 
... growth in these 
countries is significantly 
more vulnerable to hydro-
climatic conditions.
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2.5 Summary
The empirical and theoretical analysis 
demonstrates the importance of investment 
in water security for development, and the 
importance of development for investment 
in water security.
Our theoretical analysis of the economics of 
water security, risk, and growth, shows that 
when an economy is exposed to water-related 
risks, there is a benefit attached to early 
investment in assets that mitigate those risks. 
Countries that can make such investments 
protect their growth prospects from water-
related threats, and can therefore better 
harness the productive benefits of water-related 
investments. By contrast, in situations where 
hydrological hazards cause losses that affect 
other sectors of the economy, the economy can 
experience a significant water-related drag. 
Nonetheless, we find that the trajectories 
of changing national wealth over time are 
strongly context-dependent; they rely on a 
specific suite of policy choices and investment 
decisions, made at a specific point in time. 
Where a country is heavily exposed to hydro-
climatic losses (for example, where agriculture 
dominates), the likelihood of substantial 
feedbacks between water-related losses on  
the one hand, and national wealth on the other,  
is strong. In such circumstances, a poverty  
trap is possible. 
In contrasting situations, where the economy 
is more effectively disconnected from water-
related losses - either through economic 
diversification, or via water-related policies, 
practices, and infrastructure that limit 
vulnerabilities - there is a much lower chance 
of experiencing water-related limits to growth. 
In particular, our findings reveal that even in 
an interacting hydro-economic system, the 
route from poverty to wealth cannot be found 
through water-related investments alone. The 
fastest improvements in economic growth arise 
through investments in water-related assets, 
combined with measures to create broad-based 
growth across multiple sectors of the economy.
The empirical findings of this report provide 
new evidence confirming that economic  
growth is vulnerable to negative hydro-climatic 
effects. Water, and water-related hazards,  
have a statistically significant effect on 
economic growth that historically has been at 
least as important - and likely more important 
- than temperature effects.29 These results 
have significant implications for economists 
assessing the potential economic costs of 
climate change. They emphasize that water-
related impacts should be considered; and that 
studies that neglect water may underestimate 
the economic consequences of climate change, 
especially in the most sensitive countries. 
Water availability, and protection against 
drought and flood, are shown to be at the heart 
of the challenge to improve water security. 
Runoff, which can be thought of as fluctuating 
annual water availability, is shown to have 
a statistically significant effect on annual 
economic growth. Drought and flood are also 
shown to have statistically significant negative 
impacts on growth. Together, these factors 
reflect the multiple ways in which water,  
and water hazards, effect economic growth.
The effects of hydro-climatic variables on 
growth are strongest in poor countries as well 
as countries with high human water stress,  
high dependence on agriculture, or both.  
Such countries tend to be concentrated in  
Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, with  
few countries in South America and Europe.
For countries with high human water stress, 
the effect of runoff on per capita GDP growth 
is significantly higher than for other countries. 
29	 The	effects	of	changes	in	both	water	and	 
	 temperature	may	prove	to	be	highly	non-linear.	 
	 Our	empirical	results	estimate	relationships	 
	 within	historical	temperature	ranges,	and	find	 
	 that	water-related	variables	are	likely	to	be	 
	 more	important	than	temperature	variables.	 
	 But	climate	change	will	move	outside	these	 
	 historical	ranges.	If	temperature	increases	 
	 have	highly	non-linear	effects	on	crop	yields,	 
	 the	economic	consequences	may	be	larger	 
	 than	the	water-related	effects	we	see	in	the	 
	 historical	data.
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This suggests that investment in water 
management is more important for growth  
in water stressed countries; and that, as water 
stress increases worldwide, the importance 
of managing water will become significantly 
more important for sustaining global economic 
growth. These findings concerning the 
importance of water resource endowments 
reinforce the insights of the theoretical model 
presented in this chapter.
In agriculture-dependent economies the 
drought effect and the dependence of growth 
on runoff were significantly stronger than in 
countries with less dependence on agriculture. 
Interestingly, in countries that are generally not 
water stressed, nor dependent on agriculture, 
the drought effect is not significant. However, 
runoff remained a statistically significant factor 
even in those countries. This likely reflects the 
aggregate effects of variable water availability; 
not only on agriculture, but also on energy 
production and other productive uses of  
water across the economy. 
There are many ways to address the climate 
effects on growth highlighted in this paper. 
Our analysis suggests that managing the 
risks associated with agriculture-dependent 
economies, and low levels of mean water 
availability, is a priority. The empirical analysis 
reveals key investments to evaluate for de-
linking the hydro-climate from economic 
growth. These include: making better use of 
available water in agriculture (in particular 
irrigation, drought management, and related 
natural and man-made water storage); 
managing financial risks associated with 
periods of shortage and natural disasters  
(e.g., risk sharing instruments); promoting 
transition to less agriculturally-dependent 
economies (e.g., through investment in 
economic diversification); and persevering  
in the provision of water supply and sanitation. 
Econometric analysis shows that these are key 
factors in economies’ vulnerability to water-
related drags, at a global level. Our theoretical 
model supports the need for a blend of water-
related and unrelated investments to promote 
economic diversification and to sustain growth.
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The economic impacts of water insecurity 
materialize through a wide range 
of different mechanisms for people, 
households, businesses, and communities.  
These impacts aggregate and spill over 
national boundaries. 
The nature of these risks and opportunities 
varies both between and within countries. 
Indeed, global water insecurity is very unevenly 
distributed. The uneven distribution of risks 
and opportunities is not simply associated  
with developing economies. 
We shall see that many of the world’s most 
advanced and diversified economies are also 
subject to severe and growing water-related 
risks. Nonetheless, the poorest economies 
worldwide tend to bear the greatest relative 
burden of water insecurity: partly because of 
their hydrological endowment; and because  
of historic under-investment in infrastructure 
and institutions that would help to reduce,  
and manage, water insecurity. We use 
global-scale analysis to build a picture of 
the distribution of water-related risks and 
opportunities.
There are now more data to quantify risks  
on a global scale than has hitherto been 
the case. These datasets are providing new 
opportunities for analysis, but the coverage  
and accuracy of these datasets is still inevitably 
limited. In some locations, there are relatively 
precise datasets, so we take the opportunity 
to incorporate more local information and 
knowledge in the analysis of case studies in 
Chapter 4. Notwithstanding these inevitable 
data limitations, a global perspective on water 
security provides an opportunity to compare 
the nature and scale of risks between different 
countries. The analyses provide decision makers 
in different contexts with evidence of the scale 
of the water security threats and opportunities 
that they face. 
The case for investment in institutions and 
infrastructure requires information - at the 
appropriate scale - about the potential benefits 
(in terms of risk reduction, and economic 
opportunities) and the costs of improving  
water security. The present value of risks  
over some future time-frame provides an  
upper bound on the amount it would be 
worthwhile to invest to eliminate the risk.  
In practice, it is never possible - nor even 
desirable - to reduce risk to zero: so, the benefit 
of risk reduction is the discounted value of the 
risk in the case that no investment is made,  
less the present value of the residual risk  
that remains after investment. Whether 
investment is economically attractive needs 
to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, 
but national assessments have begun to 
demonstrate the economic case for  
investment in water security: for example, 
the UK Environment Agency’s analysis of the 
optimal level of investment in flood protection.1  
Thus, understanding the scale of water-related 
risk, and the potential for risk reduction,  
is only the starting point on the pathway to 
water security. Subsequently in this Report,  
we will demonstrate the importance of the 
design and sequencing of investment in 
infrastructure and institutions.
The present value of  
risks over some future 
time-frame provides  
an upper bound on  
the amount it would  
be worthwhile to invest  
to eliminate the risk.
1	 Environment	Agency	(2014).
3. The Global Status of Water Security
71
3.1 Four headline risks
Water security emerges from complex 
interactions between human and natural 
phenomena. As we have seen in Chapter 2, 
these interactions yield opportunities and 
risks. Here, we apply the logic of risk to 
develop a set of indicators of water security, 
focused upon four headline risks. 
1. Water scarcity
Our analysis of water scarcity combines  
water availability (in surface and groundwater 
sources) and water use. In contrast to metrics 
that deal with average availability per capita, 
our focus is upon the dynamics of supply  
and water use: how they vary from month to 
month and year to year. The manifestation of 
water scarcity is shortage of water for people 
or the environment, on a range of different 
timescales. Because of the effects  
of hydrological variability, the shortages  
can be acute, and may have multiple impacts. 
These events may be referred to as ‘droughts’, 
but in the absence of human vulnerability, 
droughts do not necessarily constitute a risk - 
although, in some circumstances, they produce 
negative impacts on aquatic ecosystems. 
Scarcity is the harmful state that is experienced 
by humans and the environment.
2. Floods
Floods impact households and industry at a 
range of scales, causing direct damage and 
broader indirect disruption to households, 
businesses, and trade. The economic and 
political consequences may be far-reaching. 
Floods are a natural phenomenon, and river 
ecosystems depend on such hydrological 
variability - but when people put themselves  
in the paths of floods, loss of life and damage  
to property can occur. We consider coastal  
and estuarial floods alongside river flooding, 
given the large and growing vulnerability  
of coastal regions (including megacities)  
to flood risk.
3. Inadequate water  
supply and sanitation
The largest human health/mortality risk from 
water is from inadequate water supply and 
sanitation. The risks are a consequence of 
inadequate institutions and infrastructure - 
unable to provide potable water supplies,  
or to separate humans from direct or indirect 
contact with human faeces. This third category 
of risk is effectively a man-made hazard, and a 
consequence of inaction or inability to reduce 
that risk.
4. Ecosystem degradation  
and pollution
Human interventions can have harmful  
side effects on land and water ecosystems. 
These impacts on the environment may 
be deliberate (e.g., draining wetlands for 
agricultural purposes) or inadvertent (e.g., 
diffuse pollution). As well as being harmful  
to habitats and species, these risks undermine 
the ecosystem services that the aquatic 
environment supplies to humankind.
We note that the first two categories of risk 
(scarcity and floods) are manifestations of 
hydrological variability. These two categories 
can overlap, particularly - but not only 
- in the poorest parts of the world; with 
cycles of damaging floods and droughts, 
interspersed with ‘normal’ seasons or years, 
as a consequence of unmitigated hydrological 
variability. The other two categories (harmful 
water supply and sanitation, and ecosystem 
degradation and pollution) are consequences 
of human (in)action. All four of these risks 
interact, so the risks associated with inadequate 
water supply and sanitation can be exacerbated 
by the interplay between hydrological 
variability and human vulnerability.  
For example, flooding can magnify the  
risks of poor sanitation practices by spreading 
faeces widely through a community. Ecosystem 
degradation and pollution can exacerbate the 
risks of droughts and floods. 
We recognize broader indirect concerns  
about water insecurity: especially relating  
to production, services, trade, migration,  
and conflict. These insecurities, which 
materialize in response to the four direct  
risks we have identified, pose greater  
challenges in terms of quantification.
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3.2 Risk-based indicators 
of water security
Risk is a contingent expectation of harmful 
outcomes, measured in the units of those 
outcomes (dollar losses, mortality, species 
declines etc.).
Risk is not an observable quantity. Risk is 
highly context-dependent, and depends on  
the perceptions and attitudes to risk of various 
stakeholders. Thus, any risk metric is bound 
to be a composite: incorporating elements of 
hazard, vulnerability, exposure, and perhaps 
also adaptive capacity – and doing so from  
a range of perspectives.2
The impacts of risks are observable, but these 
impacts occur - at least in part - in a random 
way; thus, observed impacts do not provide an 
effective way of monitoring risk, in particular 
for the most extreme events. In order to develop 
indicators of risk, we need to break risk down 
into its component parts. Conventionally, risk is 
thought of in terms of:
1. Hazard:
the phenomenon with the potential  
to cause harm
2. Exposure:
the people and assets in harm’s way
3. Vulnerability:
the sensitivity of exposed people/assets  
i.e., their susceptibility to harm should  
a hazard materialize.
This suggests a structure for developing 
metrics of water security, based upon hazard, 
exposure, and vulnerability. At the same time, 
risk is thought of as a function of probability 
and consequences of harmful events: where 
the consequences are determined by exposure 
and vulnerability, while the probability 
characterizes the likelihood of the hazard.  
2	 Hall	and	Borgomeo	(2013);	IPCC	(2012).
Vulnerability will be profoundly influenced 
by the actions humans have taken to reduce 
risk, e.g., the construction of flood protection. 
Adaptations may involve infrastructure, 
information, and institutions, typically in 
combination. While many adaptations are 
focused upon particular risks (e.g., water 
allocation), some institutional adaptations  
(e.g., effective river basin management 
institutions) may be cross-cutting. 
Adaptation actions may also modify  
exposure, e.g., via floodplain zoning  
or crop insurance. 
In the long run, all other things being equal, 
we expect the realized impacts of risks to be 
roughly equal to the mathematical expectation 
of the risk. But ‘all other things’ are not equal: 
hazards are changing, for example due to 
climate change and catchment modification, 
and changing vulnerability is an inevitable 
consequence of economic development. Records 
of impact, as well as being inevitably limited by 
reporting gaps and errors, will also reflect these 
changes. Nonetheless, metrics of impact provide 
useful evidence to validate risk estimates and 
so they should be reported within a set of risk-
based indicators. 
Vulnerability will  
be profoundly  
influenced by the  
actions humans  
have taken to  
reduce risk ...
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Thus, our indicator framework has four  
main components (Figure 4): 
A. Hazard
B. Exposure
C. Vulnerability
D. Realized impact.
A, B, and C - when integrated together -  
can provide an estimate of risk, against one  
or more dimensions of risk (e.g., financial loss, 
loss of life). D provides further evidence with 
which to compare, and to some extent validate, 
risk estimates. Each of these four dimensions 
can, in turn, be broken down into measurable 
contributing factors. As our objective has been 
to provide global indicators, the datasets at our 
disposal have been limited; but the risk-based 
indicator framework could be applied  
at small scales, which would enable  
more focused analysis.
Our emphasis in developing water security 
indicators is upon present day risks. Water 
insecurity threatens societies and economies 
now, often requiring urgent action. As we will 
see in Chapter 4, intolerable water-related risks 
have, in the past, triggered adaptation actions 
to manage those risks. Risks are dynamic:  
both changing through time, and interacting 
with economic growth trajectories. Looking 
to the future, we are particularly concerned 
about the factors that may increase the severity 
of water-related hazards (climate change, 
catchment alteration, pollution, etc.) or human 
exposure and vulnerability (e.g., population 
growth or floodplain development).  
Where we have been able to do so, we report  
on the potential future impacts of climate 
change, population, and economic growth, 
based upon scenario studies.
Risks are dynamic: 
both changing through 
time, and interacting 
with economic growth 
trajectories.
Overview of risk-based indicator framework (Fig	4)
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3.3 Global analysis  
of water security:  
(1) water scarcity
In analysing the risk of water scarcity,  
we look beyond the standard calculations  
of average annual water availability  
per capita, instead focusing on shortages 
relative to existing water use in specific 
places, and the frequency and severity  
of those shortages. 
We are concerned about the effects of 
hydrological drought (extreme low flows,  
soil moisture deficits, and low groundwater 
levels) and the interplay with human, economic, 
and environmental water uses. In times of 
shortage, supplies for municipal and industrial 
use will tend to be prioritized over agricultural 
uses and the environment - so, our analysis 
of shortage focuses upon agricultural use, 
and the trade-offs with the water required for 
a sustainable environment. We also explore 
evidence of the impacts of water scarcity for 
other economic activities, such as cooling of 
thermo-electric power plants.
Likelihood of 
water scarcity 
In simple terms, analysis of water scarcity  
is a problem of calculating the ‘water balance’ 
in a given spatial unit of assessment, and 
identifying the frequency with which harmful 
deficits occur. This contrasts with metrics 
of average scarcity that compare the average 
sustainable water available with the average or 
desired water use. Metrics of average scarcity 
provide an overall picture of the likely pressure 
on the resource, but ignore the inherent 
variability in water availability. There may 
be ample water available on average, but if it 
materializes in a highly variable way  
(for example as occasional high flows,  
interspersed by longer periods of low/ 
no flow) then there is a genuine and  
potentially harmful risk of scarcity.  
Our concern is with the frequency and  
severity of harmful shortages, rather than  
with average scarcity.
The analysis starts with global modelling  
of runoff, which Chapter 2 showed to  
be an important hydro-climatic variable, 
impacting economic growth per capita.  
The runoff data were simulated by the  
global hydrological model, MacPDM,3  
run at a 1-degree resolution. Daily runoff 
was calculated by summing the surface and 
subsurface flows, and aggregated to the river 
basin. MacPDM’s performance in reproducing 
observed runoff compares well with other 
global hydrological models, where differences 
in inter-annual variations in runoff between 
models were demonstrated to be fairly small 
in the Water Model Inter-comparison Project.4 
MacPDM was driven by climate variables from 
the reanalysis data set ERA-Interim5 for 1979 to 
2012 inclusive. Daily precipitation, temperature, 
wind speed, surface solar radiation, surface 
thermal radiation, and dew point temperature  
were interpolated onto the 1-degree grid. 
Reanalysis data sets are produced using  
climate models, and incorporate historical 
observations. They offer spatially complete, 
consistent, and coherent records of climate -  
unlike observations alone. 
3 Arnell (1999).
4 Haddeland et al. (2011).
5 ECMWF (2014).
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Figure 5a illustrates the mean annual runoff; 
and Figure 5b shows the coefficient of variation 
of monthly runoff, calculated as the standard 
deviation of all months in the series (1979-
2012), divided by the mean of all months in the 
series. This coefficient of variation captures 
both intra-and inter-annual variability.  
Strong seasonal variability, which is 
experienced in monsoonal and tropical climates, 
limits the productive portion of the year.  
In parts of India, 50 percent of the precipitation 
falls in just 15 days, and over 90 percent of river 
flows are concentrated in only four months  
of the year.6 
6 Briscoe and Malik (2006).
Mean and variation of runoff: (a) mean annual runoff  
(b) coefficient of variation (CV) of monthly runoff (Fig	5)
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The arid regions of the world, like the south-
western United States, Australia, Middle 
East, North Africa, and Central Asia, are 
characterized by strong inter-annual variability, 
with the possibility of multi-year droughts, and 
intense rainfall that far exceeds the average and 
can lead to catastrophic flash flooding.
For each river basin, we have calculated  
the monthly balance of water availability  
(from runoff and groundwater abstractions)  
and water use for irrigated agricultural, 
domestic, and industrial purposes.7  
These estimates of water use can be  
seen in Figure 6. 
7 Rosegrant	et	al.	(2012).
Water use (Fig	6)
Water storage capacity (Fig	7)
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Our analysis of the frequency of shortages of 
water available for use (Figure 8) is calculated 
for Basin-Country Units (BCUs), based on all 
of the world’s large river basins, sub-divided 
where national boundaries cross the basin.  
For transboundary rivers, flows are routed  
from one BCU to the next. In each BCU we  
have aggregated the total amount of storage 
available using the Global Reservoirs and 
Dams Database (GRanD) records data for 6,862 
reservoirs, excluding natural lakes such as the 
Great Lakes.8, 9 Figure 7 shows this aggregate 
storage capacity. We have accounted for 
evaporation losses from these reservoirs.  
The analysis tracked on a monthly basis 
whether there is enough water available  
8 Lehner	et	al.	(2011).	
9	 We	observe	anomalies	with	the	GRanD	database,	 
	 for	example:	the	185bcm	storage	of	(artificial)	 
 Lake Kariba appears to be allocated to Zambia  
	 and	none	to	Zimbabwe,	which	co-owns	the		  
	 Kariba	dam;	 and	the	204.8bcm	regulated	 
	 storage	of	(natural)	Lake	Victoria	appears	 
	 to	be	allocated	to	Uganda.
from rivers, groundwater, or reservoirs  
to satisfy existing water use patterns.
Our risk metric is an indicator of how frequently 
reservoir levels are predicted to fall below 20 
percent of the total storage - which we take as 
being the storage level at which, on average, 
restrictions on water use may be applied  
(Figure 8). The results show how scarcity 
emerges as a combination of hydrological 
variability (Figure 5b) and high human  
use of water (Figure 6), which may in part be 
mitigated by storage infrastructure (Figure 7). 
We observe that this class of water insecurity is 
most severe in South Asia and Northern China, 
but that signicant risks of water shortage exist 
in all continents. Note that this metric will not 
identify water insecurity to rainfed agriculture. 
Furthermore, being based upon river basins, 
the analysis does not address the most arid 
parts of the world through which no rivers flow 
(for example in much of North Africa and the 
Arabian peninsula).
The impacts of water scarcity are of particular 
security concern when water-scarce nations  
are highly dependent on transboundary flows. 
Index of frequency of shortages of water available for use (Fig	8)
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Transboundary water dependence: which water-scarce 
countries are highly dependent on transboundary flows (Fig	9)
Analysis of transboundary water security (Box 7)
Figure 9 was derived using the results of our model of shortage of water availability for  
use. This index is plotted on the y-axis, and is defined as the proportion of months in our  
simulated period (1979-2012) when storage ≤ 20 percent full.
The proportion of months in which water security is reliant on transboundary flows  
from upstream (x-axis) was calculated as follows: Naturalized flows (no storage is included) 
were used to examine the frequency of water scarcity in all BCUs (occasions when the total 
water demand could not be met). Then, transboundary flows were excluded, which meant that 
downstream BCUs had less water supply, and water scarcity was examined again to find the 
number of months in which demand exceeded supply. The difference of water-scarce months 
between these two scenarios was calculated and divided by 408, which is the highest possible 
difference of months. The calculation was thus (shortage frequency without transboundary 
flows minus shortage frequencies with transboundary flows)/all months. In that way, the 
difference of water-scarce months was given more importance than the overall water scarcity 
(92 to 90 water-scarce months have the same importance as 6 to 4 water-scarce months). 
Limitations: This is a water balance model that does not include dam operation rules,  
or political aspects such as water treaties. Results have to be interpreted accordingly.
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In Figure 9, we examined water-scarce BCUs 
using the same index of shortage frequency 
as used in Figure 8, but have also identified 
the proportion of water use that is supplied 
by transboundary flows. Egypt has the 
highest transboundary water dependence, 
but, because of the large storage capacity in 
Lake Nasser, Egypt has reasonable reliability 
of water available for use. The Indus and Aral 
basins stand out as having unreliable water 
supplies that are also highly dependent on 
transboundary flows (see Box 7 for further 
discussion).
Consequence 
of surface and 
groundwater 
water scarcity
The analysis in Chapter 2 has highlighted how 
water insecurity can impact the economies 
of agriculture-dependent countries. In our 
analysis of water scarcity we have therefore 
focused upon the impacts on agricultural 
production, and the consequences of reduced 
crop yields, increased agricultural commodity 
prices, and their child malnutrition impacts. 
The consequences of hydrological variability for 
food production have been modelled with the 
IMPACT model.10 The IMPACT model is a partial 
equilibrium agricultural sector model linked with 
a global hydrology model, a global water supply 
and demand model, and a gridded global crop 
simulation model. Unlike previous analyses, the 
effects of variability in precipitation and runoff 
on crop yields have been analysed, to give better 
insight into the effect of unmitigated variability 
on fluctuations in agricultural production and 
the value of the agricultural sector to national 
economies. The model has been calibrated 
to reproduce production averaged over the 
years 2004-2006. Figure 10 shows the global 
10 Rosegrant	et	al.	(2012).
Total national food crop production (Fig	10)  
‘Other	crops’	=	all	cereals	other	than	rice,	wheat,	and	maize,	plus	soybeans
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distribution of the production of food crops in 
2010, with three staple crops (rice, wheat,  
and maize) shown explicitly.
Analysis of the variation of crop yields 
demonstrates that some locations are more 
susceptible to hydrological variability than 
others. Africa stands out as having the greatest 
variability in agricultural yields, while South 
America, Central Asia, and parts of Europe show 
significant variability as well. (See Figure 11.)
We can analyze the economic significance of 
hydrological variability on food crop production 
by using the IMPACT model to simulate a 
situation in which variability is effectively 
suppressed by assuming that water storage 
and delivery capacity is able to maximize the 
use of all available water. In this scenario, 
reservoir storage capacity and surface water 
withdrawal capacity constraints in the IMPACT 
model are relaxed so that surface water supply 
is not limited by the regulation capacity of 
surface reservoirs and the withdrawal capacity 
of diversion and conveyance infrastructure. 
Irrigation area is fixed and groundwater 
withdrawal capacity is retained to control 
depletion. Rain-fed agriculture is not directly 
affected by this scenario, although may be 
indirectly affected through price effects. This 
counterfactual still respects the constraints 
on water availability, but supposes that the 
available water can be stored and delivered 
efficiently to existing users to enable 
agricultural production.
This scenario, which makes more water 
available to irrigated agriculture, increases 
global production and also reduces the 
variability in production of some food 
commodities (notably rice) and prices (see 
upper graphs of Figure 12). Investing to enhance 
water security reduces the probability of food 
production being at the low end of the ranges 
shown in Figure 12. For example, the probability 
of global wheat production falling below 650 
million tons per year is reduced from 83 percent 
to 38 percent. The IMPACT model has been 
used to estimate the corresponding variation 
in the prices of food commodities (Figure 12). 
The effect is greatest for rice, which is the 
most irrigation-dependent of the three crops. 
The effect of suppressing water insecurity not 
only reduces the mean rice price, but also has 
a noticeable effect on the variance in the price. 
The probability that the price of rice could 
exceed US$400 per ton is reduced from  
21 percent to 0.7 percent, in the market 
conditions simulated in the model.
Coefficient of variation (CV) of annual food crop production 
(Fig	11)
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There would be winners and losers in the 
scenario described above. The drop in prices 
would diminish the incomes of some farmers. 
Other farmers, who are currently water insecure 
(and likely more poor and vulnerable), would 
be able to increase production significantly and 
increase their incomes despite the drop  
in prices. 
All consumers would benefit from lower food 
prices, which would be particularly important 
for low-income households. 
To measure the welfare implications of this 
scenario, IFPRI’s IMPACT model was used to 
estimate aggregate welfare benefits. On the 
consumer side, demand curves with regional 
demand elasticities adjusted from the United 
States Department of Agriculture were used to 
Variability in food crop production and commodity prices, 
plotted as probability density functions (Fig	12)
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calculate the consumer surplus. On the producer 
side, supply curves come from price-sensitive 
area and yield functions by land type (irrigated 
and rain-fed) at the sub-regional level and were 
used to calculate producer surplus. Because 
IMPACT is a partial equilibrium model,  
it directly captures changes in producer and 
consumer surplus only in agriculture, but not 
any welfare gains from spillover effects from 
agriculture to the rest of the economy.  
We provide an estimated measure of this 
spillover effect at the national level that must 
be viewed as an approximation since we do not 
have information about supply and demand 
curves in the non-agricultural sectors. 
Using this analysis, the total welfare gains of 
improving water security to existing irrigators 
was estimated to be US$94 billion globally for 
2010, of which about half comes from standard 
measures of producer and consumer surplus  
(for producers from increased water security 
and for consumers from reduced food prices) 
and half from spillover effects to the non-
agricultural sectors. These welfare changes  
are plotted in Figure 12.
While the aggregate welfare benefits are very 
significant, they represent a rather narrow 
interpretation of the potential benefits of water 
security for agriculture, because the analysis 
relates only to irrigated agriculture, not to 
rain-fed agriculture. Moreover, the opportunity 
that water security might provide to expand 
irrigated areas is not included.
To test the potential economic benefits  
of increasing irrigation, we have modelled 
a scenario in which the area of irrigated 
agriculture is increased by 3.8 percent.  
The global welfare benefit of this increased  
area of irrigation, accompanied by secure  
water supplies, is calculated to be US$246 
billion per year. 
Welfare gains and losses in a scenario in which there is more 
water available for irrigation, helping to suppress the effects 
of hydrological variability (Fig	13)
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Furthermore, there are also opportunities for 
other water-related innovations, often at a farm 
and field scale, to improve productivity; such 
investments might be made as a consequence 
of enhanced water security. The results of this 
welfare analysis should therefore be taken as  
a lower bound.
Variable agricultural production directly 
impacts nutrition of subsistence farmers.  
Low yields during periods of water scarcity,  
and the consequent increase in prices, impacts 
all low-income households that spend a large 
share of their household income on food.
The IMPACT analysis of malnutrition (Figure 14) 
estimates that 150 million children are currently 
undernourished, with the impacts greatest  
in South and Southeast Asia and widely 
distributed across Africa.
Projecting 
future 
agricultural 
risks and 
opportunities
Increasing global populations and increasing 
diversity of demand for food associated with 
increasing wealth will intensify pressure on 
water resources.  
Figure 15 shows the scale of these potential 
increases in demand for irrigation water. 
Whether these increases can be sustainably 
achieved, depends in part, on the scale of 
climate change. To estimate future agricultural 
production and water use, we have combined 
a scenario of population growth and socio-
economic change, based on the SSP2 scenario 
Child malnutrition (2010) (Fig	14)
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Future food crop production (Fig	16)
Future irrigation water use (Fig	15)
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of the Shared Socio-Economic Pathways11 with 
a corresponding set of climate projections 
from the HadGEM climate model run with an 
RCP8.5 forcing. The results show that population 
growth and increasing wealth will drive demand 
for food commodities, in the context of a more 
variable climate. By 2050, food production will 
increase in all regions, the greatest proportional 
increase being projected in South America 
(Figure 16).
Consequences  
of water 
insecurity for 
energy security
Thermo-electric power plants (coal, gas, 
nuclear) depend directly on the availability  
and temperature of water resources for cooling.
During recent warm, dry summers several 
thermoelectric power plants in Europe and 
the south eastern United States were forced 
to reduce production owing to cooling-water 
scarcity.12 Vulnerability to the risks of water 
shortage on cooling water supplies depends 
on the power plant location and cooling 
technology. We have analyzed this vulnerability 
making use of the index of shortage frequency 
shown in Figure 8. We have multiplied this 
index by the cooling water demand of the 
power plants located in each river basin. Figure 
17 therefore shows where power plants are 
located in river basins that we have calculated 
to have potentially unreliable water availability. 
India and northern China stand out as having 
the highest water security risks to electricity 
production. South Asia and the southern 
United States also have noteworthy risks. 
We have not been able to disaggregate power 
plants by cooling type, which is an important 
determinant of their vulnerability. 
11	 Kriegler	et	al.	(2014).
12 van Vliet et al. (2012).
For countries that are highly dependent on 
hydropower, reductions in flow can mean 
shifting demand to more expensive and 
polluting thermal plants. Brazil relies on 
hydropower for 75 percent of its electricity 
supply, but a severe drought has forced 
production to shift to thermo-electric plants, 
with consequential price increases and a surge 
in imports of Liquefied Natural Gas. 
Where water resources are secure and abundant, 
hydropower represents an opportunity for 
renewable energy production. However,  
the distribution of hydropower exploitation 
worldwide is uneven. Using data from the 
International Hydropower Association,  
in Figure 18 we illustrate the proportion of 
hydropower potential that has been exploited  
in different countries worldwide, noting 
that this reflects physical potential but not 
necessarily economic or financial feasibility,  
or environmental desirability. 
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13
13	 International	Hydropower	Association.
Vulnerability of thermal power plants to unreliable cooling 
water availability (Fig	17)
Hydropower generation capacity and potential13 (Fig	18)
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3.4 Global analysis of  
water security: (2) floods 
The societal and economic impacts of  
river and coastal flooding are large,  
and the economic losses associated with 
flooding are increasing rapidly because 
more property is at risk in floodplains.  
For example, Kundzewicz et al.14 estimate 
that fluvial flood losses at the global level 
have increased from US$7 billion per year 
during the 1980s, to US$24 billion per year 
during 2001-2011 (inflation-corrected). 
These floods affected the livelihoods of 
millions of people. The economic impacts of 
flooding can negatively affect the long-term 
economic performance of countries15 as well 
as directly affect the well-being of people.16
While records of flood losses provide some 
indication of impacts from flooding, they do 
not fully reflect the scale and extent of risk. 
Global flood risk assessment that incorporates 
quantification of hazards, vulnerability, and 
exposure can help to provide a more complete 
picture. 
The analysis conducted here combines  
results from two global flood models (Box 8):  
1. The GLOFRIS model17 has been used to  
assess risks from river flooding. 
2. The DIVA model18 has been used to assess 
flood risk in coastal and estuarine areas.
By combining GLOFRIS and DIVA, we have for 
the first time been able to assess the combined 
risks of fluvial and coastal flooding. In both 
cases, as Box 8 shows, the economic risks of 
flooding have been estimated by quantifying the 
damage to assets located in (fluvial or coastal) 
14 Kundzewicz et al. (2014).
15 Brown et al. (2013).
16 Luechinger	and	Raschky	(2009).
17 Ward	et	al.	(2013);	Winsemius	et	al.	(2013).
18	 Hinkel	and	Klein	(2009);	Hinkel	et	al.	(2014).
floodplains for floods of different severity, 
where that severity is measured in terms of 
return period (the average time between arrival 
of flood of that severity). The population at 
risk has been estimated using gridded global 
population datasets.
The economic risk of flooding is spread  
across countries at all income levels (Figure 19). 
Our analysis suggests that the United States, 
China, and India all have expected annual 
damages (EAD) in excess of US$10 billion.  
As a share of GDP, the losses are greatest in 
South and Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa 
and parts of South America (Figure 20).  
These economic losses are expectations  
and do not materialize every year. They occur  
as extreme events at a range of severities 
(Figure 21). Large countries will incur some 
floods - of at least low severity - each year; 
however, the expected annual damages also 
incorporate the risk of occasional extreme 
events that will greatly exceed the EAD.  
For example, floods in Thailand in 2011  
resulted in economic losses of US$46 billion.19 
Because of the differing standards of flood 
protection, the risk in high-income countries 
materializes from less frequent - but more 
severe - events overwhelming flood protection. 
At return periods greater than 100 years,  
the damage potential in North America  
exceeds that in Asia.
19 World Bank (2012).
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20 Ward	et	al.	(2013);	Winsemius	et	al.	(2013).
21 Hinkel	and	Klein	(2009);	Hinkel	et	al.	(2014).
22 Hallegatte	et	al.	(2013).
GLOFRIS and DIVA (Box 8)
GLOFRIS is a cascade of models for estimating flood risk at the global scale.20 GLOFRIS 
calculates flood risk at a resolution of 30x30 arc-seconds (c. 1 km x 1 km at the equator).  
The cascade of models in GLOFRIS essentially involves five steps: (a) hydrological and  
hydraulic modelling to develop daily time-series of flood volumes; (b) extreme value  
statistics to estimate flood volumes for different return periods; (c) inundation modelling 
for different return periods; (d) impact modelling; and (e) estimating impacts under flood 
protection and calculating annual expected impacts.
The Dynamic Interactive Vulnerability model (DIVA) currently offers the most detailed  
global scale representation of the coastal zone and relevant processes at a global scale.21  
DIVA assesses biophysical and socio-economic consequences of sea-level rise and socio-
economic development. It incorporates coastal erosion (both direct and indirect), coastal 
flooding (including rivers), wetland change, and salinity intrusion into deltas and estuaries. 
DIVA is also able to account for adaptation in terms of raising dikes and nourishing shores  
and beaches.
To estimate economic flood risk, we have made assumptions about the standard of flood 
protection in different locations. Estimates of actual protection standards have been used  
for the world’s largest 140 port cities.22
Fluvial Coastal
Urban Rural Urban Rural
Low income 1:10 None 1:10 None
Lower-middle income 1:25 None 1:25 None
Upper-middle income 1:50 1:10 1:100 1:20
High income 1:100 1:50 1:200 1:50
Netherlands 1:1000 1:1000 1:10000 1:10000
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Expected annual damage due to fluvial and coastal flooding 
(Fig	19)
Expected annual damage due to fluvial and coastal flooding  
as a share of GDP (Fig	20)
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Our expected annual damage estimates are 
larger than previous estimates23 and empirical 
estimates based on reported losses. We have 
included coastal flood risk. Moreover, the length 
of time over which reported losses are available 
is limited, and we suspect that ‘reported’  
losses do not report all losses, in particular 
losses from smaller but more frequent floods.
Modelling of flood damage at a global scale 
is in its infancy, and there are significant 
limitations. The results are sensitive to the 
assumed protection levels. For countries 
with a high standard of protection and dense 
floodplain development, a small underestimate 
in the standard of protection can greatly 
increase the flood damage estimate, introducing 
a bias into the analysis. The protection 
standards assumed in this study (Box 8) are 
relatively crude estimates, so cannot accurately 
represent all protection standards globally. For 
example the River Rhine, which has an assumed 
protection standard of 1:100 years in this 
study, is known to have an average protection 
23 Kundzewicz et al. (2014).
standard of about 1:750 years (higher in some 
places, lower in others). The risk calculation 
itself uses best practice for broad scale studies, 
but there are inevitable approximations in the 
assumed water levels during floods, both in 
rivers and in floodplains. Finally, the data used 
for constructing damage functions in poorer 
parts of the world is very limited, meaning that 
flood damages may be under- or overestimated.
The damages estimated in our analysis include 
only direct financial losses to built assets in the 
floodplain. The risk estimate does not include 
the effects of business interruptions, human 
health and life losses, employment disruptions, 
or potential economic spill-overs, which during 
the Thailand floods of 2011, for example, had 
disruptive impacts on global manufacturing 
supply chains.
Damage due to floods at different return periods (Fig	21)
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Floods not only cause property losses,  
they also put people’s lives and health at 
risk. While the financial risks of flooding are 
distributed across the continents, the greatest 
flood risk for human lives and health (measured 
in Figure 24 in terms of the expected number  
of people at risk from flooding) is concentrated 
in Asia, in particular in South and Southeast 
Asia and China (Figure 22). The exposed 
population increases steadily with return period 
(Figure 23) and Asian population dominates 
throughout. While we have not been able to 
calculate the population exposed to coastal 
flood risk at all return periods, for 1:100 and 
1:1000 year events the coastal exposure is 
roughly a quarter of the fluvial exposure.  
The reported flood impacts on people  
(Figure 24) broadly reflect our risk analysis.
Flood risk to people (Fig	22)
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24	 EM-DAT	(2014).
Expected number of people exposed to flooding at different 
flood return periods (Fig	23)
People affected by floods (1980-2013)24 (Fig	24)
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Projecting 
future risks
Flood risk will increase as a consequence of 
increasing population exposure, and the value 
of financial assets at risk. In coastal locations, 
sea-level rise, along with subsidence in many 
densely populated deltas,25 will increase flood 
hazard. The effects of climate change on fluvial 
flood risk are more difficult to predict: a recent 
model inter-comparison study26 found that the 
return level of a 1:30 year flood decreases in 
magnitude and frequency at roughly one-third 
(20–45 percent) of the global land grid points, 
particularly in areas where the hydrograph is 
dominated by snowmelt flood peak in spring.  
In most model experiments, however, an 
increase in flooding frequency was found in 
more than half of the grid points.
We have used selected scenarios from model 
analyses of future flood risk to explore the 
challenge that this aspect of water security 
poses in the future (2030s and 2050s,  
Figure 25). As with the agricultural projections, 
the analysis is based upon the Shared Socio-
economic Pathways (SSPs).27 The coastal 
scenarios contain the projected effect of sea-
level rise on flood risk while the fluvial analysis 
does not include the effect of climate change 
on fluvial flood risk, given the uncertainties in 
the direction of future change. In all cases, the 
scenarios do not include additional investment 
in flood protection. The most striking effect on 
the financial risk of flooding is the projected 
increase in coastal flood risk in Asia, driven by 
the combined factors of coastal urbanization 
and rising sea levels. By the 2030s, in the 
absence of adaptation, the coastal flood risk is 
projected to increase by a factor of four while 
the fluvial flood risk could more than double. 
Thus, flood risk is already a major contributor to 
water insecurity and is set to increase in future.
25 Syvitski et al. (2009).
26 Dankers et al. (2014).
27 Kriegler	et	al.	(2014).
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Scenario analysis of future flood risk (Fig	25)
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3.5 Global analysis  
of water security:  
(3) inadequate water  
supply and sanitation 
The economic benefits of improving 
inadequate water supply and sanitation do 
not just include improved health outcomes. 
Bringing piped water services to households 
saves time spent collecting water from 
outside the home (especially of women),  
and results in important quality of life 
benefits. Improved sanitation services 
can also result in time-savings where 
households are walking away from their 
homes to defecate in the open, as well 
as improved human dignity and reduced 
vulnerability to personal assault  
(again, especially for women).
While major steps have been taken to address 
the risks of inadequate water supply and 
sanitation, this continues to be the largest 
global water security risk in terms of annual 
numbers of fatalities (Figure 26). The data on 
access to water supply and sanitation, which 
come from the WHO/UNESCO Joint Monitoring 
Programme (Box 9) data for 2012, demonstrate 
that the risks are concentrated in South Asia 
and Africa, which reflects the size of the 
population without access to improved water 
supplies (Figures 27 and 28) and sanitation 
(Figures 29 and 30). Improvements in access  
to water supply and sanitation have kept pace 
with global population growth (Figures 28  
and 30), but the risk persists, and is increasing 
in Africa.28
28 Jeuland et al. (2013).
The World Health Organization (WHO) has 
estimated economic losses associated with 
inadequate water supply and sanitation (WSS) 
(Figure 31).29 The value of time-savings that 
result from using a water source or latrine 
closer to home than existing facilities accounts 
for a large share of total economic losses. 
The estimated economic losses also include 
healthcare costs, lost productive time due to 
being sick, and premature mortality. WHO 
estimates the total global economic losses 
associated with inadequate water supply and 
sanitation to be US$260 billion annually in 2010, 
or 1.5 percent of GDP of the countries included 
in this study.30 In Niger, Democratic Republic  
of Congo, and Somalia, the economic losses 
from inadequate WSS is estimated to be equal  
to more than 10 percent of GDP (2010 estimates). 
The largest absolute economic losses are 
incurred in China and India, which together 
account for US$120 billion in economic losses 
annually, though in China these losses now  
only amount to 1.6% of GDP.
29 Hutton	(2013);	WHO	(2012).
30 Ibid.
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31 WHO	UNICEF	(2012).
32 Ibid.
Percentage of population without access to improved  
water supply32 (Fig	27)
Deaths from water supply and sanitation related diseases31  
(Fig	26)
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Definitions of water supply and sanitation 
from the WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring 
Programme (JMP) (Box 9)
The Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) publishes coverage statistics 
for two definitions of improved water services. The first is the 
simplest and most straightforward: ‘a piped water connection on 
the premises’. This definition includes both yard taps (outdoor 
plumbing), and piped water delivered inside the house (indoor 
plumbing). The second statistic measures: ‘an improved water 
source that by the nature of its construction, adequately protects 
the source from outside contamination in particular with faecal 
matter’. The JMP classifies all of the following as improved sources: 
(1) piped into dwelling, plot, or yard; (2) public tap/standpipe; (3) 
tube well/borehole; (4) protected dug well; (5) protected spring; and 
(6) rainwater collection. ‘Piped into dwelling, plot, or yard’ (item 1, 
above) is one of the six types of improved sources, therefore the first 
definition is a subset of the second definition, i.e., reported coverage 
using the second definition will always be higher than reported 
coverage using the first definition.
Both indicators of coverage can be misleading. First, a piped water 
connection on the premises is counted as an improved source in 
both JMP definitions, but there is no assurance that the quality of 
water delivered to the household is potable. A piped connection 
that delivered unreliable, poor-quality water is still counted as an 
‘improved source’. Similarly, for the second definition, water from 
the other types of improved sources may be contaminated - yet the 
household will still be counted as having an ‘improved source’. 
Second, water sources considered by the JMP to be ‘unimproved’ 
may, in fact, provide a household with potable water. For example, 
water vendors (both tanker trucks and distributing vendors) and 
bottled water are counted as ‘unimproved sources’, even though 
both may reliably supply a household with sufficient quantities of 
safe (i.e., high-quality) water. 
Third, both indicators of coverage implicitly assume that a 
household only uses one source for its drinking water. This is often 
untrue. Households may collect drinking water from both improved 
and unimproved sources, even if their ‘improved’ water source is a 
piped water connection on the premises. Despite these limitations, 
the JMP data on improved water coverage are the best available,  
and we rely upon them for our analysis.
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33 Jeuland et al. (2013).
34	 WHO	UNICEF	(2012).
Changes in population without access  
to improved water supply33 (Fig	28)
Percentage of population without access  
to improved sanitation34 (Fig	29)
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35 Jeuland et al. (2013).
36	 Hutton	(2013);	WHO	(2012).
Change in access to improved sanitation35 (Fig	30)
Economic losses from inadequate water supply  
and sanitation36 (Fig	31)
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3.6 Global analysis of water 
security: (4) ecosystem 
degradation and pollution
Water-related threats to the natural 
environment arise from human action for 
a number of reasons including: pollution, 
over-abstraction, modification of the 
natural variability of flow regimes and  
of river, wetland, and coastal morphology. 
Many of these impacts are a consequence  
of humans adapting to water-related risks  
that have already been described, notably:
• water abstraction as a response to  
water scarcity
• interruption of river connectivity and natural 
flow regimes due to reservoir construction, 
for water supply, irrigation, hydropower,  
or flood control
• river training, dredging, and separation from 
floodplains, to enable urban expansion or in 
order to reduce flood risks
• urban wastewater discharges resulting from 
piped sewer networks without wastewater 
treatment facilities. 
Other threats arise from industrial activities, 
including waterway modification for navigation, 
point and diffuse pollution from industry and 
agriculture, over-fishing, and temperature 
modifications from cooling water. The presence 
of invasive species is, in part, a broader 
consequence of globalization.
The threats are therefore multiple and 
interacting. The scale of the risk depends upon 
the sensitivity of the natural environment 
to these hazards, acting individually and in 
combination. Analysis of the nature of water-
related risks to the natural environment at a 
global scale is in its infancy, and in particular, 
there is very limited analysis of the relationship 
between environmental threat and observed 
impacts (for example in terms of species 
distributions or extinction).
Here we rely extensively on the work of 
Vörösmarty and colleagues who analyzed 
threats to river biodiversity on a global scale.37 
We supplement that analysis with evidence 
of actual impacts on aquatic species (from 
the IUCN Red List) and our own analysis of 
the locations where environmental water 
requirements are threatened and/or not met.
Figure 32 illustrates the global distribution of 
pollution threat, which includes the effects of 
nitrogen loading, phosphorous loading, mercury 
deposition, pesticide loading, organic loading, 
salinization, acidification, and sediment 
loading. The index reflects the impacts that 
intensive agriculture, industries, and over-
abstraction have on water quality.
We have estimated the frequency of over-
abstraction relative to environmental water 
requirements through consideration of
proposed environmental flow requirements 
(EFR), which here are defined as a percentage 
of the monthly flow.38 In the analysis of water 
scarcity, we estimated residual flows after 
human abstractions and the effect of reservoirs. 
We have calculated the average residual flow, 
as a percentage of the EFR for every month of 
the year. In Figure 33, we show the fraction 
of months in which the flow is less than the 
EFR. This illustrates where the environment’s 
requirement for water is most impacted by 
water use.
37 Vörösmarty et al. (2010).
38 Pastor et al. (2014).
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39 Vörösmarty et al. (2010).
Aggregated pollution hazard39 (Fig	32)
Fraction of months in which flows are less  
than environmental flow requirements (Fig	33)
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Evidence of harmful impacts of water-related 
risks to ecosystems is scarce. The most 
extensive relevant dataset are IUCN Red List 
records for amphibians (the data for freshwater 
fish are even less complete) (Figure 34).  
The data are limited by incomplete coverage  
and to some extent reflect the native extent  
of amphibian species. Nonetheless, alongside 
the composite biodiversity map and analysis  
of environmental flows, Figure 34 helps to build 
up a picture of the environmental dimension  
of water insecurity.
The various environmental metrics we  
have developed are not directly comparable. 
However, by evaluating the metrics in 
combination, we can begin to develop an 
overview of water-related threats to the  
natural environment.
Table 3 ranks countries according to each of 
these metrics and shows the top ten countries 
where the risks to the aquatic environment  
are greatest according to these metrics.
40	 Adapted	by	WRI	from	IUCN.
Threatened amphibians40	(Fig	34)
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Top ten countries for risks to the aquatic environment (Table	3)
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3.7 Aggregating  
water security risks
From the analysis presented in this chapter,  
we observe that different parts of the  
world are subject to different versions of 
water insecurity. The risks of water scarcity 
are concentrated in locations with highly 
variable hydrology and over-exploitation 
of relatively scarce resources. The risks to 
people from flooding are greatest in Asia. 
The economic risks from flooding  
are increasing in all locations worldwide, 
due to increasing economic vulnerability, 
and Asia is set to overtake North America 
and Europe as having the greatest economic 
concentration of flood risk. The burden  
of inadequate water supply and sanitation  
is greatest for Sub-Saharan Africa,  
but significant economic impacts are 
still felt in Asia. Hazards to the aquatic 
environment have tended to materialize  
as a consequence of industrialization.
Each of these four categories has major 
economic implications: 
1. As we saw in Chapter 2 of this Report,  
the economic consequences of droughts  
and water scarcity are most pronounced  
in agriculture-dependent economies.  
Runoff variability affects all economies, 
however, reflecting non-agricultural impacts 
such as instances of water scarcity impacting 
hydropower production (as in Brazil) and 
cooling water availability. While water 
scarcity can also hit urban water supplies, 
urban water demands tend to be prioritized 
in times of scarcity, so the earliest impacts 
are felt in agricultural production. We 
have therefore based our economic metric 
on the estimates of the economic value of 
water-related constraints on agricultural 
production as being the primary economic 
metric of water scarcity (Figure 13).
2. Our analysis of flood risk was computed 
directly in terms of expected annual damages 
(expressed in financial terms) (Figure 19). 
These calculations are for damage to property 
and do not include agricultural losses, but 
these tend to be less than urban damage.  
Nor does the analysis incorporate the 
economic impacts of business interruption 
and spillover effects.
3. The economic impacts of inadequate water 
supply and sanitation are based on WHO 
estimates of the benefits of universal access 
(Figure 31). Most of these impacts are 
associated with unproductive use of time  
due to inadequate WSS, along with healthcare 
costs and loss of life.
4. Degradation of the aquatic environment is 
reflected in the lost value of the ecosystem 
services that those environments supply. 
While the value of freshwater ecosystem 
services has been estimated,41 the value by 
which those services have been reduced due 
to degradation in the aquatic environment 
has not been estimated. We are therefore 
not able to incorporate an environmental 
dimension in our calculation of the economic 
scale of these water-related risks.
Given very different economic assumptions 
used to estimate (1) the welfare impacts of 
water scarcity for agriculture; (2) the expected 
direct damages due to flooding; and (3) the 
economic impacts of inadequate water supply 
and sanitation, these economic values are not 
directly comparable. To show how the burden of 
risk is distributed between countries and across 
risks, we have standardized the three categories 
of economic impact to have equal total impact 
globally. Figure 35 shows this relative burden  
of economic risk. 
41 Wilson and Carpenter (1999).
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Relative economic impacts of water insecurity (Fig	35) 
Relative economic impacts of water insecurity,  
per capita (Fig	36)
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China and India stand out carrying the greatest 
total economic burden of water insecurity, 
and are subject to all three risk categories. In 
Africa the economic impact from inadequate 
water supply and sanitation is greatest, whereas 
in most advanced economies flooding makes 
the greatest contribution to economic risk. 
In Figure 36 this economic burden has been 
divided by the national population. On a per 
capita basis, Africa and the Middle East stand 
out as having the greatest economic impacts 
from water insecurity.
The risks of water insecurity impact people 
directly in terms of health, livelihoods, and 
wider well-being. These diverse impacts are  
not necessarily comparable with one-another, 
but we can endeavour to quantify which 
populations are most heavily burdened by  
water insecurity (Table 4). We have ranked 
countries according to:
1. the number of people exposed to shortages  
of different severity
2. the number of people at risk of flooding
3. the number of people without access to 
improved sanitation.42
The impacts on people are for the most part 
concentrated in lower-middle income countries. 
India and China stand out as the most water 
insecure nations according to all three of the 
risks to people. Pakistan and Bangladesh also 
rank highly in all three rankings for risks to 
people. 
Table 5 shows the top ten countries that have 
the greatest percentage of population exposed 
to the three major risks to people listed 
above. All of the countries with the highest 
percentages at risk of flooding or without access 
to improved sanitation are low or lower-middle 
income countries. Vietnam, Myanmar, and 
Bangladesh are global hotspots for flood risk 
in absolute and per capita terms. Some of the 
poorest countries of the world have the lowest 
levels of access to improved sanitation.
42 To	avoid	double	counting	within	this	category,	 
	 the	number	of	people	without	access	to	improved	 
	 water	supply	has	not	been	included.	
In Africa the economic 
impact from inadequate 
water supply and 
sanitation is greatest, 
whereas in most advanced 
economies flooding makes 
the greatest contribution  
to economic risk.
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Top ten countries for people at risk of water insecurity (Table	4)
Top ten countries (with population greater than 1 million)  
for proportion of population at risk of water insecurity (Table	5)
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3.8 Toward common 
metrics of water security
The analysis described in this chapter has 
sought to develop quantified metrics of the 
impacts of water security. We have focused 
upon risks of water insecurity to people 
and the environment, and also sought to 
quantify some of the economic benefits that 
water security could yield.
Quantified metrics of risk and opportunity 
provide a logical and consistent approach to 
measuring water security. The approach is 
attractive in that it focuses on outcomes that 
people value: economic and human well-being, 
and health of the environment. Calculation of 
these metrics has been based on a consistent 
methodology of risk, aimed at understanding 
water-related hazards and their consequences. 
This risk-based approach provides a consistent 
logic, which avoids arbitrariness in the 
specification of water security metrics.  
The quantification of risk provides a  
starting point for estimating the value of 
investing in order to reduce risk. Thus, there  
is a direct link from our analysis to the process 
of building an economic case for reduction of 
water insecurity. 
The analysis has involved large quantities 
of data. These data have been aggregated to 
develop headline indicators of four key water-
related risks:
1. The economic and human 
impacts of water scarcity 
We have concentrated upon agriculture and 
malnutrition, but even from this rather focused 
perspective, the analysis has raised challenges 
of defining a reasonable counterfactual of water 
security for farmers. We expect future studies 
to also quantify the economic impacts of water 
scarcity for the energy sector, other industries, 
and municipal water supplies.
2. The economic and human 
impacts of flooding
We have focused upon direct impacts of fluvial 
and coastal flooding on urban assets, and the 
associated populations at risk. We expect future 
studies to quantify potential for loss-of-life 
and health impacts, and to explore the indirect 
economic impacts to business and supply  
chain interruption.
3. The economic and human 
impacts of inadequate water 
supply and sanitation (WSS) 
We have been able to draw upon the JMP’s 
monitoring efforts of the Millennium 
Development Goal for WSS, and in-depth 
economic analysis from the WHO, to present 
estimates of economic damages of, and 
populations at risk from, inadequate water 
supply and sanitation.
4. The impacts of water 
insecurity on the natural 
environment
We have inevitably used a multi-attribute 
approach, drawing upon indicators of pollution, 
flow disruption, and environmental impact.  
We expect that future studies will seek to 
quantify the economic value of water security 
threats to ecosystems services.
Each of the economic metrics is based upon 
somewhat different methodological approaches. 
We expect future studies to explore more 
general and transferable approaches and 
datasets for quantification of the economics of 
water security. A focus upon monetization also 
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... the analysis  
reported here has  
put in place frameworks 
and methodology for  
the quantification of  
water security.
risks overlooking important impacts that are 
harder to monetize: most notably, the impacts 
upon the natural environment, and the social 
and cultural values associated with sustainable 
water resources management. Even with further 
progress in monetization, water security will 
continue to be a multi-attribute construct.
The methods we have used to calculate  
risk can doubtless be improved upon, so we 
expect that future assessments will generate 
better estimates. Nonetheless, we believe  
that the analysis reported here has put  
in place frameworks and methodology  
for the quantification of water security.
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3.9 Summary
Water insecurity has harmful impacts 
on people, economies, and the natural 
environment. Those risks influence people 
directly: for example, via the health impacts 
of inadequate water supply and sanitation; 
through reduced yields to farmers because 
of water scarcity; or through damage to 
people’s health and homes because of floods. 
Water-related risks also influence people’s 
economic opportunities: for example, 
through the time required to collect water, 
which could be used for other productive 
activities. Water-related risks have impacts 
on production, notably in the agriculture 
and energy sectors. They can impact the 
natural environment as well, in ways that 
are less amenable to quantification in 
economic terms.
In this chapter, we have sought to quantify, as 
far as global datasets have allowed, the most 
important direct water-related risks to the 
economy, society, and the environment. The 
focus of these metrics reflects the findings 
of the global econometric analysis developed 
in Chapter 2. That analysis pointed to runoff 
variability (in particular scarcity and flood), and 
to investments in water supply and sanitation 
(WSS) as important factors in water security. We 
have demonstrated the scale of water-related 
risks using global-scale analysis, providing 
a basis for comparison between risks, and 
between countries. It has not been possible to 
monetize all of the impacts of water security; 
a multi-attribute approach has allowed us to 
incorporate dimensions (most notably, of risks 
to the natural environment) that are more 
problematic to monetize. The analysis has 
demonstrated the following:
• Inadequate WSS has been estimated to be the 
largest water-related risk globally, in terms 
of economic and human impact. This is a 
chronic risk, materializing on a daily basis 
in countries without adequate water supply 
and sanitation infrastructure and services. 
Improvements in access to sanitation have 
kept pace with global population growth, but 
the risk persists - and is increasing in Africa.
• Floods are a major and growing economic 
risk in all societies, and we project a growing 
proportion of flood risk in coastal megacities. 
Asia stands out in this regard, because of 
large human exposure to flood risk. While 
Europe and North America have invested 
heavily to reduce the human and economic 
impacts of floods, they still face the greatest 
economic risks, and their exposure to the 
most extreme events continues to grow. 
By the 2030s, in the absence of adaptation, 
coastal flood risk worldwide is projected to 
increase by a factor of four, while fluvial 
flood risk could more than double.
• Our analysis has demonstrated the complex 
effects of water insecurity on agricultural 
production, food prices, and the health of 
malnourished children. Water insecurity 
leads to higher and more-variable food 
prices (in particular, for rice) than would 
be expected in a more water-secure world. 
Investment in water security could boost 
production, and reduce food prices and 
food price volatility for the world’s poorest 
consumers.
• The impacts of water insecurity on the 
natural environment are multiple and 
interacting. Ecosystem services in the 
regulation of runoff, assimilation of waste, 
and provision of fisheries, all underpin water 
security. We have demonstrated the extent 
of major risks to the aquatic environment, 
which need to be managed on the pathway  
to water security.
The analysis of risks has focused upon known 
physical mechanisms by which water-related 
risks harm people and the environment.  
These impacts aggregate, and have broader 
impacts on the economy and society. We have 
demonstrated how the market can compensate 
for local impacts to some extent - for example, 
through food-trade and price adjustments -  
but markets are also a mechanism for 
propagating risks globally. Perceptions of risk 
can modify investment choices: from those 
of individual farmers, to major foreign direct 
investment decisions. Extreme events - be they 
droughts, floods, disease outbreaks, or pollution 
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incidents - have particularly broad-ranging 
economic and political consequences.  
These impacts interact with other contextual 
factors within society, and so become 
increasingly difficult to isolate and quantify. 
The risk analysis methodology adopted here 
ensures that analysis of risk is grounded in 
known observable mechanisms, but it inevitably 
overlooks these broader scale impacts. 
The analysis has drawn extensively on global 
datasets that are now becoming available, 
thereby providing exciting opportunities for 
the quantification of water security impacts. 
While addressing most of the dimensions of 
water security already considered by previous 
studies (and in several instances, the same 
datasets), our approach is novel in its consistent 
focus upon hazards and impacts within a risk-
based framework. We have sought to avoid 
commonplace ‘fragmented’ approaches to water, 
by addressing diverse aspects of water-related 
risk within this common framework.  
The geographical aspect of our approach has 
helped to identify the spatial co-location of 
risks. The risk-based approach has also led 
to a focus upon the effects of hydrological 
variability. We have looked specifically at the 
effects of variability on agricultural production 
and prices. We have developed a metric of water 
scarcity that accounts for runoff and demand 
variability, the mitigating effect of storage,  
and the seasonal variability in the 
environment’s requirement for water. 
Analysis and quantification of risk provides 
the starting point for action to tackle water 
insecurity. It helps to prioritize action,  
target it geographically, and indicate the 
scale of an appropriate response. However, 
investment decision-making requires analysis 
of costs, impacts, and residual risks, on a 
case-by-case basis. Not all water security 
investments will be cost-beneficial.  
The sequencing of investment in infrastructure, 
institutions, and information is essential -  
as we shall see in the next chapter. Nonetheless, 
our analysis has demonstrated that the risks  
of water insecurity are both globally significant, 
and unevenly distributed - providing a strong 
case for targeted action.
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‘For every hundred  
studies of what might  
or should be done with 
a river system, there is 
hardly one that deals  
with the results …  
[T]here are only the 
roughest gauges of the 
effects of river works 
upon economic growth 
and community stability 
or change. Little basis 
exists for comparing 
the effectiveness of one 
multiple-purpose plan  
with another for the  
same basin or with  
an alternate method of 
fostering social change.’
White	(1957)
‘Most of the available 
documents and sources  
on the long-term 
development of water 
services and utilities are  
of a descriptive nature, 
often based on a 
deterministic conception  
of technological 
development and 
concentrating on technical 
evolution of the systems 
rather than bifurcation 
points, alternative 
development paths  
and path dependencies …  
In the early establishment 
phase of the WSS  
(Water Supply and 
Sanitation) systems,  
several alternatives were 
debated and discussed 
often for several decades,  
if not a century. After the 
systems were established, 
the focus was on 
continuous expansion  
of the systems together 
with urban population 
growth, while less 
attention was paid  
to alternatives.’
Juuti and Katko (2005)
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4.1 Introduction
In previous chapters, we have shown 
how water insecurity can act as a drag 
on growth. We have examined the scale 
and distribution of water-related risks 
on a global level - establishing that even 
the wealthiest economies face risks from 
hydrological variability and deteriorating 
water quality. Yet for all its value, this 
broad-scale analysis struggles to deal 
with the complexity and context of water 
security. It cannot tell us why risks and 
economic impacts come into being, and 
change with time. It cannot tell us why  
an investment brings greater water  
security in one circumstance - and failure  
in another. Gilbert White’s observations, 
from nearly 60 years ago, about river basin 
development still capture the fundamental 
challenge today of identifying and 
evaluating alternative pathways to  
water security. 
This chapter draws on an examination of 
32 cases, including the eight selected for 
presentation in this chapter. We reconstruct, 
analyze and compare historical water 
development paths at three scales: river basins, 
cities, and aquifers. We use multiple sources of 
evidence - including interviews with local and 
international experts, and policy and academic 
literature. Together, these data underpin a 
comparative analysis, allowing us to learn from 
historic pathways to water security, examine 
setbacks - and understand successes.
In the sections that follow, we define pathways 
to water security, and identify their main 
elements. These elements include investments 
in the three key areas of information, 
institutions, and infrastructure, typically 
designed, combined, and sequenced in response 
to water-related risks and opportunities, as well 
as broader social, economic, and environmental 
drivers. We develop and compare case studies,  
to generate a mixture of context-specific 
insights and crosscutting lessons. Our historical 
analysis compares patterns of investment,  
and lays foundations for informed decisions  
and investments in years to come.
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4.2 Pathways  
to water security
‘Investments, projects, 
and regulations can move 
societies along different 
trajectories toward  
a water-secure future.’1
Pathways
The idea of a ‘pathway’ has long been used 
to describe the sequence of decisions and 
investments aimed at achieving complex 
goals, ranging from poverty reduction  
to resilience or adaptive capacity.2
Evidence about pathways has emerged from 
many different fields, including dynamic models 
of economic growth, social-technological 
transitions theory, and the management of  
the commons.3 All of these perspectives share  
a focus on the interactions and interdependency 
of institutions, information, and infrastructure. 
They also emphasize the potential for 
alternative paths to a given outcome,  
the importance of ‘triggers’ in prompting 
human action, and the long-lasting effects  
of historic decisions and technologies.  
Pathways to water security are, therefore, 
‘path-dependent’ - past choices open some 
options, and foreclose others.4 Framing the 
dynamics of water security in terms of adaptive 
pathways helps to achieve two key goals:  
first, understanding the historical development 
paths that shape water security today;  
and second, gaining insight that helps  
navigate paths to future water security.
1	 Whittington	et	al.	(2013).
2 Haasnoot et al. (2013).
3	 Anderies	and	Janssen	(2013);	Geels	and	Schot	 
	 (2007);	Haasnoot	et	al.	(2013).
4 Heinmiller (2009).
Here we define ‘pathway to water security’ 
as a sequenced portfolio of investments in 
institutions and infrastructure, underpinned  
by investments in information. And, as we  
see time and again, information, institution, 
and infrastructure are interdependent.  
We use the word ‘portfolio’ to denote a set  
of different investments ideally chosen to 
complement one another. We may measure 
different portfolios’ success by different  
baskets of metrics - but all portfolio 
investments are intended to achieve  
more collectively, than they can alone. 
Historic pathways are relevant for decisions 
today because past choices influence future 
options. The evidence from historic pathways 
is descriptive, cataloguing events and decisions 
in a development path and identifying critical 
interactions and consequences, including 
unanticipated impacts. 
Developing and implementing pathways  
is difficult due to the technical complexity  
and the political considerations involved. 
Historically, many investments were chosen 
through one incremental decision after 
another, with varying levels of coordination 
across projects. Dynamic, adaptive pathways 
and planning approaches are increasingly 
being developed to guide decision-making 
under uncertainty as part of multi-stage 
planning processes - processes with identified 
contingency options and opportunities for 
learning and adjustment. Executing long-term, 
multi-step plans is difficult, however, within 
almost any dynamic, political context.
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Portfolios
Pathways are characterized by sequenced 
portfolios of policies and water security-
related investments in institutions, 
information, and infrastructure 
implemented in response to triggers -  
both risks and opportunities. Pathways are 
shaped by historical, geographic, political, 
and economic factors.
Institutions
Institutions are the ‘rules of the game’ 
shaping how people, technology, and the 
environment interact.5 In the broadest sense, 
they include formal laws, policies, regulations, 
and administrative organizations as well as 
informal networks and coalitions. Formal 
and informal institutions create a system of 
water governance - a set of rules, incentives 
and processes for decision-making and 
accountability across multiple values and scales.
Institutions contribute to water security in 
multiple ways and are needed, for example, to:
• plan, finance, construct, operate,  
and manage water information and  
infrastructure systems 
• deliver water and sanitation  
(including waste-water treatment  
services) and irrigation services 
• allocate water resources, including 
permitting, property rights, pricing,  
and other incentives
• regulate water quality in drinking  
water supplies, river/coastal waters,  
and the environment 
• regulate floodplain development
• establish building codes relating to water 
efficiency, wastewater, and flood resilience 
• insure against losses from water- 
related hazards 
• ensure monitoring, enforcement,  
conflict resolution, and public participation  
in relation to all of the above.
5	 North	(1990).
National and international laws and plans can 
act as an overarching institutional framework, 
but governance arrangements and capacity exist 
at all levels from the individual, community, 
district, and service area to the national, 
transboundary, and international levels. The 
result is a ‘poly-centric’ and multi-level 
governance system that has been described as 
an ‘institutional tripod’ involving water users, 
states and markets.6 Without the rule of law, 
transparency, and security of property rights, 
water institutions are unlikely to succeed.7  
In transboundary rivers, international 
agreements can define rights and 
responsibilities among riparian countries,  
and stimulate investment by reducing risks  
of disputes and clarifying costs and benefits  
of national and transboundary actions in  
the basin.8
Information
Information provides the foundation needed 
to enable sound decision-making for water 
development and management. When designing 
and implementing pathways to water security, 
information challenges are created through 
water resource variability and uncertainty, 
changing water supply and demand patterns, 
and the need for trade-offs across multiple 
sectors and values.
Information used for policy-making, investment 
decisions and operations is gathered from 
diverse sources, including: 
• local knowledge, participatory governance, 
and stakeholder involvement
• long-term and continuous observations of 
hydrological and meteorological parameters 
at an appropriate-scale, including monitoring 
networks and metering systems
• development studies and options analyses 
(e.g., cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness 
studies, and risk assessments)
6	 Meinzen-Dick	(2007).
7	 Pahl-Wostl	et	al.	(2012).
8 Leb (2013).
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• modelling tools that assess investments 
and engage stakeholders (e.g., systems 
optimisation, decision support systems, 
dynamic adaptive planning)
• communication tools that forecast, monitor, 
and communicate hazards to decision makers 
in government, civil society and business, 
and to vulnerable communities.
Good institutions and infrastructure are 
founded on good information, about risks, 
opportunities, and values for example, each of 
which will evolve with economic development, 
population growth, and climate change. In this 
context, information is a shared knowledge 
asset that underpins the design and operation 
of any water infrastructure or institution,  
the re-operation of existing systems to  
respond to evolving water security challenges, 
and the monitoring and appraisal of 
investments. Diverse forms of knowledge and 
institutional learning shape how information 
feeds into decisions made under uncertainty.  
A pathway to water security is guided by 
technical capacity, public participation,  
and accountability, underscoring the essential  
role of information.
Infrastructure
Water infrastructure refers to the structures 
that modify the course, flow, quality, storage, 
and distribution of water. This includes,  
for example:
• delivery systems for urban, rural, industrial, 
and irrigation users
• treatment facilities for potable water and  
for wastewater
• storage structures such as reservoirs,  
lakes, aquifers, floodplains, and wetlands
• development of alternative sources,  
for example rainwater harvesting, 
wastewater reuse, and desalination 
• flood protection and flood control structures
• land and urban drainage, and water  
level management.
Related investments that can reduce costs and 
environmental impacts and, potentially, provide 
long-run economic gains, might include water 
conservation and efficiency, re-use of water 
supply and storm water for irrigation, pollution 
and wastewater bioremediation in natural or 
constructed wetlands, and watershed, wetland, 
and floodplain restoration and management
Infrastructure systems seek to reduce risks 
and capture water-related opportunities, 
although efforts to reduce some risks may 
exacerbate others. For example, water security 
for irrigation may lead to reductions in energy 
security and ecosystem health/quality. 
Challenges and 
opportunities
Historically, management of water resources 
has involved cycles of development in 
response to human needs, cultural values 
and economic opportunities, interacting 
with chronic or acute stresses that impact 
upon human development in ways that 
require adaptation.9 Adaptation is inherently 
dynamic: actions are taken in response to 
a changing and evolving context of risks 
and opportunities. A pathway to water 
security is a pursuit of a moving target 
with a recurring pattern of challenges and 
responses. 
Triggers
The factors triggering social and technological 
transitions in pathways to water security will 
vary in their frequency, amplitude, speed, 
and scope. The triggers for action can come 
in different forms: gradual or chronic stress, 
variability, shocks, disruptions to a key external 
force, or ‘avalanches’ of major changes to 
multiple dimensions simultaneously.10  
Gradual and chronic stresses include inadequate 
water supply and sanitation. Variability and 
shocks include unpredictable seasonal and/or 
inter-annual runoff and extreme events such as 
droughts and floods. 
9  Briscoe (2014).
10	 	Geels	and	Schot	(2007).
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Population growth is an example of a disruption 
(a trend in one dominant variable), while 
‘avalanches’ may involve the combination 
of an external event, like a political change 
or financial crisis, along with a water-
related hazard, such as a drought. A typology 
of triggers and disturbances is useful for 
diagnosing the governance and infrastructure 
needed for robustness and resilience.11
Path dependency  
and sequencing 
Path dependency means that historical 
decisions and technologies open some 
pathways, while foreclosing others. Any 
discussion of pathways starts with a recognition 
of these constraints and the importance of 
selecting and sequencing investments to 
preserve flexibility. The sequencing of each 
pathway to water security involves a pattern 
of information, institutional development 
and infrastructure systems that shapes 
contemporary challenges and opportunities, 
influencing the costs and benefits, and the 
winners and losers, for alternative actions.
Economic decoupling
Economies depend on some access to water 
for almost all activities. Economies that are 
dependent on agriculture require a substantial 
and reliable supply of water, and are especially 
vulnerable to hydrological variability, 
unpredictability, and shocks. In Chapter 
2, we see that unmitigated hydro-climatic 
variability is a drag on growth, especially 
where the contribution of agriculture to growth 
is high. Economic ‘de-coupling’ occurs when 
agriculture-dependent economies industrialize 
and diversify economic activity, reducing 
the proportion of the GDP and labour force 
in agriculture, and expanding the industrial 
and service sectors. Economic de-coupling 
from the monsoon in India is described by 
reports declaring that the growth surge due to 
manufacturing and services meant that growth 
was ‘no longer a gamble on the monsoon’. 
However, the widespread move by farmers and 
industries from unreliable surface water to 
unregulated and unsustainable groundwater 
abstraction is leading to new economic threats, 
11	 	Schoon	and	Cox	(2012).
due to rapidly falling groundwater levels 
in some parts of India.12 Pathways to water 
security cannot be separated from local and 
national economic planning.
Key 
institutional 
actors and 
policy leaders
Water cuts across many different economic 
sectors, administrative and political boundaries 
and institutional responsibilities. Water security 
is jeopardized when institutional arrangements 
are not in place at appropriate scales, or when 
there are substantial coordination gaps within 
and across governance or administrative 
levels.13 The principle of subsidiarity 
suggests that decisions should be taken at 
the lowest level with authority and capacity 
to act. Subsidiarity implies local actions at 
the municipal or user level when possible, 
complemented by higher-level institutions, 
including national governments, river basin 
organizations, intergovernmental bodies, and 
special districts.14 However, the entities with 
primary responsibility to lead on issues in  
the water sector will vary by context and 
starting points. 
12  Briscoe and Malik (2006).
13  OECD (2011).
14	 	Marshall	(2008).
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4.3 Approach
Case study 
selection
Political and economic histories have told  
the story of water development experiences 
as diverse as New York City’s water supply, 
the ancient civilizations and modern 
infrastructure of the Colorado, Indus,  
and the Nile, and the relationship between 
groundwater and livelihoods in South Asia.15 
Each history tells a story of a challenging 
water development path, yet the scope  
for comparison is limited by the lack of  
a common language to guide the analysis 
and interpret the results. 
We use case studies to illustrate different 
historic pathways and to identify different 
triggers and types and sequences of investment. 
Thirty-two cases were examined as background 
to our analysis, eight of which are presented in 
this chapter. The cases were selected at three 
intersecting scales: the river basin, city, and 
aquifer, including transboundary river basins 
and aquifers (Figure 37). The cases illustrate 
different hydroclimatic conditions (semi-arid, 
highly variable/monsoonal, temperate), levels 
of development, social and economic contexts, 
configurations of water-related risks, and 
patterns of investment in water security.16
Evidence of historic pathways is typically 
limited and dispersed within different 
disciplines – each using different terms to 
describe similar concepts and relationships. 
This chapter includes ‘timelines’, which take 
an initial step toward establishing consistent 
chronologies of risks, opportunities, and 
patterns of investment, drawing from two main 
sources: consultations with experts (interviews, 
surveys, verification of data from policy, and 
academic literature); and economic histories, 
development plans, and risk assessments.
15	 	Molle	and	Wester	(2009);	Scarborough	(2003);	 
	 Shah	(2010);	Soll	(2013).
16  Grey et al. (2013).
The river basins we have examined include 
examples of highly-variable/monsoonal,  
arid and semi-arid, and temperate rivers  
with different levels of economic development. 
The highly variable/monsoonal rivers (e.g., 
Mekong) are mostly low to middle-income.  
The arid and semi-arid rivers include all levels 
of development from lower (e.g., Senegal,  
Aral drainage) to middle (e.g., Yellow) to higher 
income (e.g., Colorado and Murray-Darling). 
Temperate rivers (e.g., Rhine) are typically 
higher-income with substantial assets at risk 
from flooding and from water quality impacts 
of urban, agricultural, and industrial pollution. 
Some rivers may cross these climate zones, 
for example from upstream highly-variable/
monsoonal, to downstream arid and semi-
arid (e.g., Indus, Nile, São Francisco), or even 
vice-versa (e.g., Niger). While all pathways 
to water security reflect local context, this 
identifies rivers with similar hydro-climatic 
characteristics and levels of development for 
direct comparison, and allows the distinction 
between general lessons (all or most rivers)  
and context-specific insights (one or a  
few rivers). 
The cities we have examined include major 
urban centres on each continent, given their 
role as critical nodes in the global economy. 
These cities are characterized by a range of 
growth rates, population densities, water 
service delivery systems, and risks from 
flooding and inadequate WASH services.  
The OECD has catalogued the recent 
development of typologies of global cities 
and identified the attributes important for 
distinguishing the innovation pathways to 
urban water security. The factors identified 
by the OECD include the profile of water-
related risks, urban characteristics, and the 
institutional architecture of urban  
water services.17 
17	 	OECD	(2015	forthcoming).
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The aquifers we have examined are 
principally major systems with different 
levels of exploitation, pollution, and economic 
development. Intensively exploited aquifers 
have experienced different patterns of 
development. Intensive groundwater-based 
irrigation is undertaken in wealthy economies 
(e.g, Guadiana, Spain; Ogallala, US) and in less 
wealthy economies (e.g., Ica Valley, Peru;  
Indus Plain). Some urban centres are underlain 
by major aquifers (e.g., North China Plain; 
Gnangara, Australia; Mexico City). Other major 
aquifers have varying levels of development 
across a wide area, where the effects of 
groundwater management and use  
(e.g., water level decline, pollution,) are felt 
locally (e.g., Guarani Aquifer System; Gangetic 
Plain; Nubian Sandstone). Our primary approach 
in this chapter is the development of case 
studies, guided by a common framework.  
This complements the econometric analysis  
in Chapter 2 and the risk mapping in Chapter 
3, both of which used global data sets of 
information, with the case study analysis of 
water security and development in river basins, 
aquifers, and cities.
Each location experiences its own path to  
water security. The importance of taking 
context seriously - the cultural, environmental, 
political, and economic conditions - makes it 
difficult to generalize from local experiences at 
best, and dangerous at worst. Through analysis 
of the histories, investments, and system 
responses that have evolved through time,  
we can learn lessons about alternative  
pathways in different contexts.
Timelines
Timelines of selected case studies were 
created to illustrate specific pathways  
and patterns of risks, opportunities,  
and investments. The timelines include:  
(i) past political and economic events, 
water-related hazards and opportunities 
that may have acted as triggers for 
investment; and (ii) discrete past 
investments in information, institutions, 
and infrastructure (Figure 38).
Water-related hazards include the four  
headline risks examined in Chapter 3:  
drought and shortage, flooding, inadequate 
water supply and sanitation, and water pollution 
and ecosystem degradation. Water-related 
opportunities include a focus on irrigation 
and hydropower, and we also identified other 
investment purposes, including shipping and 
navigation, ecosystem restoration and tourism, 
and industry. Investments in information 
include: local knowledge and expertise 
studies or reports; hydrological, biophysical, 
socio-economic, and financial monitoring 
systems; and measurement technologies and 
modelling tools for river system planning and 
operations. Institutional investments include: 
water service institutions; irrigation user 
associations; institutional coordination bodies 
(e.g., river basin organizations); water planning 
and legislation (policy); allocation systems; 
financing mechanisms for infrastructure 
construction; and environmental regulations. 
Infrastructure investments include the 
construction and maintenance of reservoirs, 
dykes, and water and wastewater treatment 
networks. Economic development provides 
a backdrop for pathways to water security, 
which respond to driving forces that include 
urban, industrial, and irrigation development 
opportunities featured on the timelines.  
Each of the timelines will tell a context- 
specific story, with not all of the headline  
risks appearing, with different portfolios  
and sequences of investments, and with 
the detailed patterns of risks and responses 
selectively depicted. These timelines reflect  
the events captured in economic histories  
and reviewed by experts and should be  
viewed as indicative, not exhuastive.
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Cities, aquifers, and river basins selected as case studies (Fig	37)
Common elements of case study timelines	(Fig	38)
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4.4 Case studies
River basins
In this section, we consider the case of 
three river basins, each providing different 
histories of investment in water security.
The Colorado River is an example of a pathway 
to water security in a semi-arid region, where 
climate variability and sustained drought have 
posed challenges for regional development 
and prompted transboundary cooperation 
and conflict resolution to harness, adapt and 
restore the river. The Rhine River illustrates the 
modification of the river in pursuit of economic 
development opportunities, together with 
evolving risks from environmental pollution 
and flooding. The São Francisco River faces 
similar challenges of variability to those of 
the Colorado; in this case, Brazil has invested 
in infrastructure and institutions to develop 
hydropower, irrigation and urban  
water supplies.
The Colorado River Basin: 
chasing water security  
in a difficult hydrology
The Colorado River (637,137 km2) is an 
international river shared by two federal 
countries: Mexico and the US. It straddles 
seven US and two Mexican states, supporting 
2.23 million hectares of irrigated agriculture 
and 40 million people concentrated in diverse 
cities and rural areas (from Los Angeles to 
Las Vegas and from Mexicali to the Navajo 
Nation).18 The Basin’s extensive multi-purpose 
reservoir system stores approximately four years 
of annual average runoff (approximately 18.5 
billion m3), provides 4200MW of hydropower 
capacity, and supports a range of recreational 
uses, including rafting and boating. However, 
upstream development of water resources 
has led to the decline of a once-vast delta 
ecosystem, which is now the focus of bi-national 
restoration efforts by the US and Mexico to 
secure water for baseflows and pulse flows.
18  US Bureau of Reclamation (2012).
Triggers and sequencing
The gold rush in the North American west in 
the mid to late ninteenth century triggered 
the modern pathway to water security in the 
Colorado River Basin. This period spurred 
the development of rules and technologies 
for diverting water in this semi-arid region, 
initially in the mining camps of California and 
Colorado. The boom-and-bust cycle of mining 
enterprises gave way to regional and national 
efforts to support irrigation development and 
to buffer agricultural production against the 
seasonal variability and multi-year droughts 
prevalent in the region. 
Flooding in 1905 destroyed a private irrigation 
scheme in California’s Imperial Valley, 
coinciding with a new federal commitment  
to land reclamation in the Western US.  
The interstate and federal responses to the 
flood, combined with efforts to rebuild and 
expand water infrastructure in the Basin, 
marked the end of laissez-faire development 
(Figure 39 traces this evolution and interplay  
of risks, opportunities, and investments).  
The farmers of the Imperial Valley in Southern 
California petitioned the US government to 
accelerate federal investments, stimulating 
the development of US interstate institutions 
to share the costs and benefits of river basin 
development for irrigation and hydropower.19
Elements of the pathway
The earliest European settlements in the 
Colorado River occurred in the late 1500s  
and early 1600s when Spanish missions  
were established in the Lower Colorado.20  
Today, the Colorado River Basin is governed 
by a complex mix of more than 100 laws, court 
decisions, operational guidelines, and technical 
rules known as the ‘Law of the River’. The 
1922 Colorado River Compact and the 1928 
Boulder Canyon Project Act established a fixed 
water allocation for downstream states within 
the US. This legal framework for interstate 
19	 	National	Research	Council	(2007).
20  Kenney (2009).
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apportionment was confirmed in the Supreme 
Court decision on Arizona v. California in 1963; 
it requires ‘upper division’ states (Wyoming, 
Colorado, Utah, and New Mexico) to deliver 
92.5 billion m3 to the ‘lower division’ states 
(Arizona, California, and Nevada) over a 
rolling 10-year period. It formally allocated an 
equivalent volume to the upper division states. 
Downstream delivery requirements from  
the upper division to lower division states are 
assessed on a rolling 10-year accounting period. 
In practice, the fixed allocation leaves the  
upper division states with residual flows  
and hence disproportionate exposure to 
hydroclimatic risks. Both divisions are 
responsible for Mexico’s 1.85 billion m3  
annual allocation secured under a 1944 
international treaty.
Early studies and institutional reforms enabled 
a period of intensive development from the 
early 1930s to the 1960s, bookended by the 
construction of the Hoover and Glen Canyon 
dams. The completion of the Central Arizona 
Project marked the end of this development era. 
Contemporary and future water security 
challenges have required adaptation to a 
variable and changing climate; at the same 
time, intensified competition between farms, 
cities, energy, and ecosystems has reduced 
the margin for error when prolonged droughts 
occur. In 1999, long-term supply and demand 
intersected for the first time, coinciding with 
the beginning of an unprecedented 15-year 
sequence of dry years and increasing evidence 
from tree-rings of the potential for severe 
sustained drought. Despite over-allocation 
and a history of dispute, this period was 
marked by institutional innovations, including 
interstate cooperation and interim rules, as 
well as renewed investments in information 
and infrastructure. The states and other 
stakeholders in the Basin have undertaken 
inter-related investments in institutions, 
infrastructure, and information to address  
the consequences of climate variability and 
change, starting with the development of 
interim guidelines for sharing surplus water 
among the states in 2001, and six years later,  
for sharing shortage. 
Key information investments include long-
range, adaptive planning for water supply 
variability and climate change impacts - the 
2010-12 Colorado River Basin Study - supported 
by a river system-modelling platform for 
engaging stakeholders and by a basin-wide 
research group, established to integrate climate 
science into basin planning and operations. 
Institutional adaptations include interstate 
and bi-national agreements for coordinated 
operations of reservoir storage, together 
with new rules for managing surpluses and 
shortages, incentives for system efficiency 
improvements, and commitments to  
ecosystem restoration. 
Investments in infrastructure include the 
operation of desalination plants, conservation 
measures, and reservoir intakes. In the context 
of prolonged drought conditions, environmental 
flow requirements in the Delta have received 
additional attention, culminating in 2012 in 
‘Minute 319’, an agreement made under the 1944 
Treaty, coordinating US and Mexico’s water 
storage and delivery options  
to enhance water supply reliability for Mexican 
water users and the Delta ecosystem.  
Looking forward, the annual average cost  
of reducing shortage risks is projected 
to approach up to US$6 billion in 2060, 
demonstrating that future pathways will  
require substantial investment to sustain  
water security and safeguard the economic 
activities, urban centres, and ecosystems that 
depend on the river in a changing climate.  
The historic pathway also demonstrates  
the importance of maintaining flexibility,  
enabling learning, and making trade-offs  
across competing demands in a closed and 
highly variable basin, particularly as  
heightened competition and the impacts  
of climate change have increased systemic  
risks and interdependencies across food,  
energy, and water security.
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The Rhine River Basin: 
a dynamic, adaptive 
pathway
The Rhine is one of Europe’s major river 
basins, with an area of 185,000 km2 primarily 
in Switzerland, Germany, France, and the 
Netherlands. The Rhine originates in the 
high Alps and flows through lower mountain 
ranges where the largest tributaries, the Main 
and the Mosel, join and continue through the 
lowlands and into the North Sea. The Rhine 
has contributed to the economic development 
of the basin countries and continues to provide 
important services. It forms a major shipping 
route, connecting Rotterdam port with the 
hinterland of the industrial Ruhr and up to 
Basel in Switzerland. Hydropower is produced  
in the upstream stretches and river water  
is used by industry and power plants.  
Thirty million people depend on the Rhine  
for drinking water and many people use 
the river for recreation. It also provides an 
important habitat corridor for fauna and flora. 
However, human pressure on the river has also 
resulted in major risks, including flooding, 
pollution, and, historically, public health.
Triggers and sequencing
There have been many triggers in the Rhine 
basin, including floods and pollution, leading  
to significant transitions. Flood disasters,  
near-disasters, changing values, and new 
climate scenarios have triggered adaptive 
management and planning in the Rhine basin, 
together with substantial investment in flood 
protection infrastructure. 
The 1986 Sandoz agrochemical storehouse 
fire in Switzerland was a shock and a 
stimulus for major changes. The fire led to 
contaminated water leaking into the river in 
Basel, killing almost all fish, and requiring 
prolonged closure of intakes for drinking 
water along the Rhine in Germany and the 
Netherlands. The profound impacts of Sandoz 
became the trigger for political commitment 
to action. Effective legislation in all Rhine 
riparian countries and systematic monitoring 
of the river’s water quality were rapidly 
established after Sandoz. The large scale 
of the environmental impacts required the 
establishment of robust institutions - both 
nationally and internationally. Treaties and 
conventions resulted from cooperation within 
the International Commission for the Protection 
of the Rhine (ICPR), established in 1950 to 
analyse pollution, recommend water protection 
measures, harmonize monitoring and analysis 
methods, and exchange data. The Rhine Action 
Programme built upon these investments in 
information and institutions, coupled with 
major investments in infrastructure, including 
treatment plants to clean up industrial 
emissions and reduce pollution of the river. 
Elements of the pathway
The pathway to water security in the Rhine can 
be traced back at least 1,200 years, with land 
reclamation of the Rhine-Meuse delta starting 
between 800-1100 AD. The reclaimed land 
was highly productive, population increased 
and cities developed. Around 1100, water 
management intensified with the reclamation 
of larger floodplain and peat areas converted 
to polders. The Duke of Holland established 
institutions in the thirteenth century, with the 
first official ‘water board’ established in 1323, 
having responsibility for water management 
and flood protection. By 1350, the lower 
Rhine branches were completely embanked. 
The industrial revolution in the nineteenth 
century and the subsequent period of intensive 
demographic and economic development led 
to new waves of development in the basin, 
accompanied by increased vulnerability to 
flooding. Industrial activities in the Ruhr area 
in Germany increased the need for transport 
and, as ships grew in size, long stretches of 
the Rhine were modified and even canalized, 
resulting in narrower and deeper channels. 
Hydropower was developed to power industry. 
Figure 40 traces this intensive development and 
increasing vulnerability. 
The subsequent emergence of systemic risks 
increasingly required international cooperation. 
Water quality quickly became an issue in the 
wake of rapid industrial development in the 
Rhine basin after the Second World War. Algal 
blooms, bad odour, and foam-covered rivers 
and lakes helped rally public opinion against 
pollution. Nevertheless, regular monitoring 
of Rhine water quality started only in the late 
1970s. After ‘hard’ flood protection measures 
were completed in the second half of the 
twentieth century, the focus shifted to the 
ecological and landscape values of the river. 
The severe floods of 1993 and 1995 and the very 
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dry summer of 2003 resulted in both policy 
makers and the public realising that extreme 
events may be rare, but will come and with 
little warning. At the same time, awareness of 
the potential impacts of climate change on the 
river grew and has increasingly been accounted 
for in national and international policies and 
plans. A new approach has been developed in 
the Netherlands, using vulnerability to define 
Adaptation Tipping Points (ATP) to indicate 
whether current water management strategies 
will continue to be effective under different 
climate change scenarios. Unexpected events 
and shocks are recognized as triggers for 
adaptation, with societal change and learning, 
which focus both on a future endpoint and on 
the pathway to get there. The ATP approach 
and the exploration of ‘dynamic adaptation 
pathways’ have together enabled adaptive 
management, with changing environmental 
values and recognition of climate-related risks.
The São Francisco:  
in transition to water 
security for people, 
irrigation, and energy
The São Francisco River Basin (640,000 km2, 
15 million inhabitants) covers five Brazilian 
states and represents nearly 8 percent of 
Brazil’s territory. Most of its flow results from 
precipitation in the upstream part of the basin, 
with the discharge decreasing from 15 l/sec/km2 
upstream to 5 l/sec/km2 downstream. 
The river provides development opportunities 
that range from hydropower generation to 
mining and urban water uses, and from 
irrigated agriculture to freight transportation. 
Rainfall variability is high, groundwater 
resources are limited, and recurrent droughts 
periodically affect water uses in the basin. 
Water quality concerns include pollution from 
untreated wastewater, agrochemicals, and 
heavy metals from industry and mining as well 
as soil erosion. 
Triggers and sequencing
Historically, the need for agriculture and energy 
development within the basin triggered early 
investment by the Federal Government in 
irrigation projects and large hydropower plants 
in the basin (Figure 41 traces these efforts 
and the interplay of risks, opportunities and 
investments).21 Infrastructure investments have 
since resulted in nine storage reservoirs with 
a capacity of 45 billion m3, 50 percent of the 
mean annual flow, and hydropower plants with 
a total installed capacity of 10.3 GW (about 11 
percent of national hydropower generation). The 
plants are connected to the high-voltage grid 
that serves most of the Brazilian population. 
Between the 1950s and 1990s, more than 28 
irrigation projects have been promoted and 
funded by the Government, which developed 
the irrigation, transportation, and energy 
infrastructure and reserved about 50 percent of 
the irrigated land for local, small-scale farmers. 
The establishment of capable institutions 
within the basin to address key issues, such 
as issuing water rights, managing conflicts 
among competing uses, and cost recovery of 
infrastructure operation and maintenance,  
has lagged behind the development  
of infrastructure.
The development of the São Francisco is also 
entwined with the water needs of the semi-
arid Northeast States beyond the basin, which 
have always seen the resources of the basin 
as a solution to their severe water security 
and poverty challenges, with 10 percent of the 
national population and by far the lowest per 
capita income. Political pressures triggered a 
decision to move water from the São Francisco 
to enable firm supply to the cities and, if 
possible, to high-value irrigated agriculture in 
Northeast Brazil. After a fierce technical and 
political dispute between those in favour and 
those against, an ambitious inter-basin transfer 
project (the Transposition Project) to divert 
water from the São Francisco to the Northeast 
was approved in 2005 by the National Water 
Resources Council. The project is presently 
under construction, at an estimated cost of 
US$4 billion. The inter-basin transfer scheme 
will only use the infrastructure at full capacity 
during wet years, when part of the flow will be 
21  Lee et al. (2014).
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diverted into storage reservoirs in the recipient 
area. It will be some time before there will be 
evidence that the poverty alleviation objective  
is being met. 
Elements of the pathway
The Federal Government has had a long-
standing objective of developing irrigated 
agriculture in the semi-arid, downstream 
section of the basin. Some public irrigation 
districts have been very successful in the 
cultivation of fruits and in progressively taking 
responsibility for infrastructure operation and 
maintenance. Other irrigation districts have 
not performed as well, due to the lack of local 
capacity to produce market-oriented crops 
and the absence of agribusiness moving local 
production into national and international 
markets. The Federal Government is now 
considering moving from State-supported 
agriculture to public-private partnerships,  
with agribusiness companies playing a greater 
role in the management of infrastructure 
and the commercialization of agricultural 
production of both large and small farms. 
Private entrepreneurs have been attracted to  
the region and there are currently about 500,000 
hectares of irrigated land in the semi-arid  
zone (140,000 and 360,000 in public and  
private properties, respectively). 
Most of the irrigation infrastructure is privately 
owned and there is now significant agricultural 
research underway by Embrapa (a government 
agency that specializes in tropical agriculture), 
boosting productivity of agribusiness. 
Hydropower production is partially decreasing 
due to water withdrawals resulting from the 
expansion of agribusiness and the siltation of 
reservoirs diminishing their capacity, but the 
complex revenue system of the Brazilian power 
system creates little incentive for companies to 
engage in an open debate with the agricultural 
sector over water rights. New water right 
applications need careful evaluation to ensure 
that new uses do not jeopardize existing ones, 
especially during droughts.
Institutional investments are now being given 
priority. During the latter part of the twentieth 
century, Government recognized that little 
progress would be achieved without capable 
water institutions. In 2001 the Brazilian Water 
Agency (ANA) was created within the legal 
framework of the 1997 Water Resource Law and 
several states have made substantial progress in 
developing modern water resource management 
agencies. The most pressing challenges in the 
São Francisco river basin are related to the need 
to create a favourable institutional environment 
to ensure sustainable economic growth within 
the basin and to develop the potential of the 
Transposition Project. While the hydropower 
potential of the river is almost fully employed, 
water use for irrigation, transport, and other 
industry can still be significantly increased. 
Developing this new potential, however, 
requires optimising water allocation to different 
uses, stimulating competitive, self-sustained 
irrigated agriculture, and addressing water 
quality issues. The institutional challenges of 
the Transposition Project include allocating 
water among receiving states, ensuring recovery 
of operational costs, and designing an effective 
management regime.
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Cities
Even if they share common features,  
each of the large cities in this study has 
followed a distinct pathway. Singapore, 
Mexico City, and Gauteng Province in South 
Africa (which comprises Johannesburg and 
Pretoria) illustrate contrasting pathways  
in three rapidly developing regions. 
Singapore exemplifies a sustained and strategic 
effort to develop domestic water sources, 
increase water use efficiency, and reduce 
dependence on imported water supplies. The 
Gauteng Province of South Africa lacks local 
water supplies, which has prompted a century-
long water resource development effort to 
deliver sustainable water services for the 
conurbation - first in response to gold mining 
opportunities and now to address inequality of 
access in the post-Apartheid era. Mexico City is 
one of the largest groundwater-dependent cities 
in the world; it illustrates a combination of 
chronic impacts and shocks, creating windows 
for institutional reform and capital investment. 
Each pathway illustrates major features of the 
triggers, types, and sequences of investments.
Singapore: a sophisticated 
approach to achieving 
water security
Singapore is a highly urbanized city-state 
with an area of 18.3 km2 and the third highest 
population density in the world. Although 
Singapore’s annual rainfall of 2,400mm is  
well above the global average of 1,050mm, it is 
not sufficient to provide water to a population 
of 5.4 million people and industry, commercial, 
and landscaping sectors that require 55 percent 
of a mixture of potable water, NEWater (high-
grade recycled wastewater), and industrial 
water. Established in 1963 under the Prime 
Minister’s Office, the Public Utilities Board 
(PUB) was initially responsible for electricity, 
water, and piped gas. It was established as the 
National Water Authority in 2001, relinquishing 
its other utility responsibilities and taking over 
those of sewerage and drainage. 
Triggers and Sequencing
Prior to independence from Malaysia in 1965, 
when it had a much smaller population, 
Singapore supplied its water through three 
reservoirs in its own territory and transfers 
via pipeline from Malaysia. The 1961 transfer 
agreement with Malaysia expired in 2011, and 
the 1962 agreement will expire in 2061 (Figure 
42 traces the interplay of risks, opportunities 
and investments). Singapore’s limited capacity 
to capture and store rainwater and its historical 
dependence on transboundary water transfers 
triggered a major, long-term strategy to explore 
the options for self-sufficiency, while retaining 
the option for continuing to import water,  
if necessary, at a reasonable price.
Although water self-sufficiency may be 
technically achievable, there will be trade-offs 
between self sufficiency and affordability, even 
in a prosperous state. Singapore’s long-term 
strategy for achieving affordable water security 
has meant developing an integrated portfolio of 
approaches that focuses on long-term planning, 
promoting policy, management, and technology 
innovation and retaining flexibility for the 
future.22 The starting points are maximizing 
the use of rainfall on the island, managing per 
capita demand, and developing infrastructure 
and unconventional sources of water. Runoff 
from two-thirds of the island’s area is captured, 
and the PUB hopes to extend this to 90 percent 
of the island’s area by 2060. This work has been 
accompanied by vigorous source protection, for 
example, by implementing strict regulations to 
limit contamination in urban areas and from 
industry. Leakage from the supply system 
averages 4.5 percent, which is exceptionally 
low for an urban water supply. Meanwhile, 
per capita demand has been managed through 
a combination of pricing, water efficiency 
measures, and public education, with an 
increasing block tariff structure penalising 
excessive domestic use. These policies have led 
to a drop in domestic demand from 176 l/cap/
day in 1994 to 151 l/cap/day in 2014.
22	 	Tortajada	et	al.	(2013).
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Elements of the pathway
Singapore has taken a long-term and integrated 
approach to water resources management. The 
strategic direction was set at independence 
and has been implemented through sustained 
investment in water institutions, infrastructure, 
and information. 
The PUB has overall responsibility for the 
water resources system, and use of sustainable 
water resources has been embedded in land-
use legislation and building regulations. The 
infrastructure system has been developed 
with staged investments and progressively 
integrated to enable efficient management of 
the resources. The PUB has promoted policy and 
management (e.g., catchment management), 
institutional (e.g., tariff structure), 
technological (e.g., NEWater and desalination), 
and institutional (e.g., tariff structure) 
innovations. The first desalination plant was 
constructed at Tuas in 2005, and a second, 
larger plant opened in 2013 in the same location; 
yet, desalination is more costly than wastewater 
treatment and reuse, in which Singapore has 
become a pioneer globally. Re-used water, 
which is known as NEWater in Singapore, has 
been controversial worldwide, and suffers from 
the risk of public unacceptability. Singapore 
managed this risk by developing the technology 
over a period of decades and progressively 
raising public awareness. The first experimental 
reuse plant was closed in 1975 because it proved 
to be uneconomical and unreliable. A new plant 
was completed in 2000, and water quality was 
monitored over a period of two years, when an 
expert panel approved the water for use in the 
public supply. At present, NEWater is able to 
cover up to 30 percent of the water demand of 
the city-state.
Looking forward, population, urbanization, 
industrial growth, and overall development 
continue to challenge Singapore’s water 
security objectives. In the face of uncertainties  
regarding energy prices, societal expectations 
and attitudes, climate change, and international 
relations, Singapore has adopted a diversified 
approach. Although a least-cost approach would 
suggest an emphasis on surface water and 
NEWater, Singapore has preserved the option 
to adopt new technologies that may become 
more cost-effective in the future, such as low-
energy desalination by freezing (using liquefied 
natural gas regasification as a heat sink), 
energy recovery from brine streams, increasing 
energy and water recovery from NEWater, and 
exploring groundwater sources. Singapore 
has diversified its approach while managing 
public concerns about the safety of recycled 
water for human consumption. This has also 
involved a long-term strategic approach that 
links investment in information (knowledge 
and public communications), institutions, and 
infrastructure. Facing a future that is uncertain 
in significant respects, Singapore’s strategic 
approach includes the sophisticated analysis  
of uncertainties and options for managing 
future risks.
Mexico City: urban  
water security in a 
groundwater-dependent 
city - a national priority 
The Mexico City Metropolitan Area (MCMA) is 
located in the Valley of Mexico (almost 10,000 
km2) where the pathway to water security 
can be traced prior to the Aztec period and 
the use of chinampa farming techniques 
(artificial islands on shallow lakebeds) to 
support a growing urban population. Today, 
the MCMA is home to over 21 million people 
and it generates about 30 percent of Mexico’s 
GDP23 - making it of great national and 
regional economic importance. The modern 
pathway to water security depends heavily on 
groundwater development, which accounts for 
about 68 percent of the valley’s water supply. 
Groundwater withdrawals exceed recharge  
rates with an annual deficit of 713 Mm3/yr,  
and the resulting land subsidence damages 
municipal infrastructure and increases  
losses and leakages. 
Urban water security within the MCMA also 
requires infrastructure and organizational 
capacity to deliver water supply and sanitation 
services to a growing metro area, which has 
rapidly expanded by about 500 percent in both 
area and population between 1950 and 2000. 
Access to potable water and sanitation has 
improved but coverage remains incomplete at 
about 92 and 94 percent respectively. Water-
23	 In	this	case	it	is	Mexico’s	‘producto	interno	 
 bruto manufacturero del país’ or GDP  
	 of	the	manufacturing	sector.
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related hazards include climate variability, 
with urban flooding and the drought impacts 
on surface water sources. The economic costs 
of deficiencies in water services have been 
estimated at almost US$2 billion annually, 
approximately 1 percent of GDP in the Valley.24
Triggers and sequencing
In the face of these chronic pressures, 
the combination of natural hazards, rapid 
population growth, and political changes 
have produced policy and planning windows 
for reform (Figure 43 traces these reforms 
and the interplay of risks, opportunities and 
investments). Drought in the 1960s, major 
flooding in 1967, an earthquake in the 1980s, 
political changes associated with the Salinas 
presidency in 1988, and economic crises, have 
all been triggers for investment and influences 
on the water security pathway. Major crises 
appear to have recurred on a 20- to 25-year 
cycle, which has led to an opportunity: plan 
with purpose, be ready for a crisis, and then 
act. The MCMA has adopted proactive planning 
to reduce the impacts of crises; and to seize 
the opportunities during crises, to coordinate 
investments in water security in line with 
national and regional development priorities.
Elements of the pathway
After the Mexican Revolution in the early 
twentieth century, the problem of food security 
prompted institutional development with 
the creation of the national commission for 
irrigation, which gave way to the Ministry of 
Water in 1946. Initial plans were adopted for 
importing water supply to the MCMA from 
two interbasin transfers from the Lerma and 
Cutzamala systems of 151 and 464 Mm3/yr, 
respectively. In 1976, the Ministry of Agriculture 
annexed the Water Ministry, fragmenting 
authority over water. However, the national 
government initiated a water-planning 
programme in 1972, which laid the foundation 
for a comprehensive programme that took effect 
when the Salinas administration took office 
in 1988. During this political transition, water 
services were at the top of the political agenda 
due to problems of reliability, equality of access, 
conflicts, and scarcity. 
24	 	CONAGUA	and	World	Bank	(2013).
Planning conducted from the early 1970s 
identified the need for a comprehensive 
approach to water development, which 
culminated in the creation of the national 
water agency (CONAGUA) in 1989. The 1992 
National Water Law and 2004 amendments have 
promoted decentralization, resulting in the 
building of local capacity, and private sector 
participation in water services. As part of these 
efforts, the groundwater challenges have been 
addressed by the National Water Commission 
of Mexico, with participation of River Basin 
Councils and their auxiliary bodies, such as the 
Technical Groundwater Committee (COTAS), 
which promotes participation of watershed 
stakeholders. River basin councils and their 
auxiliary bodies are still work in progress.
Water supply and sanitation services are 
a municipal responsibility governed by 23 
municipal operators in the Valley of Mexico, 
and the Mexico City Water System (Sistema 
de Aguas de la Ciudad México ‘SACM’ within 
the federal district portion of the MCMA). 
Few of these operators perform well. Initially, 
local governments were opposed to private 
participation and water tariff reviews. Efforts 
to improve services have now included 
private participation in water provision in 
several Mexican cities, with success stories in 
Aguascalientes, Cancún, and Saltillo, despite the 
mixed success in the MCMA. 
The modern pathway to water security in 
the MCMA highlights the need to consider 
the water security of cities as part of the 
national development agenda, with the fate 
of Mexico City directly linked to that of the 
country, due to the major infrastructure and 
economic linkages between the MCMA and 
the surrounding region. Urban water security, 
delivering water supply and sanitation services, 
remains a major challenge. Groundwater 
dependence has enabled urban growth, but also 
poses risks from subsidence and unreliable or 
costly extraction.
In a context of chronic stresses and periodic 
crises, the MCMA has sought to plan with 
purpose so as to be ready to act, rather 
than wait for crises. This allows the steady 
development of ideas and the opportunity to 
promote these ideas before policy, planning, 
and investment windows open. The case 
study highlights that people are at the heart 
of both problems and solutions. People who 
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have experience and institutional knowledge 
must build new capacity; regulations are not a 
substitute for the experience that ensures that 
information, institutions, and infrastructure 
will be coordinated to deliver urban water 
security. 
Gauteng Province: 
water resource security 
underpins sustainable 
water services
First colonized at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, South Africa’s 
Gauteng Province, including the cities of 
Johannesburg and Pretoria, is the highly 
urbanized core of a larger economic 
zone encompassing the rich goldfields 
that attracted settlement and economic 
development to the region in the  
nineteenth century. 
Gauteng is the smallest of South Africa’s nine 
provinces, yet the most populous and wealthy 
- accounting for 60 percent of national GDP. 
Although situated on the Witwatersrand,  
the watershed between two major river systems, 
Gauteng’s achievement of water security shows 
how centres of economic growth can interact 
effectively with their surrounding urban and 
rural regions, even across multiple river basins 
and national borders, to manage and develop 
water resources for sustainable water services.
Triggers and sequencing
The region was transformed by the discovery, 
in 1884, of large gold reserves, triggering a 
gold ‘rush’ and the need for water supplies 
for mining and an expanding population. 
The aggregation of economic activity and the 
location of the administrative capital (Pretoria) 
of the newly established Union of South Africa 
in 1910 has seen Gauteng grow into a global 
city-region with a population approaching 13 
million, dependent on a high degree of water 
security for its sustainability. Water supply to 
the region, initially derived from a few private 
springs serving a few thousand people in 
temporary mining communities, progressed 
through the development of the Vaal (a tributary 
of the Orange-Sengu River) to today’s ‘Vaal 
system’ that inter-links the resources of four 
major river systems (the Orange, Limpopo, 
Thukela and Inco Maputo), three of which  
are international. 
Climate variability and water demand have 
necessitated extensive storage and transmission 
infrastructure, designed and operated to achieve 
reliability levels of 99.5 percent for power, and 
98 percent for urban water supplies. Ninety-
seven percent of the Province’s population 
has access to a safe water supply although 
human settlement and industry affect water 
quality, with old mines adding 15-20 percent 
to the salt loads in the Vaal River. The post-
Apartheid period has created the political 
imperative for investment in water services for 
black communities and informal settlements 
to enhance equity of access (Figure 44 traces 
the interplay of risks, opportunities, and 
investments).
Elements of the pathway
The Vaal system includes major investments 
in infrastructure, with large storage and 
inter-basin transfers, including energy-saving 
diversions from neighbouring Lesotho, and now 
integrates wastewater streams that support 
neighbouring areas. While local works were 
built by the Rand Water Board (a regional utility, 
established in 1903), the infrastructure of the 
wider system was built and managed by the 
national government department responsible for 
water matters.25 Today, Rand Water draws ‘raw’ 
water from the system, which it treats  
and distributes to the region’s municipalities 
and industries both inside and beyond the 
province.
Much of the infrastructure created by the 
national government and Rand Water was 
funded by charges levied on major users, with 
recent infrastructure developments, such as 
the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), 
entirely paid for by user charges. For the 
past four decades, the Vaal system has been 
extensively modelled, with annual reviews of 
performance, resource availability, and demand 
trends, which are used to schedule investments 
- an exercise conducted collaboratively with 
major water users. The last major augmentation 
in supply, LHWP Phase 1B, was completed in 
2003 in accordance with a 1986 Treaty between 
Lesotho and South Africa; Phase 2 is currently a 
25	 	Tempelhoff	(2003).
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few years behind schedule, putting the system’s 
reliability targets at risk if a drought greater 
than 1-in-50-years severity occurs before 2024. 
The keys to the region’s sustained water security 
include (1) effective monitoring and management 
of growing demand, (2) timely planning, 
implementation and operation of infrastructure 
investments, with involvement  
of and funding by the users and (3) improvement 
of water quality through effective monitoring 
and management. These investments in 
information, institutions and infrastructure 
have underpinned the region’s water security, 
enabling provision of basic water services as well 
as sustained economic growth.26
A further contribution to this water security is 
that water resources and their management are 
under the control of national government.27 This 
has enabled timely investments across a wide 
geographic area without prolonged negotiations 
between different administrations, a challenge 
that has typically undermined water security 
in other metropolitan areas. The focus on 
the needs of user sectors rather than on river 
basin or sub-national jurisdictions has also 
been critical for success, allowing the system’s 
boundaries to be expanded to meet the needs of 
expanding populations and economic activities. 
The availability of adequate public and private 
investment at an early stage has been critical to 
the establishment of the infrastructural base. 
The economic activity supported now allows new 
infrastructure to be financed by users, through 
utility structures that can access market finance.
26	 	Eales	and	Schreiner	(2008).
27  Muller (2012).
Future water security will require an 
intensification of water management, 
strengthening of management institutions  
and continued engagement with key water 
users. The expansion of the inter-connected 
system will pose complex risks, and water 
quality management will increase in importance. 
Having a very interconnected system reduces 
risk in a variable climate and may improve the 
climate resilience of the system, since there 
is no dependence on just one catchment. The 
availability of human resources to undertake 
these tasks is perhaps the major medium-term 
risk facing the region.
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Aquifers
Aquifers offer an opportunity that is not 
widely recognized in the current debates 
on water security, which is their very large 
and relatively resilient storage capacity 
(Box 10). Groundwater already makes a 
key contribution to water security in many 
regions of the world. 
Effective groundwater management and 
development require a sound knowledge of the 
resource and robust institutional mechanisms, 
to ensure that groundwater dependence 
does not become a source of insecurity over 
time due to overdraft or pollution. The case 
studies presented in this section are both 
large transboundary aquifer systems, where 
groundwater exploitation has been triggered 
by different pressures and followed different 
paths. The Guaraní Aquifer System (shared by 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) is 
located in a region endowed with abundant 
but often polluted surface water. Groundwater 
development is growing locally to meet 
increasing water demands by a variety of 
sectors, including domestic supply, geothermal 
uses, and incipient irrigation. The Nubian 
Sandstone Aquifer System (shared by Chad, 
Egypt, Libya and Sudan) is the only water 
resource available for the development of the  
oil industry and agriculture in the Libyan 
desert. The future of groundwater exploitation 
here, however, faces major uncertainty because 
the abstracted resource is non-renewable.28 
In both aquifer systems, major international 
efforts have been made to establish a framework 
for transboundary cooperation, to pre-empt 
possible disputes over the shared  
groundwater resource.
28 	Non-renewable	groundwater	includes	fossil		
	 groundwater	that	has	accumulated	over		 	
	 geologic	time,	and	therefore	is	not	replenished		
	 over	human	timescales.
The Guaraní Aquifer 
System: a lightly-
exploited aquifer 
with precautionary 
transboundary 
cooperation 
The Guaraní Aquifer System (GAS) has only  
been developed very locally for municipal  
water supply systems in parts of Brazil, 
Uruguay, and Paraguay for about 50 years. 
It was first recognized as a single, massive 
groundwater system during deep geological 
exploration for hydrocarbons in the 1990s.29  
The GAS underlies an area of over 1 million km2 
mainly in the Paraná River Basin of Brazil  
(62 percent of its known area), Paraguay, 
Uruguay, and Argentina. It stores an estimated 
30,000 km3 of mainly high quality water. 
Groundwater extraction is estimated to be 
only about 1 km3/yr (about 80 percent of which 
currently occurs in Sao Paulo State, Brazil), 
for public water supply (80 percent), industrial 
processes (15 percent) and geothermal uses for 
spa facilities and industrial processes where 
hot groundwater occurs (5 percent), with 
groundwater-irrigated agriculture an incipient 
activity. In São Paulo State there are many wells 
extracting water from the deep confined areas, 
usually for public water supply of medium-sized 
cities (100,000-300,000 inhabitants).
Triggers and sequencing
The GAS is an example of a large transboundary 
groundwater system with vast storage (stocks) 
and significant flows (flux) but limited 
development and demand for groundwater. 
The area occupied by the aquifer has plentiful 
surface water resources and experiences 
drought occasionally. There have therefore been 
few triggers for development in the Guarani. In 
contrast to many other aquifers, groundwater 
exploitation has primarily been driven by public 
and industrial water supply needs, and not by 
irrigated agriculture, because of its high quality 
water and drought reliability, compared to local 
surface water. 
29  Foster et al. (2009).
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30  Foster et al. (2013).
31  Foster and MacDonald (2014).
Aquifers as vast freshwater reservoirs: using groundwater 
storage for water security (Box 10)
Extensive aquifers can have much more water 
in storage than the world’s largest surface 
reservoirs. Groundwater systems constitute 
the planet’s predominant freshwater reserve. 
All aquifer storage buffers rainfall-related 
inputs, transforming highly variable recharge 
into more constant discharge. Groundwater 
in large aquifer systems has long residence 
and response times, greatly increasing water 
security, as storage can offset the impacts of 
scarcity and drought.28 Given the role of water 
storage in water security, groundwater plays 
a fundamental role and must be taken into 
account. Examples of the role that groundwater 
storage plays include:
• the alluvial aquifer underlying Lima, Peru, 
developed conjunctively with surface-water 
for water supply in a hyper-arid area
• the alluvial aquifer of the Indian Punjab used 
for intensive irrigation, securing high grain 
yields irrespective of monsoon rainfall. 
Aquifers vary with geology and are not 
uniformly present in the subsurface. Aquifer 
recharge varies considerably with land use and 
vegetation cover (notably irrigated agriculture) 
and with urbanization processes (notably water-
main leakage and on-site sanitation). Excess 
infiltration can cause rising water-tables and 
waterlogging, damaging urban infrastructure 
and reducing crop yields. 
Groundwater resilience varies by aquifer type. 
The ‘resilience’ of water-resource systems to 
climate variability and change is now being 
applied to groundwater systems. Two scenarios 
need to be considered: resilience to long-term 
(inter-decadal) ‘climate change’ and to shorter-
term (inter-annual) ‘climate shocks’.29 Large 
sedimentary formations in what are today 
more arid climatic regions usually contain 
groundwater recharged long ago (and may be 
essentially a non-renewable or ‘fossil’ resource). 
All such groundwater can be regarded as highly 
resilient to current climate variability. In 
contrast, groundwater in lower-storage aquifers 
is more dependent on modern recharge and, 
therefore, less resilient to long-term climate 
change - but even these often have sufficient 
residence times to buffer short-term climatic 
variations. However, some groundwater 
systems (for example, shallow alluvial and 
karstic limestone formations) can have rapid 
connection with overlying surface water, and 
their storage does not contribute significantly 
to water security in drought.
Managed aquifer recharge and storage is an 
innovative solution. Excess wet-season and 
flood flows can increase groundwater in storage 
by recharging aquifers in different ways, for 
example:
• management measures on agricultural  
land to recharge groundwater over  
large land areas for water supply
• recharge structures (wells, lagoons) to  
inject water for later recovery from 
wellfields, for urban water supply.
Natural groundwater storage can also be 
enhanced through conjunctive use with surface 
water for urban or irrigation supply, resulting 
in higher water supply volumes and associated 
water security than depending on  
a single source. 
Good groundwater governance and management 
are essential if groundwater is to improve urban 
and irrigation water security, and to avoid 
serious depletion and pollution and associated 
irreversible degradation. This will include:
• real-time monitoring of groundwater 
withdrawals, levels, and quality as the  
basis for adaptive management
• innovative approaches to regulate 
groundwater abstraction and use,  
in coordination with power consumption 
• stakeholder engagement in financial  
and regulatory matters
• alignment of fiscal provisions to become  
an incentive for sustainable use
• regulatory provisions to constrain point-
source pollution and diffuse agriculture 
pollution.
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Groundwater quality is generally high,  
although pollution poses local challenges.  
Urban centres tap the Guarani mainly due  
to its high quality water compared to local 
surface water. Development of groundwater 
resources for public water supply has been 
promoted by municipalities and state 
government agencies in Brazil, and by central 
government in Uruguay and Paraguay (Figure 
45 traces this evolution and interplay of risks, 
opportunities and investments). 
Whilst natural groundwater quality is high, 
in its outcrop recharge areas, the aquifer 
is vulnerable to pollution from inadequate 
disposal of urban wastewater and solid waste 
and the intensification of agriculture. However, 
these issues are local and availability of water 
is not a limitation. The aquifer still has a large 
development potential, constrained by the 
relatively high cost of drilling wells. In the 
absence of clear triggers for investment,  
the management of the GAS has involved  
pre-emptive efforts to establish a 
transboundary cooperation framework  
to study the aquifer before pressures mount.
Elements of the pathway
The aquifer has only been subjected to intensive 
exploitation locally around a few urban centres 
- most notably in north-eastern São Paulo 
State. As a consequence, groundwater levels 
in Ribeirão Preto have fallen by an estimated 
30-40 m since 1970, with a consequent increase 
in water supply costs and degradation of local 
watercourses, where natural groundwater 
discharge has been replaced by wastewater 
discharge. 
The GAS has also recently been considered  
for supplying the Piracicaba-Campinas region 
(São Paulo State) with water from a large well 
field (1m3/s), as a strategy to alleviate the 
water crisis in the Metropolitan Region of São 
Paulo. Geothermal use for the tourism sector 
is promoted by the private sector, but in some 
cases also receives financial support from the 
public sector because of tourism’s importance  
for employment. 
Groundwater use for irrigation is limited due to 
reliable rainfall and the high cost of developing 
groundwater for the occasional droughts, 
although this might grow with climate change. 
There is a gradual increase in groundwater used 
for irrigation to secure citrus yields, to increase 
water supply for the sugar-alcohol industry in 
São Paulo State, and to provide supplementary 
irrigation for soybeans in the southwest of Rio 
Grande do Sul State.
The four ‘Guaraní countries’ have opted for 
precautionary cooperation, pre-empting 
possible problems arising from future 
groundwater development. This cooperation is 
both on technical and legal aspects, with a legal 
framework for the management and protection 
of groundwater resources and culminated in 
2010 with the signing of the Guarani Aquifer 
Agreement. This Agreement creates a legal 
framework for future cooperation, although 
it has yet to be ratified by the Brazilian and 
Paraguayan governments. However, there is 
a good understanding of the aquifer system, 
due to a Global Environment Facility (GEF) 
supported Strategic Action Program for the 
Guarani Aquifer during 2003-2009, which 
catalyzed national efforts in data collection and 
pilot management. At the local level, however, 
detailed knowledge is patchy and understanding 
of the impact of rapidly occurring land-use 
change is very limited. The main challenge 
now will be to implement the 2010 Agreement, 
and, in particular in Brazil (where groundwater 
use is expanding), to ensure increased human 
and financial resources in some of the key 
state water agencies. To date, there have 
been very few transboundary disputes related 
to groundwater use, and good cooperation 
was achieved in two pilot transboundary 
management projects in the GEF Program.
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Nubian Sandstone  
Aquifer System 
The Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System (NSAS) 
is the largest groundwater system in the 
world, stretching over 2 million km2 across 
Chad, Egypt, Libya, and Sudan. Northern Libya 
has been an important agricultural region 
depending on groundwater from Roman times 
to the twentieth century. Today, the NSAS is 
mostly exploited in Libya, which relies almost 
exclusively on the NSAS for water supply. 
Although relying mainly on the Nile, Egypt also 
taps the NSAS, while groundwater development 
in Chad and Sudan is still limited. The NSAS 
challenge is its long-term viability, as it 
overwhelmingly comprises ‘fossil’ palaeowater 
that was recharged tens of thousands of years 
ago with naturally declining water levels since 
the last glacial period. Due to the magnitude 
of aquifer reserves, there is limited room for 
development, although the depletion of storage, 
potential risks of increasing salinity, falling 
water levels, and associated damage to or loss 
of oasis ecosystems will all need to be managed. 
Triggers and sequencing
Oil exploration drilling in the early 1960s 
led to modern discovery of major fresh 
groundwater reserves in the NSAS (Figure 46 
traces the interplay of risks, opportunities 
and investments). The initial trigger for 
NSAS development was to meet the needs 
of the petroleum industry, as in the desert 
groundwater is the only possible water source 
for petroleum recovery. The petroleum industry 
supported aquifer analysis and exploitation, 
creating dependence on foreign technology and 
expertise. Since then, groundwater development 
in all NSAS countries has been led by central 
government, to provide water for domestic 
supply and for economic activities (the oil 
industry, mining and irrigation).
Elements of the pathway
Traditionally in Libya, there has been low-
intensity exploitation of groundwater in 
oases, directly from springs or from shallow 
wells, which still support a variety of local 
needs of settled agriculturalists and nomadic 
herders. Since the 1960s, groundwater use has 
intensified with the construction of well fields 
whose wells are equipped with high-capacity 
pumps to meet the needs of petroleum-related 
industry, domestic water supply, and mining. 
Petroleum development has also provided the 
economic resources needed to build large-scale 
irrigation projects both in oasis and coastal 
areas. However, the NSAS is also vulnerable to 
water quality deterioration due to inadequate 
treatment of petroleum industry wastes  
and domestic wastewater.
Irrigation along the Mediterranean coast 
received a substantial boost with the so-called 
Great Man Made River Project (GMMRP), whose 
implementation by the Libyan government 
started in the 1980s. The GMMRP comprises 
major infrastructure to pump groundwater from 
the NSAS in the Sahara desert in the south and 
pipe it to the northern coastal areas, where 
most of the population is concentrated, and 
where traditionally-irrigated agriculture has 
water supply problems due to local groundwater 
exhaustion and salinization. Groundwater 
from the NSAS has ensured a water supply 
of excellent quality for urban centres on the 
Libyan coast, but this supply is still affected 
by failures in the distribution system and 
inadequate wastewater management. 
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In the 1960s and 1970s foreign research agencies 
assessed aquifer dynamics, established its non-
renewability, and considered its exploitation 
potential. Since the 1980s, international and 
regional agencies have acted as catalysts for 
knowledge generation and cooperation. One of 
the many achievements was the establishment 
of a programme for formulating a regional NSAS 
development strategy and a regional monitoring 
programme (Nubian Aquifer Regional 
Information System, NARIS) in 1997. Several 
international studies and initiatives have also 
paved the way for transboundary management. 
While there are regional NSAS monitoring 
networks and models, the spatial and temporal 
coverage of data collection is patchy, as is local 
technical capacity.
The two main Libyan government agencies 
managing groundwater use are the General 
Water Authority (1972), and the Great Man 
Made River Authority (1983). There is current 
instability within the water management 
structure, due to civil strife, leading to supply 
disruption and problems of maintenance. At a 
transboundary level, the Joint Authority for the 
Study and Development of the Nubian Sandstone 
Aquifer System was established by Egypt and 
Libya in 1989, later joined by Sudan (1996) 
and Chad (1999). Problems associated with 
groundwater abstraction (aquifer depletion, 
quality problems, ecosystem degradation),  
while occurring across the NSAS, rarely  
involve international borders.
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Guaraní (Fig 45)
The Guaraní Aquifer System (GAS) has only been developed very 
locally for municipal water supply systems in parts of Brazil, Uruguay, 
and Paraguay for about 50 years. It was first recognised as a single, 
massive groundwater system during deep geological exploration for 
hydrocarbons in the 1990s. The GAS underlies an area of over 1 million 
km2 mainly in the Paraná River Basin of Brazil (62 percent of its known 
area), Paraguay, Uruguay, and Argentina. It stores an estimated 30,000 
km3 of mainly high-quality water. Groundwater extraction is estimated 
to be only about 1 km3/yr (about 80 percent of which currently occurs in 
Sao Paulo state, Brazil), for public water supply (80 percent), industrial 
processes (15 percent), and geothermal uses for spa facilities and 
industrial processes where hot groundwater occurs (5 percent), with 
groundwater-irrigated agriculture an incipient activity. In São Paulo 
state there are many wells extracting water from the deep confined 
areas, usually for public water supply of medium-sized cities 
(100,000-300,000 inhabitants).
19801975 1985
1. Institutional developments driven by states with
the support of regional and international agencies
2. Paced aquifer development 
combined with progressive creation 
of groundwater related institutions
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Brazil's National
Water Policy Act
declares water
a public asset Brazil extends Water Policy
Act to groundwater
Establishment of Guarani
extraction-restrictions in
Ribeirão Preto
Establishment of a general
framework covering extraction
of mineral and thermal groundwaters 
National Water Resources
Council series of resolutions
to integrate surface and
groundwater management
1 2
1975 1995 2015
Start of intensification of 
geothermal use for tourism
sector starts in Uruguay,
North-East Argentina,
& South West Brazil
Guarani acknowledged
as world's largest aquifer
UNESCO: Creation of Regional Center
for Groundwater Management 
GEF Program for Sustainable Development
and Environmental Protection of GAS is launched
Strategic Action Program (SAP)
for GAS management
GAS is considered 
to supply a series of
cities in region of
Piracicaba-Campinas (SP)
Current:
The GAS is still lightly developed and overdraft
and pollution problems so far are felt mainly only
close to some water use hotspots (e.g., cities).
Future:
In the future challenges could come from already
increasing water demand from urban users,
irrigation, and geothermal development, as well
as higher surface water variability due to
climate change.
GEF (Global Environment Facility); UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization)
Each timeline is indicative, and not exhaustive. Major elements have been selected based on 
expert consultations to depict broad patterns of water-related risks, opportunities and investments. 
The schematic below features additional elements essential to the pathway, conveying a cycle of 
challenges and responses unique to the Guaraní Aquifer System.
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4.5 Findings
‘A longer, historical,  
view suggests that …
the history of water 
management is a  
history of challenges 
(which change over time)  
and responses.’ 
‘… The implication is  
that context matters,  
a lot, and that great  
care needs to be taken  
in extrapolating  
findings from one  
period to another,  
or from a rich country  
to a poor country.’32 
We can draw general and context-specific 
lessons from the historical timelines 
and narratives of these cases. Here we 
summarize what we have learned about 
pathways, including general lessons and 
insights across different phases and scales, 
to achieve and sustain water security. 
Looking forward, we explore insights about 
decision-making in strategic and adaptive 
pathways.
32  Briscoe (2014).
General lessons
Each pathway is unique, shaped by its starting 
point and context. And yet broad lessons 
emerge, offering insights about pathways to 
water security – what they are, and how they 
have worked.
Lesson 1  
From projects to 
pathways: investments  
in institutions, 
information, and 
infrastructure are 
interdependent and can 
be mutually reinforcing
• No investment stands alone -  
institutions, information,  
and infrastructure are interdependent  
and can be mutually reinforcing.
• Investment priorities and options are not 
stationary – they change with development 
and the shifting values and capacity that  
it brings.
• Pathways never end, only evolve –new risks, 
opportunities, and values prompt adaptation. 
The case studies show that institutions, 
information, and infrastructure are 
interdependent. Significant investment is 
generally needed in all three to derive the full 
benefits of investment. Sequencing is strongly 
influenced by socioeconomic context and the 
type and scale of risks faced and opportunities 
created. Some common trends can be identified. 
Early in the pathway to water security, 
investments tend to be opportunistic, often in 
simple infrastructure, with limited information 
and fledgling institutions. In wealthy nations, 
complex water systems are often analyzed and 
managed using advanced information systems, 
including systems analysis models for the 
development of future scenarios and analysis 
of institutional and infrastructure options, 
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based on multi-stakeholder planning and 
engagement. Information needs become more 
refined as wealth increases and lower tolerance 
of risks resets water security objectives, 
requiring more investment in institutions and 
infrastructure. Institutions may prioritize 
participatory governance and economic 
instruments to achieve social, ecological 
and economic objectives, as competition and 
trade-offs intensify. Infrastructure design may 
become incrementally more complex, because 
of the need to integrate with existing assets 
and systems. In terms of what comes first - 
institutions, infrastructure, or information, 
analysis shows that there is no best sequencing, 
only emphasis on one or another at specific 
moments of the system’s history, depending on 
context. 
While in many cases it is possible to identify 
key investments that represent a turning 
point in the development pathway (e.g., the 
1995 Mekong Agreement; the construction 
of Hoover Dam in the Colorado or the joint 
effort to study the Guaraní Aquifer System), 
these are the consequence of antecedent steps 
along a pathway. The benefits of investment 
accrue non-linearly and a given system 
requires coordinated investment to increase 
and optimize cumulative benefits. Solutions 
are always provisional and pathways are never 
complete, requiring periodic adaptation to new 
circumstances and challenges.
Lesson 2 
Information: knowledge 
and trust are ‘pillars’  
of legitimacy and 
cooperation
• Shared knowledge and trust are assets –  
they create the foundation for the pathway  
to water security. 
• Political debate and contest is part of 
the process - omission of key groups or 
viewpoints may undermine the pathway  
to water security.
• Comprehensive monitoring feeds  
databases that can build systems models  
for adaptive planning. 
• Early, in-depth understanding of rivers, 
aquifers, or urban water networks enables 
and sustains their development.
Investments in water security are built on 
knowledge - a shared understanding of the 
water resource system, its boundaries and 
dynamics, dominant risks and opportunities, 
and the values of different stakeholders. In the 
case of the Murray-Darling Basin in Australia, 
for example, a series of parliamentary inquiries 
occurred at critical junctures, resulting in: 
interstate water sharing and infrastructure 
financing and construction in the early 1900s; 
construction of Lake Victoria in the 1930s; 
responses to salinity problems in the late 
1960s and 1970s; and the establishment of 
water diversion limits since the 1990s. An audit 
of water use in the 1990s was followed by a 
government audit of current and future water 
availability under climate change, conducted 
by the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial 
Research Organisation, ‘CSIRO’. This knowledge 
enabled basin institutions to establish diversion 
limits, modify water rights systems to facilitate 
water trading, and plan irrigation efficiency 
improvements. Joint enquiries stabilize the 
knowledge base that guides policy change and 
infrastructure investment. Shared knowledge 
requires participation by affected stakeholders 
- in order to provide legitimacy, and to prevent 
any participant or group from dominating the 
way knowledge is tabled and fed into decisions.
Lesson 3  
Triggers: plan for  
the future. Don’t waste  
a crisis, but don’t wait  
for one
• Good planning is dynamic - as good 
plans will be ready for the opportunity 
when it comes; the next crisis is the next 
opportunity.
• Populations and their expectations  
change - plan for expanded and  
diversified water services.
There are multiple triggers for investments in 
water security: opportunities, chronic impacts, 
and acute shocks, and both water-related and 
external factors, such as political changes, 
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natural hazards, and international trends. In 
any given situation, multiple different factors 
coincide to trigger investment. 
Triggers include: opportunities offered by the 
exploitation of natural resources (Gauteng, 
Nubian Sandstone, Ica Valley); economic or 
natural hazards (e.g., earthquakes, major 
flooding, or drought), prompting a strong 
response, often by the national government 
and in some cases backed by international 
initiatives/funds (Mexico City, Colorado, 
Murray-Darling); and major political and 
economic events that contribute to removing 
constraints, opening up new opportunities, 
or creating new frameworks where different 
actors can interact (Indus).
Specific events can open windows of opportunity 
- perhaps economic or natural crises, perhaps 
the end of political instability or of conflict. If 
regular and robust planning is already in place, 
such opportunities can be seized quickly and 
effectively. Without prior planning, ad-hoc 
responses are likely to be insufficient. As a case 
in point, Mexico initiated a water planning 
effort in 1972 that laid the groundwork for more 
comprehensive activities under the Salinas 
administration, in office from 1988. During the 
start of the Salinas government, water services 
were at the top of the new administration’s 
agenda due to myriad problems of reliability, 
equality of access, conflicts, and scarcity. The 
planning from the early 1970s identified the 
need for a comprehensive approach to water 
development, supporting the creation of a 
national water agency (CONAGUA) in 1989.
Lesson 4 
Everybody counts: build 
capacity, cooperation,  
and political will
• Communities are part of the solution -  
water users have a direct stake in the problem, 
and are central to the solution when river 
basins and aquifers are threatened (Yellow, 
Colorado, Murray-Darling, Western La 
Mancha, Ica Valley, Ogallala, Arizona).
• A shared vision of the basin future builds 
stakeholder support for water management 
and development (Rhine, Mekong,  
Senegal, Nile).
• Foster inter-state and international 
cooperation to design, finance, and operate 
infrastructure for shared benefits (Colorado, 
Murray-Darling, Senegal). 
• Coordinate infrastructure development  
and operations to support multiple purposes 
and optimize benefits for upstream and 
downstream jurisdictions (Colorado,  
São Francisco).
The importance of institutional actors will 
depend on context. National governments 
provide leadership and coordination, along with 
the impetus and financing for development 
planning. Sub-national governments also play 
a role, particularly in federal countries where 
authority over water development may be 
reserved for sub-national units. The private 
sector also has an important role to play, such 
as the oil industry in the Nubian Sandstone 
case, or agribusiness in the São Francisco 
Basin. Quasi-governmental organizations 
and local districts organize water users and 
service providers. Basin organizations can 
act as catalysts for development at all levels, 
if they are provided with adequate mandates, 
competencies, and resources. International 
financial institutions and other external 
agencies can play an important supporting role. 
Political will and institutional capacity, as 
well as coordination across scales, are critical 
for cities, rivers, and aquifers. In Gauteng 
and Mexico City, for example, the urban 
development pathway was and remains of 
strategic national interest, although water 
service institutions remained the domain of 
municipalities and relevant local bodies. In 
aquifers, the Guarani experience illustrates the 
priority placed on ‘preventive’ transboundary 
cooperation. Political will and institutional 
capacity is particularly important in 
international rivers to foster transboundary 
cooperation. For example, the establishment 
of the Senegal River Basin Organization 
(Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du fleuve 
Sénégal) on the common principles of solidarity 
and equity facilitated commitments at the 
highest political level to joint development. This 
institutional capacity enabled investments in 
two large, jointly-owned and managed storage 
and hydropower reservoirs, attracting external 
support from the international financial 
institutions.
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Lesson 5  
Not all investment  
is beneficial: planning 
needs to be smart and 
strategic
• The pathway to water security is an integral 
part of national development: be inclusive, 
strategic, and spend wisely (São Francisco, 
Mexico City).
• Flexibility reduces the costs of changing 
direction: beware path dependency (Colorado, 
Murray-Darling, Rhine).
• Protecting water quantity and quality 
protects the future: pay close attention to 
urban-rural linkages (New York, Gauteng, 
Mexico City, Sao Paulo).
• Values will change with growth and time: 
conserve ecosystems or face the inevitability 
of costly restoration (Yellow, Colorado, 
Murray-Darling, Rhine).
Many historical investments have 
underestimated costs, overestimated 
benefits, and foreclosed alternatives. Water 
resources development can bring growth, 
but can also have negative consequences. 
All water development paths have social 
and environmental costs; historic pathways 
demonstrate the importance of accounting for 
such costs in the design and implementation 
of investments in order to avoid, or reduce, the 
need for costly restoration efforts. 
In aquifers, declining water tables have the 
potential to jeopardize the economic viability 
of groundwater use and cause environmental 
damage to groundwater-dependent 
ecosystems. Groundwater overdraft also causes 
contamination associated with salinization 
and mobilization of toxic substances, leading 
to further resources loss. Pathways show that 
instead of reactively responding to aquifer 
depletion, policies need to ensure sustainable 
yields, where abstraction levels do not exceed 
recharge (Ica Valley, Western La Mancha, North 
and Western Gangetic Plain). 
In a similar way, water resource development 
in river basins can lead to competition between 
sectors and across political boundaries - both 
within and between countries. For example, 
irrigation can lead to salinity, high nutrient 
contents, waterlogging, and alteration of river 
pulses, while pollution and river fragmentation 
are by-products of industrial and urban 
uses and intensive agriculture. These risks 
point to the need to maintain flexibility in 
allocation and re-allocation of water rights to 
leave room for adaptation when water users 
increase and values change (Murray-Darling, 
Colorado, Yellow). In the Murray-Darling, for 
example, despite a 70 percent decrease in the 
water available for irrigation in the 2008/09 
water year compared with the baseline of the 
2000/01 water year, due to the impacts of the 
Millennium Drought (1997-2009), the gross 
value of irrigated agriculture declined by 
less than 20 percent, due to the existence of 
water markets and infrastructure to reallocate 
water among competing uses.33 Water trading 
and infrastructure efficiency enhancements 
have also been used to recover water for the 
environment, and to address the consequence of 
over-allocation. 
Path dependency is as high in urban settings as 
it is for the other scales (river basins, countries, 
and aquifers). Technologies adopted early in a 
development path (e.g., combined sewer and 
stormwater systems) may prevent the adoption 
of more efficient and cost-effective alternatives 
due to the high costs of switching. 
Efforts to experiment with new technologies 
and governance have encountered political 
resistance, rigid institutions, and complacency 
with ageing, large-scale networked 
infrastructure systems that impede innovation 
and adaptation. 
What emerges clearly, is that yesterday’s 
innovation can become today’s constraint if 
there is not enough flexibility built into the 
system. For instance, having a system of fixed 
volumetric water rights to regulate water uses 
has clear advantages in exercising control on 
uses, and providing certainty to water users, but 
those rights become a constraint when existing 
users resist changes in water planning and 
allocation, hampering opportunities to make 
substantial changes if the basin or aquifer is 
overallocated, or is faced with severe drought.
33  Kirby et al. (2014).
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Learning  
from contexts: 
cities, rivers, 
and aquifers
The case studies are descriptive rather than 
prescriptive, exploring actual pathways, not 
optimal ones; each of these has different 
triggers, water security investments, and 
economic activity. The case studies suggest 
several challenges and opportunities for 
innovation and tailoring adaptation actions to 
specific risks in different types of cities, rivers, 
and aquifers.
Urban pathways
Inadequate water supply and sanitation 
services cause public health risks and may 
impede municipal and industrial development. 
Inadequate urban drainage exacerbates public 
health risks and inhibits economic activity. 
Large-scale flooding can be highly damaging 
to the urban economy and propagate through 
supply chains nationally and globally. Urban 
water security requires addressing all of these 
challenges. The pathway to water security 
starts with water supply, piped, delivered, 
or collected (e.g., from kiosks), treated and 
untreated, as no settlement can survive without 
it. This is followed by sanitation, with sewerage 
coverage expanding slowly. The new city, rich 
or poor (and there will be many of the latter 
as the developing world urbanizes rapidly in 
this century), has the opportunity to employ 
innovative solutions, perhaps moving from 
centralized, water-intensive systems to newer, 
better systems that conserve water, harvest 
rain and storm water, reduce waste loads, and 
balance urban, rural, and ecosystem needs (e.g., 
with resource recovery and wastewater re-use).  
Integration of green infrastructure into the 
urban environment, in particular to mitigate 
stormwater flows and pollution, will require 
sustained planning and regulatory attention.
We examine our cases of urban pathways 
to water security in three contexts: mature 
cities in advanced economies; rapidly 
developing cities in emerging economies; 
and predominantly poor cities with rapidly 
expanding informal settlements.
Mature cities in 
advanced economies
London and New York are examples of mature 
cities in advanced economies, with potable 
water supply and wastewater collection 
and treatment presumed by consumers and 
generally functioning adequately. Behind this, 
however, is a story of rising operational costs 
and capital investment needs, not least due to 
ageing water and wastewater infrastructure and 
growing environmental concerns. With rising 
costs and reducing subsidies, cost recovery is 
important, but politically difficult. Flooding 
is a significant and a growing problem, with 
already high and increasing values of assets 
at risk, compounded by climate change. Major 
re-investment is needed but political inertia is a 
challenge to overcome, unless there is a specific 
trigger (such as a crisis). 
A water secure future is likely to stem from 
investments in information and institutions 
that provide incentives for innovation, 
ensure efficiency improvements, and recover 
costs through smart tariffs. Investments 
in infrastructure will be needed to manage 
scarcity and navigate urban-rural trade-offs, 
to replace essential underground assets, and to 
provide resilience to hydrological variability and 
climate change.
Conversely, a water insecure future is one 
of continuing deterioration of urban water 
networks, declining reliability and quality of 
drinking water, increasing vulnerability to 
floods, public health risks, and environmental 
degradation. 
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Rapidly developing cities 
in emerging economies
Beijing, Delhi, Gauteng Province, Mexico 
City, and Sao Paulo are examples of rapidly 
developing cities in emerging economies, with 
reliable services to high-income housing and 
industry. Access to and reliability of service is 
typically much less in low-income settlement 
and lower still in informal settlement. 
Economic growth has triggered rapid 
infrastructure development to establish urban 
water networks, where conventional water 
supply and wastewater solutions are the default 
option. Increasing water resource demands 
exhaust local supplies and require identification 
of (typically more distant and costly) alternative 
water supplies from rural hinterlands. 
Wastewater services typically lag behind 
water supply, with consequently deteriorating 
environmental water quality. The rapid 
growth of urban water supply networks brings 
challenges for financing capital and operation 
and maintenance costs, with conventional 
financing models and tariffs often inadequate 
for full cost recovery. Some new infrastructure 
is financed through utility structures with 
access to market finance, involving public and 
private contributions. The expansion of urban 
water supply networks to serve the urban poor 
and peri-urban settlements need provisions, 
including subsidies, to ensure affordable 
services for the poor.
A water secure future is likely to stem  
from innovative financial, institutional, 
and infrastructure approaches to accelerate 
pathways to urban water security, ensuring 
universal access, well targeted subsidies, and 
sustainable financing, appropriate urban water 
and wastewater networks and services, and 
integrated management of risks associated with 
water resource access, wastewater discharge 
and pollution, urban floods, and climate change.
Conversely, a water insecure future is one 
dominated by inequitable access and water 
service delivery models with high construction, 
operations, and maintenance costs and limited 
reliability and flexibility, as well as rapidly 
rising numbers of people and values of assets  
at risk, particularly from flooding. 
Cities with rapidly 
expanding informal 
settlements
Rapidly expanding informal settlements in the 
peri-urban fringe present some of the greatest 
challenges in poorer cities and the poorest 
parts of cities in emerging economies. Water 
and wastewater services are mostly adequate 
in formal settlements, yet water and sanitation 
service is a chronic challenge in the rapidly 
expanding peri-urban fringe. Wastewater 
collection and treatment are limited, 
contributing to severe health and environmental 
impacts and chronic flooding and drainage 
problems. Water utilities are ill equipped to 
confront these challenges, due to inappropriate 
delivery and financing models.
A water secure future is likely to stem from 
an appropriate pathway to urban water 
security, including alternative options, where 
‘conventional’ water and wastewater services 
and business models may not be the best 
options. Future pathways will require dynamic 
knowledge-based institutions responsible for 
water resources development, sustainable water 
services, and land-use planning to protect water 
sources and mitigate pollution, flood, and other 
risks. Resilience to extreme events and climate 
change will become increasingly important, 
particularly when droughts and floods disrupt 
economic activity.
Conversely, a water insecure future is one with 
weak urban water utilities and conventional 
urban water and wastewater services as the 
sole option providing improved services, and 
expanding settlement in vulnerable locations 
such as watersheds and floodplains, which cities 
must protect to mitigate risks.
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River & lake 
basin pathways
River basin development involves systems to 
store, distribute, and manage water resources 
and sustain land and ecosystem services in 
the context of hydrological variability. The 
pathways to water security strive to put water 
to use in a manner that increases returns to 
other resources (land, energy, ecosystems), 
motivated by urban and industrial development 
and hydropower, mining, irrigation, and other 
opportunities.
Most human settlement has occurred in close 
proximity to surface water sources, evidenced 
by the ancient civilizations of the Nile, Tigris-
Euphrates, Indus, and Mekong. This provided 
ready access to water, but also exposure 
to floods - both positive (flood recession 
agriculture) and negative (loss of life, economic 
damages). Hydrological variability and other 
water-related risks and opportunities typically 
stimulate capital-intensive investments in 
storage, flood management, irrigation, and 
energy development and associated institutions. 
Development, increasing demands, competition 
between sectors and between upstream and 
downstream users, and prolonged droughts 
can lead to river basin closure - where 
downstream needs are unmet due to temporary 
or chronic imbalances of supply and demand, 
or to pollution. Urbanization creates linkages 
between cities and rural regions, characterized 
by inter-basin transfers or competition between 
agricultural and urban water uses. Vulnerability 
to floods and droughts place economic and 
ecological assets at risk, prompting efforts 
to enhance flexibility to adapt in the face of 
uncertainty and shifting social, economic, and 
environmental values. Adaptation emphasizes 
actions to buffer variability, manage demand, 
restore riverine ecosystems, and enhance 
resilience to shocks.
We examine three hydro-climatic contexts: 
highly variable/monsoonal, semi-arid or arid, 
and temperate river basins and lake systems.
Highly variable / 
monsoonal river basins
The Mekong and the Gangetic Plain are 
examples of highly variable, ‘monsoonal’ 
systems located mostly in poor and emerging 
economies with high and growing population 
density. In these settings, river-related 
livelihoods are both dependent on and 
vulnerable to hydrological variability, with 
unpredictable seasonal and annual rainfall and 
runoff impacting both rainfed and floodplain 
agriculture. Inadequate forecasting and 
communication results in high vulnerability 
to flood and drought risks, with occasional 
major flooding incidents, particularly, but not 
only, impacting poor settlements. Inevitable 
trade-offs between floodplain development, 
ecosystem services, and other consumptive and 
non-consumptive uses are often unmanaged. 
Climate change is predicted to impact these 
regions most, with increased variability and 
unpredictability.
A water secure future is likely to stem from 
robust knowledge-based institutions adopting: 
innovative solutions to the variability challenge 
(such as artificial groundwater storage, 
floodplain zoning); alternative pathways to 
reduce the impact of extreme variability and 
flooding at the least social and environmental 
costs, leaving space for the river; strategies to 
decouple economic growth from dependency on 
highly vulnerable sectors, particularly rainfed 
agriculture; and robust strategies for climate 
change adaptation. 
Conversely, a water insecure future is one 
of cities and extensive rural communities 
with large numbers of people and livelihoods 
vulnerable to severe floods and droughts, 
severely degraded ecosystem services, and 
inadequate capacity to adapt to climate 
change, all of which could contribute to stalled 
economic growth, increased poverty and social 
and political tension.
Arid and semi-arid 
basins
The Aral Sea, Colorado, Murray-Darling, Lower 
Senegal, Lower Niger, Lower Indus, Lower Nile, 
Lower São Francisco, and Yellow are examples 
of arid or semi-arid rivers. Basins with these 
hydroclimatic conditions range from poor to 
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wealthy. The pathway to water security has 
involved intensive groundwater and surface 
water development to manage chronic scarcity 
and drought impacts. Agriculture has become 
the dominant use and irrigation systems a 
development priority, with allocation,  
capital financing, and cost recovery issues. 
The growth of cities intensifies competition 
for water between urban development, rural 
development, and ecosystems. The development 
of some rivers for economic and regional 
development has led to ‘river basin closure’ 
with inadequate environmental flows and 
water quality deficits. Social, economic, and 
environmental values change with economic 
growth, creating the need for adaptation to 
secure alternative sources, improve efficiency, 
and create more flexible allocation mechanisms 
to resolve conflicts and make trade-offs 
across competing uses and priorities. The dual 
challenges of water scarcity and variability have 
resulted in very high levels of investment in 
semi-arid parts of wealthy nations (Colorado, 
Murray-Darling) and in wealthy arid nations.  
In poorer nations and emerging economies, 
water management challenges are great 
(Aral Sea, Indus, Nile, Niger). The scale of 
the challenge can also increase rapidly with 
economic growth (Yellow, São Francisco), but so 
do the resources and capacity needed to address 
the challenge. 
A water secure future is likely to stem 
from robust knowledge-based institutions, 
innovative storage alternatives to the use of 
large reservoirs alone (e.g., aquifer storage and 
recovery); conjunctive use of multiple sources 
(e.g., reuse, rainwater harvesting, desalination, 
dual pipe systems); water use efficiency; and 
economic instruments allocating scarce water 
wisely. In addition, ‘soft pathway’ solutions 
will manage demand, re-operate existing 
infrastructure to optimize economic and 
ecological benefits, and make wise trade-offs.
Conversely, a water insecure future is one 
of little information, weak institutions, 
inflexibility in water allocation, exclusive 
reliance on supply side infrastructure, 
irreversible degradation of ecosystems,  
and maladaptation to climate change -  
all contributing to social exclusion and  
political instability.
Temperate river basins
The Apalachicola, Ebro, Great Lakes, and 
Rhine are examples of temperate basins. 
These basins are typically characterized by 
advanced economies and mature cities with 
high levels of basin modification during 
industrialism. Like the arid and semi-arid 
rivers, wealth is associated with major historic 
investments in infrastructure, including 
storage and hydropower development, flood 
control, and urban water supply and wastewater 
networks. Industrialization resulted in heavy 
pollution and ecosystem degradation with 
high restoration costs. The economic growth 
enabled by this development has increased the 
value placed on environmental assets, which 
motivates the political will to remediate. 
Development in floodplains has increased 
and economic growth has resulted in very 
high values of assets at risk, while tolerance 
of flood risk has decreased. This has renewed 
emphasis on flood management and spurred 
programmes to create room for the river to 
move within the floodplain. Relatively strong 
institutions and information systems enable 
innovative approaches to reducing pollution 
and flood risks, where political will exists. Even 
in temperate rivers, population and economic 
growth can lead to localized supply-demand 
imbalances. Complacency and the lack of 
political will delay adaptation to future risks, 
until crises create windows for policy reform 
and infrastructure investment. 
A water secure future is likely to stem 
from innovative and adaptive multipurpose 
institutions and infrastructure to (i) safeguard 
growth and wealth by mitigating water security 
risk broadly and flood risk in particular, in the 
context of climate change; and (ii) enhance 
environmental water quality, in the context of 
growing demand for recreation, biodiversity 
conservation, and public health. Investment 
in water security innovation may have useful 
applications in other contexts around the world.
Conversely, a water insecure future is one 
with complacent dependence on existing 
infrastructure (e.g., dams and flood control 
structures) to manage risks and the buildup 
of vulnerability, without incentives and 
information systems to reduce vulnerability, 
protect environmental assets, and adapt to 
uncertain futures.
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Aquifers
Aquifer development contributes to water 
security in two primary ways: by providing 
water for domestic and industrial supply 
when surface water is insufficient, unreliable, 
or polluted, and by creating economic 
opportunities through groundwater-dependent 
irrigation in otherwise water-scarce areas. 
Aquifer characteristics determine the scale and 
recharge rate of water resources, their ease of 
exploitation, their natural quality, and their 
vulnerability to pollution. In the early stages  
of aquifer development, groundwater is typically 
exploited sustainably by springs and individual 
wells, then later by increasingly sophisticated 
well fields. Without considerable information 
and strong institutions, this can lead to local 
or generalized overdraft, with declining water 
tables, pollution associated with salinization, 
mobilization of natural contaminants (e.g., 
Arsenic), and anthropogenic contamination,  
and even significant land subsidence. Aquifers 
are often exploited conjunctively with surface 
water to provide additional resources or to 
buffer the effects of drought on surface water 
supply. While groundwater resources act as 
a buffer to rainfall variability, droughts may 
raise the scale and cost of pumping, temporally 
exacerbating overdraft.
We can identify two primary contexts of 
aquifer development: aquifers where significant 
surface water is available and aquifers where 
society is dependent on groundwater for urban 
development and irrigated agriculture. 
Groundwater 
development with  
surface water available
The Guarani Aquifer System and the Eastern 
Gangetic Plain are both examples of major 
aquifers where there is significant surface 
water available. In both cases, there is limited 
groundwater dependency for irrigation, but 
significant opportunity if exploitation becomes 
economically or technically viable. There is, 
however, an important role for groundwater  
in urban and rural water supply to compensate 
for polluted or unreliable surface water 
resources. In most aquifers, there are local or 
wider problems of water quality due to one or 
more reasons, including insufficient wastewater 
treatment and solid waste disposal (mostly 
in developing economies) and agrochemical 
and industrial pollution (mostly in developed 
economies). There can be local overdraft 
problems beneath or close to urban areas,  
as a result of poorly controlled or uncontrolled 
development. With rising groundwater levels, 
there is also a risk of waterlogging and 
soil salinization. An innovative and largely 
unexploited opportunity is the medium- to 
large-scale use of artificial aquifer storage to 
augment storage in surface water reservoirs, 
achieving multiple water security objectives 
with relatively limited social and environmental 
impacts. 
A water secure future is likely to stem from 
investments in information for monitoring and 
modelling aquifer dynamics, and in institutions 
to ensure robust groundwater regulation, 
planning, and protection. Investments 
in infrastructure will include systematic 
groundwater development, with well fields  
for urban water supply, often in conjunctive  
use with surface water, and the development  
of multipurpose aquifer storage.
Conversely, a water insecure future is one by 
aggravated water quality deterioration and 
local overdraft due to unplanned distribution 
of wells, resulting in major aquifer restoration 
costs and even irreversible damage, and water 
logging and soil salinization, due to rising 
water levels caused by unplanned recharge 
(such as from leaking water and  
wastewater systems).
Groundwater 
development for  
cities and irrigation
The Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System,  
the Ogallala, Arizona, Gnangara, Ica Valley, 
North China Plain, Upper Guadiana, and Mexico 
Valley are all in locations with groundwater-
dependent development, typically either cities 
or irrigated agriculture in arid and semi-arid 
regions. In these settings, groundwater is the 
primary resource for all human settlement 
as well as for irrigation development, where 
it supports poverty alleviation (in low-
income economies) or high value agricultural 
production (in emerging and high-income 
economies). Unregulated groundwater 
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development and overdraft create water  
security challenges due to declining water 
levels, water quality deterioration and 
competition among users. Efforts to regulate 
groundwater depend on information on 
resource characteristics and use. Inconsistency 
between estimates of groundwater resources 
and authorized abstraction permits leads to 
overdraft. Groundwater development can be 
energy intensive, creating trade-offs between 
energy and water security. Subsidence, 
sometimes serious (Mexico City), can occur 
due to over-pumping and falling groundwater 
levels, which damages infrastructure and 
networks. Groundwater overdraft will also 
cause decline in baseflows to rivers, wetlands, 
and other groundwater-dependent ecosystems. 
While groundwater is resilient to climate, 
buffering variability, if poorly managed over 
time, the damage caused can be very difficult 
to repair or even irreversible, which would be 
extremely serious in these cases, where society 
is groundwater dependent.
A water secure future is likely to stem from 
participatory institutions with access to  
(i) advanced knowledge systems managing 
aquifers and groundwater abstraction with 
appropriate tools, including monitoring 
networks and systems models, quantity and 
quality regulation with flexible permits to 
enable reallocation and aquifer recovery, 
and (ii) innovative infrastructure, both in 
terms of wellfield design and aquifer storage 
and recovery, as well as in water supply and 
wastewater service delivery, where demand 
management and loss reduction will be 
essential strategies.
Conversely, a water insecure future is one 
with unregulated, unplanned, or over-
allocated groundwater abstraction resulting in 
declining water levels, (potentially irreversibly) 
deteriorating water quality, and land subsidence 
and associated infrastructure damage. The 
consequences of aquifer mismanagement, in 
terms of society-wide impacts, could be serious 
and pose major challenges for large cities and 
irrigation developments. 
International 
transboundary 
basins: rivers, 
lakes, and 
groundwater
In addition to the typologies above, we describe 
the incremental challenges introduced by the 
international transboundary nature of shared 
watercourses. The Aral Sea, Colorado, Great 
Lakes, Indus, Mekong, Nile, Niger, Rhine, and 
Senegal river basins - and the international 
transboundary aquifers of the Nubian Sandstone, 
Guarani, and Gangetic Plain - are shared by at 
least two countries (and 11 in the case of the 
Nile). In most of these cases, we can observe a 
key element of the pathway to water security, 
which is the investment in information and 
institutions represented by a defined platform for 
dialogue and shared information. In some cases, 
a formal agreement has established a basin 
institution with a shared knowledge base and 
established guidelines for some degree of joint 
decision-making and monitoring. In the case of 
the Senegal, high level of cooperation is seen in 
joint investment in multi-country, jointly-owned 
and managed infrastructure assets, including the 
Manantali and Diama dams. 
A water secure future is likely to stem from 
some level of cooperation in all international 
transboundary basins, to ensure robust basin 
management; this may be best served by 
information sharing alone, or together with 
coordinated action, or even with joint action 
(such as joint infrastructure development, as in 
the Senegal Basin). In all cases this requires an 
appropriate joint institutional mechanism. 
Conversely, a water insecure future is one 
where unilateral, uncoordinated water 
resources development by individual nations 
in international transboundary basins leads 
to suboptimal resource management and 
development, at best; or, at worst, resource over-
exploitation and degradation with potentially 
serious environmental, economic, and political 
consequences.
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Toward 
strategic 
and adaptive 
pathways
Our analysis of case studies has revealed cycles 
of adaptation in the quest for water security. 
Important decisions and actions have been 
triggered by seminal events. Pathways to 
water security have co-evolved with economic 
development and public expectations. On the 
one hand, there seems to be inevitability to this 
process of adaptation. On the other hand it is 
clear that there are genuine choices, which may 
lock in particular pathways of development. 
At each stage decision makers have had options 
at their disposal and have made choices with a 
view to reaching goals. The evidence available 
to inform decision-making is always uncertain. 
The methodologies of system analysis, decision 
analysis, and benefit-cost assessment, which 
are central to strategic choices about investment 
in water security, have matured in recent 
decades. They provide the opportunity to shift 
from reactive management of the impacts of 
water insecurity to the pro-active management  
of risks. 
Recognition of the importance of sequences of 
investments has stimulated interest in appraisal 
methodologies that deal with sequential 
decisions under uncertainty. These methods 
have their origins in the ‘decision trees’ of 
decision analysis.34 However, recognition of the 
severe uncertainties associated with climate 
change and other accelerating processes of 
global change has stimulated much greater 
emphasis on the role of uncertainty in long-
term decision-making, and in particular on 
the role of ‘severe’ or ‘deep’ uncertainties 
that are not amenable to quantification with 
probabilities,35 which is the conventional 
approach for incorporating uncertainty in 
decision analysis. Moreover, an emphasis on 
adaptive management has led to the uptake of 
34  Raiffa	(1968).
35 	Brown	et	al.	(2010);	Lempert	and	Groves	(2010).
methodologies for valuing the benefits  
of flexibility in the face of uncertainty,  
in particular real options theory.36  
These methods have now reached a level 
 of maturity that allows them to be routinely 
used to inform major investment planning 
decisions (e.g., in the Rhine delta). The extent 
of analysis always needs to be in proportion 
to the scale of the decision: small investments 
will not warrant the same scale of analysis as 
large investments. However, given the amount 
of investment that is required in water security, 
and the scale of future uncertainties, more 
widespread use of methodology for sequential 
decision-making under uncertainty is justified.
The theory of decision analysis stresses the 
importance of learning and adaptation when 
circumstances are changing and uncertainties 
are high. This has also been the main lesson 
from practice that has emerged from the case 
studies presented in this chapter and the 
broader range of cases reviewed as part of this 
study. Looking forward, we see the pathways 
to water security being informed by rigorous 
analysis of costs, benefits, impacts, and trade-
offs. But alongside that we emphasize the 
lessons from practice and the importance of 
adapting to particular contexts, which this 
chapter has sought to illustrate. 
Figure 47 depicts the principles of staged 
decision analysis under uncertainty. The 
fundamental structure of the analysis is a 
decision tree: a decision maker confronts 
a sequence of choices through time (which 
proceeds from left to right), and at each 
decision point (only two are shown in the 
figure) there is a set of alternatives at their 
disposal. The alternatives depicted in Figure 
47 are various combinations of investments in 
information, institutions and/or infrastructure 
as a means of managing water security. The top 
pathway shows the ‘baseline’ case in which no 
investments are made to add to the portfolio 
that the decision-maker has at the start of the 
pathway. For all other pathways, there will be 
investment costs, which need to be weighed 
against the benefits of investment in  
water security. 
36 	Haasnoot	et	al.	(2013);		Jeuland	and	Whittington		
	 (2014);	Zhang	and	Babovic	(2012).		
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The performance metric against which these 
management options are appraised is risk 
of water-related losses. The severity of risk 
is depicted in Figure 47 with red shading. 
Risk increases most markedly in the baseline 
pathway, because no additional steps are taken 
to manage the increase in risk, which may 
originate from any combination of increasing 
economic exposure, deteriorating infrastructure 
and climate change. The other pathways 
make a contribution to reducing risk, but the 
underlying drivers that increase risk are not 
removed, so sustained management of risk 
through both decision points is needed to  
keep risk to a manageable level. 
Figure 47 also shows the effects of uncertainty 
in decision-making. The scale of uncertainty 
is depicted as the width of the coloured bars. 
Uncertainties increase in future, and the 
uncertainty is greatest when no steps are taken 
to reduce risk (the upper, ‘baseline’ pathway). 
Taking active steps to manage water security 
can reduce uncertainty, as well as reducing risk, 
in particular by investing in information. 
Finally, Figure 47 illustrates some of the  
trade-offs and dynamics of risk, uncertainty, 
and investment, albeit in a stylized way.  
As we have already seen, the most appropriate 
combination of investments will depend upon 
context. The figure starts to demonstrate 
how decision makers can plan and analyze 
alternative pathways in the face of uncertainty. 
In practice, this will involve quantification 
of costs, benefits (in terms of risk reduction), 
and, as far as possible, uncertainties. Not all 
institutions are equipped to do this, but given 
the scale of investments and uncertainties on 
the pathway to water security, greater rigour  
in investment appraisal is needed. 
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Stylized sequential decision analysis	(Fig	47)
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5.1 Key findings 
Water insecurity acts as a drag on  
economic growth. The empirical and 
theoretical analysis in this report provides 
new evidence that economic growth is 
vulnerable to negative hydro-climatic 
effects, and confirms that the relationship  
is causal and statistically significant.
Our econometric analysis of countries across 
the world focused on climate factors, including 
temperature, precipitation, and runoff. 
While the direct consequences of hydrologic 
or temperature extremes are understood, 
it wasn’t known if these individual events 
can accumulate to affect economic growth 
in significant ways. The results find that 
the answer is ‘yes’. And, because these are 
exogenous variables - unaffected by policy 
decisions, wealth, or infrastructure - evidence 
of effects on economic growth can be attributed 
to the climatic factors with some confidence.
With regard to climate change in particular,  
it is notable that the effect of water and water-
related hazards on economic growth was shown 
to be at least as important - and likely more 
important - than the effect of temperature, 
in the historical times series used in the 
econometric analysis. This finding is significant 
because analyses of the potential economic 
costs of climate change have typically focused 
primarily on temperature rather than on water-
related impacts.
This report focuses on the economic impacts  
of water security, but social and environmental 
impacts also require vital attention.  
This is so because the impacts of bad water 
management decisions greatly affect the 
poor, women, and the environment. While the 
accuracy and reliability of economic growth 
statistics are sometimes questioned, the data 
and valuation techniques relating to social 
and environmental factors are even more 
problematic; we have therefore been limited 
by the evidence that is available to record 
changes in these factors. Furthermore, in a 
globalizing world, the impacts of water-related 
risks can be transmitted not only through the 
global economy, but also through species and 
habitat losses, social disruptions, population 
displacement, and disease. Developing 
methodologies adequate to measure and 
monitor these processes, is a priority.
Some countries are more vulnerable to water-
related risks than are others. A country’s 
hydrology, the structure of its economy, and its 
overall level of wealth (and associated level of 
institutional capacity and infrastructure stock), 
will all be key determinants of its vulnerability 
to water risks. The impact of hydro-climatic 
factors on economic growth is significantly 
higher in countries that are poor, have high 
water stress, and/or are highly dependent 
on agriculture. Countries with these profiles 
are seen largely in Africa and South Asia. 
Even in the most water-vulnerable countries, 
however, a blend of water-related and unrelated 
investments is needed to generate and sustain 
broad-based growth. This growth, in turn, 
enables the investment necessary to sustain 
water security.
Global econometric analysis confirms the 
impact of hydro-climatic variables on growth, 
but these impacts are very unevenly distributed 
across countries. We find that the poorest 
economies around the world tend to bear the 
greatest relative burden of water insecurity.  
At the same time, we find that many of 
the world’s most advanced and diversified 
economies are also subject to sizeable and 
growing water-related risks, although in large 
part, this is because they have increasingly 
valuable assets at risk from flooding. To better 
understand the nature and distribution of 
water-related risks, we examined the status  
of four ‘headline’ risks: 
Water scarcity
materializes because of imbalance between 
water use and water availability, and can be 
acute in some locations where demands are 
high, or hydrological variability is not buffered 
by storage. We found the risks of water scarcity 
to be most severe in South Asia, northern 
China, the Middle East, and arid parts of the 
United States and Africa (Figure 8 and Tables 4 
and 5, Chapter 3). Scarcity and hydro-climatic 
variability contribute to volatility in food  
crop production (Figures 11 and 12, Chapter 3),  
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which is particularly pronounced in Africa,  
but also notable in South America, Central 
Asia, and parts of Europe. Investments in water 
security can lower food prices, and significantly 
diminish food price volatility. The potential 
global welfare gains from securing water to 
existing irrigators, was estimated at US$94 
billion. This analysis does not capture the 
potentially significant benefits of additional 
investments in agricultural efficiency,  
or expansion in irrigated area, that might  
be fostered by greater water security.
Floods
are a major, and increasingly destructive, 
water-related hazard. The available evidence 
suggests expected global annual flood damages 
of US$120 billion per year from urban property 
damages alone. By the 2030s - in the absence of 
adaptation - the coastal flood risk is projected 
to increase by a factor of four. During the 
same period, the risk of fluvial flood could 
more than double. As with any global-scale 
analysis, this estimate is subject to considerable 
uncertainties, in particular related to the levels 
of flood protection that are not well known on a 
global scale. The economic risks from flooding 
are increasing in all locations worldwide,  
due to increasing economic vulnerability.  
The numbers of people threatened by flood are 
overwhelmingly concentrated in Asia (Figures 
22 to 24, Chapter 3), in particular in India 
and China; and Asia is set to overtake North 
America and Europe as having the greatest 
economic concentration of flood risk (Figure 25, 
Chapter 3).
Inadequate water supply  
and sanitation  
continues to have the greatest economic 
consequence of all water-related risks, and it 
remains the most harmful risk to people. WHO 
estimated that the total global economic losses 
associated with inadequate water supply and 
sanitation are US$260 billion annually (Figure 
31, Chapter 3), much of which reflects per capita 
estimates of the value of time spent fetching 
water, or walking to open defecation sites. 
While the largest numbers of people without 
access to sanitation are in India and China, 
the highest percentages of population without 
access are seen in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Figure 29, Chapter 3). Sub-Saharan Africa  
is the only region in which water supply  
and sanitation risks are growing (Figure 30, 
Chapter 3).
Water-related risks to  
the natural environment
arise from: pollution, over-abstraction, 
interruption of the natural variability of flow 
regimes, and interference in river, wetland, and 
coastal morphology. These risks are dispersed, 
but seen largely in Europe, the United States, 
India, and China (Figure 32, Chapter 3). Taking 
a water security perspective, estimates were 
made to determine the frequency of failures to 
meet benchmark estimates for environmental 
water requirements (Figure 33, Chapter 3). In 
every continent, there are rivers whose water 
use patterns put aquatic ecosystems at risk - 
indicating that water security is a global threat 
to environment. Monetization of environmental 
risks, and the ecosystem services that the 
aquatic environment renders, is a pressing 
challenge that we have not been able to address. 
Aggregating across the range of major water-
related risks (Figures 35 and 36, Chapter 3), 
regional challenges become apparent: 
South Asia
has the largest global concentration of water-
related risks, including severe impacts across 
the full range of hydrological variability 
(droughts to floods); the largest global 
concentration of people without adequate 
sanitation; and growing environmental threats. 
India, with its very large population, is the 
top-ranked country globally for the number 
of people exposed to water shortage; people 
at risk of flooding; people without adequate 
water supply and sanitation; and number of 
undernourished children.
East and Southeast Asia
have significant exposure to flood  
risks, and this risk is rapidly increasing.  
China and Vietnam have the second-  
and third-highest economic risks for flooding, 
globally (led only by India); with expected 
annual flood damages in Vietnam estimated 
at more than 10 percent of GDP per annum. 
Vulnerability to water scarcity varies markedly 
across the region, with northern China being 
particularly challenged.
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Sub-Saharan Africa
is estimated to suffer the greatest impacts 
of inadequate water supply and sanitation, 
measured as a proportion of GDP. Africa 
also exhibits the greatest variability in crop 
production, highlighting African economies’ 
sensitivity to hydro-climatic variability. This 
variability in food production, in turn, is 
reflected in high levels of child malnutrition. 
North Africa stands out in terms of both the 
absolute number of people, and the percentage 
the population, at risk of water scarcity.
Europe and North America
generally enjoy water security, with risks 
reduced to tolerable levels. Yet, the United 
States is estimated to have the world’s greatest 
economic exposure to flood risk, with expected 
annual property damage from fluvial and 
coastal flooding estimated at US$54 billion, 
or 0.3% of GDP per annum. And flood risks in 
both North America and Europe are anticipated 
to rise. Various environmental risks are also 
seen across these regions. Increased investment 
in water supply and wastewater treatment 
systems, agricultural water management, and 
water management institutions, will be needed 
to sustain current levels of water security.
South America
experiences significant variability in 
agricultural yields. However, thanks to its 
relatively high potential for productivity-
enhancing water-related investments, the 
region is expected to see the greatest percentage 
increase in global food production. South 
America is also shown, by our econometric 
analysis, to be a region that stands to reap some 
of the greatest benefits from drought reduction.
Taking a historical perspective, our analysis 
of pathways to water security highlights the 
fact that water security and its associated 
risks are dynamic. In each case, specific risks, 
opportunities, and prior investments influence 
the priorities for action, and the range of 
possibilities for achieving and sustaining water 
security. Moreover, water security is a ‘moving 
target’: reflecting growing economies and asset 
stocks; changing climates; and evolving social, 
cultural, and aesthetic priorities and values. As 
a consequence of this dynamism, all solutions 
are provisional. Successful strategies must 
therefore plan for uncertainty. Investments that 
incorporate options to deal with an uncertain 
future will be more likely to provide the greatest 
long-term returns.
The case studies underscore the importance  
of investing in portfolios of sequenced projects 
that combine institutions (agencies, rules, 
and incentives), information systems (hydro-
meteorological, economic, and social), and 
infrastructure (natural and constructed) 
in the management of water resources and 
water-related risks. These generally mutually 
reinforcing investments must be combined, 
sequenced, and sustained in order to achieve 
their full benefits. The pace and direction of 
these development pathways are often driven 
by triggers (e.g., crises, chronic pressures) and 
by political champions. Careful consideration 
of the concept of alternative pathways is 
important for planning, because there is a great 
deal of path-dependency in water resource 
development: past investments decisions will 
affect the feasibility, costs, and benefits of 
future options.
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5.2 Key gaps 
This report does not provide a wholly 
monetized value for global water security. 
The range and nature of water-related 
risks do not lend themselves to consistent 
valuation, and some cannot be monetized 
with available data and methods - making 
an aggregate value indefensible. Taking the 
economic risks of water security that can be 
monetized as a lower bound, however, the 
scale of the challenge exceeds hundreds of 
billions of dollars annually.
Even if precise calculations could be made, it 
would not be prudent - nor be possible - to 
design investment programmes to fully mitigate 
these global risks. It is never possible, or 
economically desirable, to reduce risk to zero. 
The marginal cost of risk reduction increases, 
and a point is reached when further investment 
to reduce risk cannot be justified. For the 
purposes of investment planning, targeted 
responses need to be crafted by assembling 
specific strategies (or pathways) for specific 
places; and, by carefully assessing the economic 
desirability of specific investments.
No matter how large the global economic risks 
associated with water security might be, not all 
investments in water security will be beneficial. 
As this report shows, achieving water security 
requires a continuous process of sound 
decision-making, founded on a basis of careful 
analysis at the local scale. There is no substitute 
for thorough appraisal of specific investments 
and investment pathways.
The ‘upside’ economic opportunities associated 
with water security are not always presented 
in this report. Our primary focus is water-
related risks, and their negative impacts upon 
growth. Risk calculations focus on estimated 
losses of existing assets, or expected losses 
of current production. We also note, however, 
that investments in water security can create 
opportunities and incentives for enhanced 
productivity, and for additional growth-
generating investments in agriculture, 
hydropower, services, industry, and navigation.
There are clear limitations to attempts at 
summarizing water security benefits and costs 
at global scales. We are coming to understand 
the scale of water-related risk and its impacts 
on economies. However, operating at a broad 
scale has limited our capacity to understand 
and quantify the mechanisms of inter-relation 
between water security and the economy. 
The implications of changing hydrological 
variability are still very poorly understood. 
There is rapidly increasing capability for 
modelling runoff, water resources, and extreme 
events, on a global scale - yet at the same time, 
there has been disinvestment in observation 
systems that are essential for validation of 
simulations, and the provision of evidence for 
risk managers on-the-ground. 
Understanding the evolution of risk also 
means tracking and predicting processes of 
demographic, economic, social, institutional, 
and environmental change. The global socio-
economic datasets that we have made use of are 
an exciting advance, but to date they provide a 
limited picture of vulnerability and exposure - 
often at a coarse resolution. 
Records of the impacts of risks rely heavily 
on reported events, providing an incomplete 
picture. Scarcest of all are the data needed to 
quantify the effectiveness of investments for 
reducing risk. These data are essential to build 
a robust business case for investment in water 
security.
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5.3 Toward a more  
water-secure future 
The profile of water security risks will 
change in the future, as countries invest and 
adapt. The headline risks examined in this 
report all show increasing trends globally 
- with the important exception of water 
supply and sanitation.
Worldwide economic losses from poor water 
supply and sanitation are falling as a result  
of strong gains in all regions other than  
Sub-Saharan Africa; but aging infrastructure in 
many developed countries, and rapidly growing 
urban centres in developing countries, require 
continuous investment in order to sustain 
current levels of service - and hence, similar 
levels of water security. In addition, we found 
that the hydro-climatic effects on growth are 
stronger in countries with high water stress, 
and that water stress will grow with population. 
By 2050, the OECD’s baseline projections 
indicate that 3.9 billion people will be subject  
to severe water stress.
The impact on economic growth, however, does 
not need to increase. A portfolio of policies and 
investments in water security can dampen the 
growth impacts of water risks. We have learned 
from the case studies that pathways to water 
security combine sustained investments in 
institutions (e.g., basin organizations, zoning, 
watershed protection, and expert know-how); 
associated legal and economic instruments (e.g., 
water allocation and property rights, regulation, 
water pricing and trading, insurance, and 
food trade); investments in infrastructure 
(e.g., in storage, transfers, groundwater wells, 
dikes, treated water supplies, and wastewater 
treatment); and the information collection, 
analysis and transfer that support them (e.g., 
monitoring, forecasting and warning systems, 
agricultural outreach, modelling and decision 
support systems). In the face of scarcity, the 
most cost-effective responses are likely to make 
use of available water through conservation; 
efficiency enhancing technologies; irrigation; 
drought management; and natural and 
man-made water storage, including 
aquifer storage and recharge. Promoting a 
transition to less agriculturally dependent 
economies - for example, through public and 
private investments that result in economic 
diversification - will reduce vulnerability to  
the vagaries of water availability.
Investment in water security can help safeguard 
growth against increasing water-related risks. 
There will be many investment pathways to 
water security, but it is likely that successful 
pathways will share certain characteristics. 
They should be devised and assessed in terms 
of outcomes and trade-offs among economic, 
environmental, and social criteria. Investments 
in physical infrastructure will need to be 
accompanied by sound water management 
institutions, integrated into wider governance 
frameworks and improved information systems. 
As economies mature, emphasis will shift 
to making the most of existing assets, and 
deploying innovative institutions and policy 
instruments. Investments should be developed 
to be robust to uncertainties, and to support 
adaptive management as risks, opportunities, 
and social preferences change. And always: 
investments should be tailored to their social 
and environmental context. All of this will 
require refined analytic tools, more holistic 
perspectives, innovation, and continuous 
monitoring, assessment, and adaptation.

